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This paper examines the influence of different types of political connections and political uncertainty on earnings credibility in Pakistan. Based on discernible differences, connected firms are grouped into civil connected and military connected firms.

The authors provide evidence concerning the earnings credibility incentives of groups of political connected firms and report that their incentives are significantly different. The findings remain robust to alternate methods of earnings credibility.

The findings evidence that civil (military) connected firms report less (more) credible earnings than the control group. High political uncertainty reduces the credibility of earnings. Results for the interaction of political connections and political uncertainty variables are not significant.

The paper investigates just one aspect of Pakistan's political economy, i.e. credibility of earnings; thus, it requires to be cautious on part of readers and policymakers. To reach a clearer conclusion, earnings credibility should be ex amined in the larger context, i.e. in conjunction with rent extractions, etc. A possible extension of the paper can be to investigate the channels of rent extractions used by the two types of connected firms.

The paper has contribution for policymakers as well as users of general purpose financial reports. The findings indicate that the users of general purpose financial reports should be more careful in the use of financial information during political uncertain periods and also of politically connected firms. Furthermore, policymakers should keep the larger context at the forefront while attempting to strengthen the enforcemnet regime.

This paper adds to extant political connections literature by identifying two types of politically connected firms and report that both groups have divergent financial reporting incentives. Furthermore, political uncertainty reduces the credibility of earnings.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the deleveraging impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on private firms with political connections, relative to those without political connections.

In this paper, taking the anti-corruption campaign employed from the end of 2012 as an exogenous shock, the authors design a quasi-experiment difference-in-difference approach to examine how the loss and failure of political connections impacts private firms’ debt financing.

The authors find that the loss and failure of political connections following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress causes the yearly new debt ratios of treatment firms with political connections to decrease, relative to those of control firms without political connections. This outcome is more pronounced for provinces with more cadres excluded in the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, which rendered politically connected firms susceptible to lose connections with central or provincial cadres. To explore the mechanism, the authors find that following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, politically connected firms limit rent-seeking activities, whereas resource acquisition is weakened. The authors also find that the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on the debt financing of politically connected firms, relative to their counterparts, is more pronounced for groups with high levels of information asymmetry and for less explicit guarantee groups. Finally, politically connected firms are more likely to be dominated by internal funds in dealing with a loss of advantages in debt financing, compared with their counterparts without political connections.

The findings in this study suggest that the loss or failure of previous political connections following Xi’s anti-corruption campaign make politically connected firms lose the advantages in debt financing through the rent-seeking, resource acquisition, information asymmetry, implicit guarantee channels, which provide new evidence for research on the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on private firms’ financing behaviors via the loss or failure of existing political connections.

The findings in the study will have some inspiration for policy makers and entrepreneur.

This study provides new evidence on the different impacts of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on private firm’s debt financing between politically connected and unconnected firms.

The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs.

Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management.

The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms.

This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies.

Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards.

The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs

The purpose of this paper is to develop a capped barrier option framework to consider the politically preferential treatment for bank loans incentivized by government capital injections and calculate loan-risk sensitive insurance premiums.

This paper takes a capped barrier option approach to the market valuation of the equity of the bank and the liability of the deposit insurer. The cap demonstrates the dynamics of a politically connected borrowing firm’s asset and highlights the truncated nature of loan payoffs. The barrier addresses that default can occur at any time before the maturity date. The bank participating in a government capital injection program is required to fund the politically connected firm that has preferential access to financing.

Political connection as such makes the bank more prone to risk taking at a reduced interest margin, produces greater safety for the bank owing to government capital injections, and leads to increasing the fair deposit insurance premium. The positive effect of political connection on the deposit insurance premium, which ignores the cap and the barrier yields significant over-estimation.

The study on the politically connected borrowing firm shows that political connection is likely to affect the distressed bank’s performance, yielding the political-connection cost of a reduced bank interest margin and the political-connection benefit of a reduced bank equity risk, contributing the literature on political connection and bank bailout.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of political connections surrounding an exogenous Supreme Court decision (Citizens United) that lifted long-standing restrictions on corporate political contributions.

This study examines key characteristics of politically connected firms compared to non-politically connected firms, including their market reaction to Citizens United, as well as cash holdings levels and governance characteristics before vs after the landmark decision.

The results indicate a significant negative market reaction to politically connected firms surrounding the announcement of Citizens United. Additionally, there is a significant increase in the cash holdings of politically connected firms relative to before the event and relative to non-politically connected firms. For politically connected firms, this result is exacerbated by poor corporate governance quality. Collectively, these findings are consistent with a positive association between agency costs and political connections.

This study provides novel evidence by exploiting an exogenous enhancement in the implications of political connections that accompanied the Citizens United decision. The use of this quasi-natural experiment offers an ideal research setting to extract fresh insights into the effects of corporate political connections.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the earnings quality of politically connected firms is affected by changes in political stability and government effectiveness in a developing country.

This study uses a sample of 2,073 firm-year observations from 349 firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2012 to examine how political stability and government effectiveness affect the earnings quality of politically connected firms, relative to non-politically connected firms. A two-stage model is used to address self-selection issues in the choice of firms to establish political connections.

