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This study explores the mediating effects of relationship marketing orientation (RMO) and service quality orientation (SQO) on market orientation, selling orientation, and policyholder retention in non-life insurance services. Additionally, it offers important recommendations for non-life insurers in Taiwan for policy development and improving policyholder retention.

Data were collected from a sample of policyholders belonging to the top five non-life insurance companies in Taiwan. The data were then analyzed with structural equation modeling.

RMO and SQO mediate the effects of the salesperson’s market orientation on policyholder retention. Thus, RMO and SQO are key factors influencing policyholder retention. Consequently, high levels of market orientation should be maintained to increase RMO and SQO, strengthening the retention rate of non-life insurance policyholders.

The main limitation of this study is its cross-sectional nature. In the future, researchers should collect data from other countries and service industries (e.g. banks, securities, and other financial institutions), expand to different insurance contexts (e.g. life insurance), and conduct longitudinal studies or experimental research.

The results of this study can act as a guide for providers of non-life insurance services. Based on the research results, we recommend decision-makers pay increased attention to increasing policyholder retention rates by strengthening their firm’s RMO and SQO.

Few studies have investigated the relationships among market orientation, selling orientation, RMO, SQO, and policyholder retention in non-life insurance services within Asian contexts in general and specifically in Taiwan. Thus, this study’s theoretical contributions, managerial implications (especially for decision-makers), and the proposed future research directions represent timely and valuable additions to the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to show how an insurance company can maximize the policyholder’s utility by setting the level of the interest rate guarantee in line with his preferences.

The authors develop a general model of life insurance, taking stochastic interest rates, early default and regular premium payments into account. Furthermore, the authors assume that equity holders must receive risk-adequate returns on their initial equity contribution and that the insurance company has to maintain a solvency restriction.

The findings show that the optimal level for the interest rate guarantee is in general far below the maximum value typically set by the supervisory authorities and insurance companies.

The authors conclude that the approach of deviating from the maximum interest rate guarantee level given by the regulatory requirements can create additional value for the rational policyholder. In contrast to Schmeiser and Wagner (2014), the second finding shows that the interest rate guarantee embedded in a life insurance product becomes less attractive compared to a pure investment in the underlying asset portfolio to the policyholder when the guarantee level is lowered too far or the contract duration is short. They also refute Schmeiser and Wagner (2014) by showing that the equity capital required by the insurance company increases with the level of the guarantee, even if the insurer is flexible with respect to its asset allocation. The last finding is that a policyholder with higher risk aversion does not generally prefer a higher guarantee level.

Definitions of pooling effects in insurance companies may convey the impression that the achieved risk reduction effect will be beneficial for policyholders, since typically lower premiums are paid for the same safety level with an increasing number of insureds, or a higher safety level is achieved for a given premium level for all pool members. However, this view is misleading and the purpose of this paper is to reexamine this apparent merit of pooling from the policyholder's perspective.

This is achieved by comparing several valuation approaches for the policyholders' claims using different assumptions of the individual policyholder's ability to replicate the contract's cash flows and claims.

The paper shows that the two considered definitions of risk pooling do not offer insight into the question of whether pooling is actually beneficial for policyholders.

The paper contributes to the literature by extending and combining previous work, focusing on the merits of pooling claims (using the two definitions above) from the policyholder's perspective using different valuation approaches.

The purpose of this paper paper is to study effective measures in dealing with the phenomenon of insurance claims’ fraud. In fact, fraud is one of the major industry concerns. It occurs in all classes of insurance and accounts for a substantial portion of indemnity payments each year.

This paper develops a model framework based on a costly state verification setting in which – while policyholders observe the amount of loss privately – the insurance company can decide to audit incoming claims at some cost. The aim is to derive optimal auditing strategies from the insurance company’s perspective while maintaining contract attractiveness to policyholders willing to adhere to the insurance relationship. The possibility for each stakeholder to adapt its behavioral strategy over the course of several periods is taken into account. Using a numerical approach based on Monte Carlo simulations, the impact of different parameterizations on the optimal auditing range by means of a sensitivity analysis is illustrated and analyzed.

The central outcome of the model is an auditing range which selects those claims which should be subject to verification.

This paper comes to the conclusion that, given some constant cost per audit, it is optimal to verify the accuracy of claims from the mid-value segment. Furthermore, it can be shown that while the option to adapt one’s strategy might be favorable from the insurance company perspective, it has a negative impact on the policyholders’ position. This disproves the common belief that adapting the defrauding strategy with the help of signals from service providers would be advantageous.

This paper extends the stand of literature on costly state verification and gives indications for optimal auditing strategies in industry practice.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the insurance market in which moral hazard and insurance fraud coexist. In this situation, this research examines the relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud. Also, this research shows how the amount of policyholder's effort to lower accident probability changes when insurance firm increases their investment in preventing insurance fraud.

Using a theoretical model containing five‐stages, the author sheds light on how the possibility of insurance fraud affects the amount of policyholder's effort.

