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It is suggested that nominalism and Platonism are modes of perceiving experience in the Kantian sense. These two modes, like the temporal and the spatial Kantian modes of perceiving experience, are related to the left and right cerebral hemispheres respectively. Learning experiments showing the relation of all these four modes of perceiving experience to the hemispheres are described. It is discussed that the nominalist and Platonic modes of perceiving experience are subjective as well as the Kantian modes, time and space. Some relation of this discussion to the collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics is considered. A phenomenon of a one‐and‐a‐half hour cycle in hemispheric activity, which may have implications to the designing of examinations, is described.

To determine where, when, how, and wherefore European social theory hit upon the formula of “the True, the Good, and the Beautiful,” and how its structural position as a skeleton for the theory of action has changed.

Genealogy, library research, and unusually good fortune were used to trace back the origin of what was to become a ubiquitous phrase, and to reconstruct the debates that made deploying the term seem important to writers.

The triad, although sometimes used accidentally in the renaissance, assumed a key structural place with a rise of Neo-Platonism in the eighteenth century associated with a new interest in providing a serious analysis of taste. It was a focus on taste that allowed the Beautiful to assume a position that was structurally homologous to those of the True and the Good, long understood as potential parallels. Although the first efforts were ones that attempted to emphasize the unification of the human spirit, the triad, once formulated, was attractive to faculties theorists more interested in decomposing the soul. They seized upon the triad as corresponding to an emerging sense of a tripartition of the soul. Finally, the members of the triad became re-understood as values, now as orthogonal dimensions.

This seems to be the first time the story of the development of the triad – one of the most ubiquitous architectonics in social thought – has been told.

Bloomington scholars are critical of the rather wide-spread “Model Platonism” of both Austrian and Chicago economists. Their empirical, B, perspective avoids the more extreme views of both Austrian “mindful economics,” A, and Chicago “mindless economics,” C. Yet the B is not a mere convex combination of A and C. It is rather a psychologically grounded empirical evidence-oriented approach that keeps clear of the non-empirical spirit of von Mises’ and Selten’s methodological dualism on one hand and the instrumentalist and behaviorist spirit of much of neo-classical economics on the other hand.

It is suggested that the left hemispheric neurons and the magnocellular visual system are specialized in tasks requiring a relatively small number of large neurons having a fast reaction time due to a high firing rate or many dendritic synapses of the same neuron which are activated simultaneously. On the other hand the right hemispheric neurons and the neurons of the parvocellular visual system are specialized in tasks requiring a relatively larger number of short term memory (STM) Hebbian engrams (neural networks). This larger number of engrams is achieved by a combination of two strategies. The first is evolving a larger number of neurons, which may be smaller and have a lower firing rate. The second is evolving longer and more branching axons and thus producing more engrams, including engrams comprising neurons located at cortical areas distant from each other. This model explains why verbal functions of the brain are related to the left hemisphere, and the division of semantic tasks between the left hemisphere and the right one. This explanation is extended to other cognitive functions like visual search, ontological cognition, the detection of temporal order, and the dual cognitive interpretation of the perceived physical phenomena.

Information science has been conceptualized as a partly unreflexive response to developments in information and computer technology, and, most powerfully, as part of the gestalt of the computer. The computer was viewed as an historical accident in the original formulation of the gestalt. An alternative, and timely, approach to understanding, and then dissolving, the gestalt would be to address the motivating technology directly, fully recognizing it as a radical human construction. This paper aims to address the issues.

The paper adopts a social epistemological perspective and is concerned with collective, rather than primarily individual, ways of knowing.

Information technology tends to be received as objectively given, autonomously developing, and causing but not itself caused, by the language of discussions in information science. It has also been characterized as artificial, in the sense of unnatural, and sometimes as threatening. Attitudes to technology are implied, rather than explicit, and can appear weak when articulated, corresponding to collective repression.

Receiving technology as objectively given has an analogy with the Platonist view of mathematical propositions as discovered, in its exclusion of human activity, opening up the possibility of a comparable critique which insists on human agency.

Apprehensions of information technology have been raised to consciousness, exposing their limitations.

Students studying the philosophy of mathematics were the subjects of an experiment to examine the functioning of the cerebral hemispheres. Results show that students whose right hemisphere is more developed than their left tended to prefer Platonistically presented logicism over nominalistical formalism. They also tended to prefer Brouwer's intuitionalism, which is based on Kant's temporal mode of perception, over Frege's geometrical approach. The result is tentatively explained by an information theoretical model of the brain's functioning and is related to the current discussion regarding constructivism and Kant's theory of consciousness.

Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou are two very different philosophers, and yet they touch upon many similar themes. Perhaps most noticeable is their respective concerns for developing philosophical systems free of the concerns of so-called post-modernism. In this paper I look at some of the themes in their work, and consider what might thereby be enabled within thinking about law. In so doing the paper argues that Deleuze’s work is particularly useful, as it allows for a polymorphous practice of thought, appropriately named as “jurisprudence.”

Applies the analytic‐synthetic dichotomy of hemispheric functioning suggested by Levy‐Agresti and Sperry to explain the chunking theory of Miller. Constructs a theory of cognition, based on cerebral functions which were discovered through hemispheric differences. Shows that all the arguments of Efron against the hemispheric paradigm are merely “puzzles” that can be solved within this paradigm. New findings of Efron and Yund were, in fact, predicted by a component of this theory.