This study finds that increased government effectiveness reduces the benefits of political connections, requiring politically connected firms to be more responsive to market pressures and resulting in higher earnings quality. However, increased political stability enhances the certainty of benefits from political connections, reducing the need for politically connected firms to respond to market pressures and resulting in lower earnings quality.

For policymakers, these results indicate that different dimensions of political and economic development can affect the incentives of firms with political connections in different ways.

This study finds that the earnings quality of politically connected firms increases as government effectiveness improves, but it decreases as the political environment becomes more stable.

This paper investigates the market responses towards four types of politically connected (PCON) firms during two political events – general election and change of leader in Malaysia.

The authors capture the market response using cumulative abnormal return and further test it using regression analysis. The authors use a sample of 376 politically connected (PCON) and non-politically connected (non-PCON) firms from 2002 to 2013.

The market reacted negatively towards government-linked companies (GLC) during both events, showing that GLCs are negatively perceived by the market during political instability. On the other hand, the reaction of the market towards firms connected by businessmen does not differ from other firms. When compared to the findings of past literature, it shows the decreasing influence that businessmen have over the government leader. In further analysis, this study finds firms that are connected to the incoming government leader recorded a higher CAR as compared to firms connected to the outgoing government leader.

The authors’ study offers several practical implications. Knowing how the market responds to the different types of political connections might prove beneficial to investors. With this information, investors can recognize stocks with potential returns before the event date and may consider buying or selling them to capture a short-term profit. The authors’ findings may also have important implications for the management of PCON firms in terms of implementing an effective risk management and asset allocation plan to safeguard their value during political events that may disrupt the stability of their firms.

This paper provides an insight on how the markets have a different perception towards different types of politically connected firms during short-run political events. Past studies usually categorize political connection into a single category. With this separation, the authors are able to see how their individual CAR differs from other types of PCON.

An important question is whether lenders perceive politically connected firms as having less or higher default risk, and thus provide them with more or less preferential loan terms compared with non-connected firms. This paper aims to examine the relationship between political connections of corporate board members and cost of debt and loan contracting in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

The initial sample comprises 288 GCC firm-year observations from 227 publicly listed firms in Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates for the period from 2011 to 2015. It includes all the GCC publicly listed firms, excluding those in the financial, insurance and banking sectors because these entities are subject to different regulations. The ordinary least squares, logit regression and other sensitivity tests have been used to analyse the data and enhance reliability of the results.

This study finds that politically connected firms, particularly those connected through ruling royal family members, are associated with lower cost of debt, greater amounts of loans and longer-term government loans. Therefore, these findings support the prediction that political connections benefit GCC firms in the form of access to favourable terms from both government and commercial banks.

This study contributes to the extant literature by providing insightful analysis using unique political features of the GCC, integrated with agency and resource dependency theories. In particular, this study fills the gap in understanding the nature of loan contracting offered by government and commercial banks in the presence of politically connected boards within GCC setting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine and explain the complex interrelationships which influence the performance of politically connected firms to create value for their providers of finance and other stakeholders. In doing so, it examines the interrelationships between efficiency and delivering on corporate performance of a firm with political ties.

The authors gathered the literature from the Scopus website. They reviewed the literature of 58 manuscripts about the efficiency and performance of politically connected firms.

The research finds that the better quality of efficiency of politically connected firms is positively related to the corporate performance of politically connected firms. The authors’ theoretical findings corroborate the political theory, agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory and stewardship theory. These theories prove that political connections have an impact on firm performance as a politician reinforces the efficacy. To better understand the effect of political connections on solid performance due to efficiency, this study classifies various efficiencies and links them with political ties.

Several avenues of research are suggested to examine further the interrelationships identified.

The authors’ conceptual findings are valuable for institutional investors, policymakers and stakeholders. To sum up, all theoretical shreds of evidence prove that politically connected firms can enhance performance via efficiency.

The paper conceptualizes the efficiency and performance interrelationships of politically connected firms. The extant literature comparison allows an assessment of the extent to which different efficiency contexts lead to differences in performance.

The purpose of this paper is to comprehensively investigate the combined influence of a firm's political connection and diversification on corporate performance, and to explore whether firm's political connection has an impact on the diversification effect, and whether this diversification effect would promote its performance significantly or not.

The research used a regression model to explore the correlation among political connection, diversification strategy, and corporate performance. The research subjects are the private enterprises listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China for the period 2002‐2005.

The study found that: first, for those firms without political connections, the relationship between diversification strategy and corporate performance displayed an “inverted U” curve; for firms with political connection, the relationship was a “reverse L”. Second, firms with political connections are more likely to implement a diversification strategy, especially unrelated diversification. Third, when implementing an internationalization strategy, private enterprises with political connections are more likely to expand through unrelated diversification strategy. Fourth, the diversification of the enterprises with political connection are more likely to promote the short‐term accounting performance than those without political connection, but the unrelated diversification of politically connected enterprises would have a negative impact upon its future performance, that is to damage the company's market value.

The paper expands the literature on the relationship between diversification and firm performance. It contributes to the research about the influence of political connection upon corporate performance.