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The purpose of this paper is to explore how the Police and Crime Commissioners have been scrutinised in their first nine months in office, focusing primarily on one particular force area.

A brief analysis of the most current writing on this topic, including official documents such as minutes of police and crime panel meetings and Home Affairs Committee and Welsh Affairs Committee evidence sessions, as well various online news sources are provided. Academic literature spanning 30 years is also drawn upon.

In considering particular major events in the first nine months of the implementation of Police and Crime Commissioners, central government have been required to take a more prominent role in scrutiny in certain regions than first envisaged, due to ambiguity of legislative guidelines.

As an exploratory paper, one force area (Gwent) is the primary focus, sampled because of the issues faced in that area and its widespread coverage in the media.

Problems with the legislative guidance for Police and Crime Commissioners, Police and Crime Panels and other involved agencies and individuals are highlighted.

The paper contributes to the body of research investigating how the new policing governance framework in England and Wales is unfolding in practice. It is informed by both academic perspectives and real life examples.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) within the new constitutional arrangements for governing police forces in England and Wales.

Desktop research of the web pages of PCPs, combined with documentary analysis of reports of panel meetings and a literature review of relevant academic materials.

During the first year of their operation the role of the PCP in the new constitutional arrangements for governing police forces in England and Wales has been widely criticised. This paper explores reasons that may impinge on the effectiveness of these local bodies to scrutinise how Police and Crime Commissioners discharge their statutory functions. In particular, it draws attention to the limited powers of the panel, the contradictions of the “critical/friend” model of scrutiny, the extent of political alignment between “the scrutinisers” and “the scrutinee”, and the ability of the latter to constrain the scrutiny function of the former.

This paper is the first to explore the scrutiny role of PCPs in the context of the research evidence regarding the development and use of scrutiny within the local government context.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the elections for Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). It seeks to analyse the policies put forward by the candidates and evaluate the significance of the elections for the future landscape of policing.

The research for this paper is library based, making particular use of primary source material. The objectives for this research are organised around key themes – preparations for the elections, the election contest, the election campaign and key issues that were raised, the election results and the significance of the introduction of the office of PCC for the future landscape of policing.

The research established that most candidates put forward policies that would seek to skew policing towards combating low level crime and disorder. It highlighted issues relevant to the future landscape of policing, including the relationships forged between chief constables and PCCs, the politicisation of policing and the extent to which PCCs are held adequately accountable for their actions.

The research focuses on the 2012 PCC elections and identifies a number of key issues that may need to be addressed in the future, either by academic or political investigation.

The research suggests that future PCC election contests should receive improved publicity and attention should also be paid to the candidates’ deposit. It suggests that the future operation of the office should be subject to thorough investigation by the Home Affairs Committee.

The creation of the office of PCC was designed to empower communities and those who resided within them. However, this goal cannot be realised without effort on the part of government to urge their involvement in future PCC election contests.

The subject matter is original and its interpretation is informed by both academic and practitioner perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the opportunities and challenges provided by the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), and particularly the prospects for enhanced public accountability of policing as a result. It considers how the new accountability framework might work in practice and in comparison with the existing arrangements of Police Authorities and highlights the key accountability relationships on which success is likely to depend.

The paper draws on a range of published research on public accountability and applies the key ideas to the particular context of police governance and accountability.

While the plans for directly elected PCCs have proved controversial, the overall view is that the new approach to police governance deserves its chance because it seems to offer at least some potential for stronger public accountability. Much depends on the three key accountability relationships and probably it will take some time for clear, significant and lasting impacts to show themselves. But in four years time, when the next round of elections are due, the nature of the challenge of injecting more effective public accountability into policing will be better understood.

The paper offers conceptual insights on the governance and accountability framework for policing, both as currently exists and as is intended with directly elected PCCs. It also highlights the three key accountability relationships which lie at the heart of the new arrangements and upon which success, to a large extent, will depend.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the background of the proposal contained in the coalition government's Police and Social Responsibility legislation to replace police authorities with directly elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs) and to evaluate the potential problems that will arise from this reform.

The research is library‐based, utilising a range of primary and secondary sources. The objectives of the research are addressed by examining a number of key themes: the creation of police authorities; the evolution of police authorities; the target regime; consequences of increased central control over policing; the Community Empowerment agenda; the reform of police authorities; the 2010 coalition government and PCCs; problems posed by PCCs; and the progress of reform.

The research established that the role performed by police authorities in the governance of policing was in need of reform, in particular because of their inability to ensure that local concerns were adequately addressed by their police forces. However, it is argued that replacing an authority with one single person possessing considerable powers over policing poses significant dangers which include the potential of this reform to politicise the police.

The paper presents a detailed analysis of a key aspect of coalition government policing policy and seeks to establish that what is proposed contains serious weaknesses which must be addressed in order to provide for a workable system of police governance. It is of relevance to those engaged in delivering policing, crime prevention and community safety agendas.

This chapter is devoted to analysing the historical peculiarity of the contemporary British politics of policing.

Research is based on an analysis of policy statements and debates, news reports, and official statistics, in the light of historical studies of the earlier politics of policing.

The Conservative government’s police reform programme severely diminishes the resources, powers, status and independence of the police, reversing the Tory’s traditional unquestioning support of the police. The package is shown to reflect broader changes in political economy and culture under neoliberalism.

There has been no previous academic analysis bringing together the various aspects of the reform programme, contrasting it with previous historical understanding of the politics of policing, and linking it to broader contemporary change.

