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Citizens are demanding better performance from governments and they are increasingly aware of the costs of poor management and corruption. In view of scarce resources and the major transformations already underway in the global economy, identification and awareness of good governance and preventing corrupt practices have become key to ensuring structural reforms and critical investments necessary for encouraging, sustaining, and enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, social, and environmental structures.

Most Americans are keenly aware of the costs political corruption extracts on system support, fiscal policies and economic development, and ultimately, government effectiveness. Among a list of 10 challenges facing the nation, the public ranks political corruption as the nation's biggest crisis Samussen (2019). Importantly, this issue cuts across partisan and demographic lines. Members of both political parties and independents consistently cite political corruption as a serious problem facing the country.

However, there is a specific kind of political corruption that is disturbing for the health of American democracy – the corruption of Congress. Most Americans appear to have little faith in lawmakers to do the right thing. Majorities believe that Congress is out of touch with average Americans, focused on the needs of special interests, and is corrupt. To be sure, political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, and social structures. This chapter considers the problem of congressional corruption including what forms it takes, where it arises, what anti-corruption reforms are needed, and what these findings mean for the future of American democracy. More specifically, this chapter will permit us to examine if and how perceptions of congressional corruption influence citizens' interactions with government and provide a better understanding of citizens' policy preferences for regulating political corruption.

The presence of political corruption possibly predates the historical record. For years, it was viewed as an artifact of political development, a common malignancy that nations would naturally reject as a function of their respective national maturations; this was one of the underlying theses of the American progressive movement. However, this cleansing has been neither as straightforward nor as natural as its proponents would argue. An anti-corruption coalition established in the 1990 under the umbrella of Transparency International (TI) has brought a new light on the world of political corruption. TI annually publishes a Corruption Perception Index that in 2001 ranked over 90 nations in terms of their perceived political corruptions. Peter Eigen, the TI Chairman, observed that “There is no end in sight to the misuse of power by those in public office – and corruption levels are perceived to be as high as ever in both the developed and developing nations” (Transparency International Press Release, 2001).¹

This paper aims to investigate the impact of political stability on corruption by drawing upon a sample encompassing both developed and developing European and Asian countries.

The dataset, sourced from the Refinitiv database, spans from July 2014 to May 2022. Panel data techniques, specifically pooled estimation and dynamic panel data [generalized method of moments (GMM)] are employed. The analysis encompasses both fixed and random effects models to capture country-specific cross-sectional effects. To validate our findings, we perform a robustness test by including in the investigation four control variables, namely poverty, type of governance, economic freedom and inflation. To test heterogeneity, the dataset is further divided into two distinct subsamples based on the countries’ locations.

Empirical findings substantiate that political stability (viewed as the risk of government destabilization) has a positive and significant impact on corruption in all analyzed samples of European and Asian countries, though some differences are observed in various subsamples. When we take into account the control variables, these analysis results are robust.

This research provided a panel data analysis with GMM, while other empirical methodologies could also be used, like the difference-in-difference approach. However, our results should be validated by extending the time and the sample to a worldwide sample and using alternative measures of corruption and political stability. Moreover, our focus was on a linear and unidirectional relationship between the considered variables, but it would be interesting to test in our further research a non-linear and bidirectional correlation between them. Furthermore, we have introduced in the robustness test only four economic variables, but to consolidate our findings, we plan to include socioeconomic and demographic variables in future studies.

These outcomes imply that authorities should be aware of the necessity of implementing anti-corruption policies designed to establish effective agencies and enforcement structures for combating systemic corruption, to improve the political environment and the quality of institutions and to apply coherent economic strategies to accelerate economic growth because higher political stability and sustainable development determine a decrease in levels of corruption.

At the microeconomic level, the survival of organizations may be in danger from new types of corruption and money laundering. Therefore, in order to prevent financial harm, the top businesses worldwide should respond to instances of corruption through strengthened supervisory procedures. This calls for the creation of a mechanism inside the code of conduct where correct reporting of suspected situations of corruption would have a prompt procedure to be notified of. To avoid corruption in operational procedures, national plans and policies should be developed by government officials, executives and legislators on a national level, as well as by senior management and the board of directors on an organizational level. This might lower organizations' extra corruption-related expenses, assure economic growth and improve global welfare.

A novel feature of our research resides in its broad examination of a sizable sample of European and Asian countries regarding the nexus between corruption and political stability. The paper also investigates a less explored topic in economic literature, namely the impact of political stability on corruption. Furthermore, the study depicts policy recommendations, outlining effective and reasonable measures aimed at improving the political landscape and combating corruption.

This study aims to examine the significance of public/political corruption; trade tax revenue (import and export) on tax evasion in a group of 140 countries for the period 2008–2017. Sampled countries were subsequently grouped into four clusters for further testing. With the increase in globalization and technology, there is a potential of increased tax corruption on trade tariffs revenue activities.

The empirical testing was carried out using the technical and more advanced dynamic two-step system-generalized moment method. The econometrical method solves the problem of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity on cross-sectional data. This study used the data from World Bank, Transparency International, World Economic Forum and Kaufmann’s governance indicators.

There is statistical interaction between the corruption perception index (CPI) and international trade activities. Moreover, other results revealed that CPI and trade tax revenue activities are statistically insignificant to tax evasion in three groups; low corrupt countries, high corrupt and trade surplus countries although the coefficient signs remain consistent. This can be attributed by a low level of corruption in the low corrupt countries or concealment of corruption-related information in high corrupt countries and the low level of import evasion in trade surplus countries.