The main results of this research are as follows. First, the amount of policyholder's effort is a weakly monotone decreasing function of the insurance firm's investment in preventing insurance fraud. Second, unlike in previous moral hazard models, the policyholder chooses a strictly positive amount of effort even in the full insurance case because the possibility of insurance fraud gives an incentive to realize policyholder's effort. Third, the amount of insurance firm's investment in preventing insurance fraud depends on whether it wants to give an additional incentive to policyholder's effort in exchange for realizing the possibility of insurance fraud.

This is the first paper to investigate the relationship between moral hazard and insurance fraud by using the microeconomic theory.

This paper aims to theoretically examine the effects of regulatory policyholder protection on spread behavior and default probability of a life insurance company.

The authors construct a contingent claim model for the valuation of the equity of a life insurance company. Then, they extend it to model default risk measures associated with a more appropriate behavioral mode of strategic invested asset rate-setting under regulation.

The findings established that the optimal insurer interest margin is explicitly modeled by a spread between the loan rate and the required guaranteed rate of the company. The effect of the guaranteed rate on the insurer interest margin is positive when the barrier is low, whereas it is negative when the barrier is high. As the barrier increases, the positive effect of the guaranteed rate on the default risk is increased, the negative effect of the participation on the insurer interest margin is decreased and the positive effect of the participation on the default risk is decreased.

Several results derived that should be of interest to investors, analysts, supervising agencies and policymakers. For example, policyholders protected by increasing the guaranteed rate may create a higher risk for the life insurance company to meet its obligations.

The authors’ approach is a significant departure from the existing literature; they differentiate among path-dependent, barrier options and suggest that the life insurance company’s defaults are more commonly triggered by regulatory responses than debt default.

The purpose of this paper is to review research on lapse in life insurance and to outline potential new areas of research in this field.

The authors consider theoretical lapse rate models as well as empirical research on life insurance lapse and provide a classification of these two streams of research. More than 50 theoretical and empirical papers from this important field of research are reviewed. Challenges for lapse rate modeling, lapse risk mitigation techniques, and possible trends in future lapse behavior are discussed.

Lapse rate modeling has been a very active field of research in the last years, as evidenced by the 44 papers on lapse modeling considered in this review. Moreover, a fair amount of empirical work (another 12 papers) has been done, especially on the issue of how environmental variables affect lapse. Research on individual policyholder and contract information is more scarce, since such information is typically treated as confidential.

The risks arising from lapse are of high economic importance. Lapsation is thus of interest not only to academics, but is highly relevant for the industry, regulators, and policymakers, especially in regard to designing an appropriate regulatory environment. Lapsation also impacts many actuarial tasks, such as product design, pricing, hedging, and risk management. A review of the recent literature might be helpful for these tasks.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first structured review of the increasingly important literature on life insurance lapsation. Next to the structured review of the existing models and the empirical evidence, the paper also contributes to the literature by discussing challenges for lapse rate modeling and possible trends.

Mutual insurance companies will have to reform their corporate governance practices if they want to avoid new and excessive government regulation. Steps they can take include: changes in board structure and composition, the addition of several committees, more open communication with policyholders, and greater involvement of the board in setting strategy.

This paper examines the relationship between behavioral biases, and demand decisions for life insurance products in Uganda.

Data were collected from 351 life insurance policyholders in Uganda. The authors used a cross-sectional survey by applying a structured questionnaire. Descriptive analysis was conducted and hypothesized relationships between the constructs were evaluated through the use of structural equation modeling.

Results indicate that, behavioral biases are significant predictors of life insurance demand among Ugandan policyholders. Also, the two behavioral bias variables (heuristic bias and prospect bias) are significant predictors of demand decisions for life insurance products.

These results are helpful for both insurers and regulators. For insurers, it is now evident that demand decisions for life insurance products are not fully rational. It is imperative for insurers to simplify life insurance product information (heuristics), integrate product education and widen dissemination of product information (prospect bias) to allow policyholders to come up with optimal demand decisions. While for insurance policymakers, the study provides an understanding of behavioral biases. With such insights, policymakers can identify exploitative and deceptive information that target policyholders to better guide life insurance documentation and product designs.

This study is the first to offer insights into behavioral biases' influence on demand decisions for life insurance products in a developing country like Uganda. By integrating prospects and expected utility theory, this study examines rationality and irrationality in demand decisions for life insurance products.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-03-2023-0201

The purpose of this study is to determine the characteristics of the equilibrium between demand and supply for a reciprocal insurance firm.

The model developed assumes a fixed number of individuals with identical characteristics and of constant absolute risk aversion who can choose between remaining self‐insured or forming a reciprocal insurer to serve their needs.

The results show that under those conditions the individuals either remain self‐insured or form a reciprocal and buy full insurance. Which of the two decisions will be made depends on the relation between the number of members of the reciprocal and the expenses that will be incurred by that entity.

Most alternative models of insurance demand imply that, in the presence of transaction costs, partial insurance is the rule.

The major practical implication is that there can be serious agency problems in the management of reciprocals if attorneys‐in‐fact have influence over their salaries, since they may be able to increase their private welfare at the expense of that of the policyholders.

The model is new and its practical implications have not been discussed previously.