The purpose of this paper is to review the establishment of this new type of elected official and the conduct of those in office during the first twelve months of their official existence, and to consider whether a compelling case has yet been made for its retention as the principal method of police governance.

The paper will review policy papers and data which preceded and followed the establishment of the office of police and crime commissioner (PCC) in November 2012; review the 2012 elections and their implications, review conduct since, particularly in respect of formal duties, principally setting budgets and police and crime plans; consider the potential for politicisation; and consider whether a case has been made for the retention of the office in future.

The paper concludes that the government has succeeded with PCCs in implementing a major plank of the Conservative party's 2010 manifesto. It can reasonably be anticipated that the Conservatives will promote this record at the next election. However, it is simply too early to tell if PCCs are individually or collectively adding value to the sum of policing in England and Wales. A compelling case for their retention as a means of police governance is therefore yet to be made. On the other hand, Labour has still to determine whether it will offer the electorate an alternative in 2015.

With only ten months having elapsed since the first elections, it is early to draw firm conclusions about the effectiveness or, more pertinently, the added value that PCCs have brought to policing. Conversely, the first twelve months was an opportunity for PCCs to make a positive impression and this has not occurred.

PCCs ought to be subject to a rigorous appraisal of effectiveness. This is unlikely, for political reasons, to occur.

First rigorous review of PCCs based on a review of available data.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the 2016 elections for Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and to compare them with those that took place in 2012. It seeks to evaluate the background of the candidates who stood for office in 2016, the policies that they put forward, the results of the contests and the implications of the 2016 experience for future PCC elections.

This paper is based around several key themes – the profile of candidates who stood for election, preparations conducted prior to the contests taking place, the election campaign and issues raised during the contests, the results and the profile of elected candidates. The paper is based upon documentary research, making particular use of primary source material.

The research establishes that affiliation to a political party became the main route for successful candidates in 2016 and that local issues related to low-level criminality will dominate the future policing agenda. It establishes that although turnout was higher than in 2012, it remains low and that further consideration needs to be devoted to initiatives to address this for future PCC election contests.

The research focusses on the 2016 elections and identifies a number of key issues that emerged during the campaign affecting the conduct of the contests which have a bearing on future PCC elections. It treats these elections as a bespoke topic and does not seek to place them within the broader context of the development of the office of PCC.

The research suggests that in order to boost voter participation in future PCC election contests, PCCs need to consider further means to advertise the importance of the role they perform and that the government should play a larger financial role in funding publicity for these elections and consider changing the method of election.

The rationale for introducing PCCs was to empower the public in each police force area. However, issues that include the enhanced importance of political affiliation as a criteria for election in 2016 and the social unrepresentative nature of those who stood for election and those who secured election to this office in these contests coupled with shortcomings related to public awareness of both the role of PCCs and the timing of election contests threaten to undermine this objective.

The extensive use of primary source material ensures that the subject matter is original and its interpretation is informed by an academic perspective.

In 2013, the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Durham, Ron Hogg, initiated a debate around the future of British drug policy. In June 2015, the Derbyshire PCC, Alan Charles, opened a similar debate with representatives from policing, third party support agencies, national advocates and academics to discuss the possibilities for change. This short paper presents the views and actions of senior figures in the police service and discusses motivations for pursuing change. The purpose of this paper is to introduce police and crime commissioners as “drug policy actors” (Seddon, 2011) and to highlight key areas for further academic enquiry.

This paper is based on press releases and media accounts of the recent activity of the PCCs in relation to national drug policy. This paper provides an academic viewpoint on recent events, supported by theoretical literature critiquing drug policy and contemporary policing.

This viewpoint articulates that motivations for pursuing a change in drug policy are based on both economic and ideological agendas of some PCCs. Irrespective of the motivation, pressure from PCCs and renowned Chief Constables may be more effective in initiating change than high-profile national campaigns and political debates.

This paper is the first of its kind to discuss the relationship between PCCs/local constabularies and drug policy reform. It provides a foundation for future research which could investigate views on alternatives to prohibition, specifically within the wider police force.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the specific institutional arrangements for realizing democratically accountable policing in England & Wales and the Netherlands. It assesses each accountability system against a set of “democratic criteria” and considers the implications for democratic policing of the current reform trajectories in both jurisdictions.

The paper adopts a cross‐national approach exploring the relationship between policing and democratic institutions by comparing the democratic credentials of the police governance systems in England & Wales and the Netherlands.

Current reforms to the police governance system in England & Wales aim to increase local elected influence over policing. By contrast, the Dutch system deliberately limits the degree of local electoral control over policing. The paper argues that there is a range of elements to democratic policing, and that “democratic accountability” should not be conflated with control of policing by elected bodies. Whilst the trajectories of reform in England & Wales and the Netherlands are going in opposite directions, each raises a number of “democratic” concerns.

The research is limited to only two developed European parliamentary democracies in the European Union. Further comparative research on democratic policing is required to expand the analysis to a wider variety of democratic contexts.

To date, there has been little attention paid by policy makers or by academics to the form and nature of police governance in continental European countries. By drawing comparisons between England & Wales and the Netherlands, the paper aims to provide a democratic assessment of the two police accountability systems (and their current reform trajectories) and discuss some broad policy implications for police governance in each jurisdiction.

Comparative analysis of police accountability in both England and Wales and the Netherlands provides potential for policy learning in each jurisdiction. The analysis suggests that both systems, in different ways, are currently at risk of over‐emphasizing particular democratic criteria (such as electoral participation, or delivery of service) to the exclusion of others (such as concerns with equitable and fair policing and the protection of minority rights).