Based on the theory and results, public and political officials should promote good corporate governance by strictly monitoring trade revenue activities because parties involved can use technical criminality to conceal illegal behavior. Additionally, all jurisdictions should apply the economic theory of crime, especially in high political corrupt countries and perennial trade deficit countries because key macroeconomic tax revenue activities such as imports invite numerous forms of dishonesty.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between tax evasion, political/public corruption and increased taxation in Zimbabwe’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

The study as a descriptive survey used questionnaires and interviews as research instruments for collecting data.

The findings revealed that most SMEs are no longer paying some form of taxes as expected since the Government of Zimbabwe through the Ministry of Finance and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced the 2% tax levy on all bank electronic transactions greater than US$10 from October 2018.

The paper recommends that the government should create an independent anti-corruption committee with strong monitoring and regulatory mechanism so as to fight political/public corruption; hence, creating a paradigm of trust and confidence among different economic players. Lastly, the tax authorities should engage all the key economic players when crafting the country’s tax laws/rates so as to promote a sense of equity, equality and economic transparency among citizens.

This paper aims to analyze thoroughly all of the sources of research used to develop the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) low-risk rating, a rating attained by Norway according to the Basel Institute of Governance, and determine the reasons why Norway is one of only two countries in the world according to the 2012 report, with the other being Estonia, to gain an overall low-risk ML and TF rating.

The differences between the USA and Norway which has obtained a low-risk ranking, were compared and contrasted.

Beginning with the Basel Institute Rating index as a legitimate source for use in assessing anti-money-laundering (AML)/TF risk, and the amount of documentation used in the index’s methodology, it has been proven that the low-risk rating Norway has received is well deserved, and that the US rating of medium risk is also deserved for the time the report was published. Achieving a low-risk rating is not as ambiguous as recently thought and neither is its application on a global scale.

The paper identifies practical areas of improvement and concerns in addressing the overall issue of ML and terrorist financing.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causes of police corruption in Taiwan and identify those factors which can enhance the status of police.

A literature review and eight in-depth interviews of informants are employed to support the arguments of environment, education, governance and culture and to formulate a typology of police corruption in Taiwan.

The literature review and eight interviews confirm that individual cases of police corruption have replaced systemic police corruption in Taiwan. The author concludes that police corruption should be addressed in the context of both environment and institutional design. Even though the public perceptions of police integrity in Taiwan have been trending positively over the years, the individual cases of police corruption which occur within certain precincts indicate the continued importance of initiating institutional reforms. The public perceptions of Taiwan’s police force will be further improved if police corruption can be minimized and properly controlled.

This paper can serve as a benchmark to evaluate future development of Taiwan police corruption.

This paper provides an analysis of the causes of police corruption in Taiwan and the measures taken to curb it.

Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across African countries? Why are some countries more effective at battling corruption than others? To assess these concerns this paper aims to examine the determinants of corruption control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption using panel data from 46 African countries for the period 2002‐2010.

The panel quantile regression technique enables us to investigate if the relationship between corruption control and the exogenous variables differs throughout the distribution of the fight against corruption.

Results could be summarized in the following. Greater economic prosperity leads to less corruption control and the magnitude of the effect is more important in countries where the fight against corruption is high. Regulation quality seems bimodal, with less positive effects in the tails: among the best and least fighters of corruption. There is support for a less negative consequence of population growth in countries that are already taking the fight against corruption seriously in comparison to those that are lax on the issue. Findings on democracy broadly indicate the democratization process increases the fight against corruption with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already taking the fight seriously. The relevance of voice and accountability in the battle against corruption decreases as corruption control is taken more seriously by the powers that be. Good governance dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law gain more importance in the fight against corruption when existing levels of corruption control are already high.

The results of this study suggest that the determinants of corruption control respond differently across the corruption‐control distribution. This implies some current corruption‐control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt African nations. As a policy implication, the fight against corruption should not be postponed; doing so will only reduce the effectiveness of policies in the future. The rewards of institutional reforms are more positive in countries that are already seriously engaged in the corruption fight.

This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of corruption by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (control of corruption). It is likely that good and poor corruption fighters respond differently to factors that influence the fight against corruption. There are subtle institutional differences between corrupt and clean nations that may affect corruption‐control determinants and government efficacy in the fight against corruption.

Rule of law is essential in reducing corruption in a country. This study aims to investigate the factors contributing to corruption in 41 of the most competitive countries in the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on judicial effectiveness, property rights and government integrity. The moderating role of regulatory quality was also considered in the attempt to explain the association among rule of law and corruption.

This study used pooled ordinary least squares regression and generalized method of moments-dynamic panel for the robustness test on data of 41 Asia-Pacific countries spanning from 2013 to 2021.

Property rights and government integrity were found to be negatively significant in explaining corruption. In contrast, the interaction between rule of law and regulatory quality had a significant positive association with corruption. The findings bring to light Asia-Pacific countries’ need for more effective control of corruption.

The authorities should work towards enhancing the countries’ image as corruption-free nations by creating a stable economic and political environment and preserving macroeconomic stability through strengthened rule of law.

Previous research looked at The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and South Asian countries, but little attention was given to Asia-Pacific countries in examining the relationship between rule of law and corruption.