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This chapter seeks to reveal what are the implications of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) debate on international investment law by focusing on the specific example of public health. The right to health is one of the human rights secured in international law and in the national legislation of a majority of States. This chapter will provide examples of investment cases concerning tobacco control measures, imposed by the Host States for the purpose of improving public health, though challenged by the tobacco companies under International Investment Agreements (IIAs) in investment tribunals. These specific examples cast rather general questions regarding the legal framework of international investment framework and its role in providing sufficient policy space for Host States to implement the public policies and to ensure that foreign companies adhere to the CSR standards.

In order to investigate what are the implications of the CSR debate on international investment law on the example of tobacco industry, the author performs a literature review and analyze two tobacco disputes and its possible implication on the public health debate and protection of foreign investors.

This case study illustrates the complex paradigm that interlink economic and human rights obligations of States on one side of the spectrum and property rights and social responsibilities of tobacco companies on the other side.

This chapter addresses a very topical and pertinent issue in public international law, namely: the role of public interest norms in the regime of foreign direct investment.

By the end of this chapter, you should be able to demonstrate an understanding of:

The impact of increasing competition occurring within the UK retail environment.

Consumers efforts to reduce the disparity between beliefs and behaviours, as conceptualised within cognitive dissonance theory.

The alignment with marketing, the wider economy and the retail sector as a means to identify ways to shape value creation.

This research investigates the effect of imposing a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) on the likelihood of purchasing SSBs. We design and test an experimental framework that examines this and the effects of providing an explanation about the presence of an SSB tax and information about the negative health effects of consuming SSBs. Consistent with Elbel, Taksler, Mijanovich, Abrams, and Dixon (2013) and Taylor, Kaplan, Villas-Boas, and Jung (2019), we find that imposing a tax, in addition to increasing the conspicuousness of the tax by explaining the presence of a tax (and in some cases, the negative health effects) reduces the likelihood of purchasing an SSB anywhere from 8.39% to 18.15%. We contribute to the public health and tax policy literature by testing consumer choice in a controlled experimental setting and considering the effect of individual differences on the choice to purchase SSBs. Imposing a tax on SSBs may be an effective tool for decreasing SSB consumption that is made more effective when the tax is conspicuous.

The U.S. 2009 Tobacco Control Act opened the door for new antismoking policies by giving the Food and Drug Administration broad regulatory authority over the tobacco industry. We develop a behavioral welfare economics approach to conduct cost-benefit analysis of FDA tobacco regulations. We use a simple two-period model to develop expressions for the impact of tobacco control policies on social welfare. Our model includes: nudge and paternalistic regulations; an excise tax on cigarettes; internalities created by period 1 versus period 2 consumption; and externalities from cigarette consumption. Our analytical expressions show that in the presence of uncorrected internalities and externalities, a nudge or a tax to reduce cigarette consumption improves social welfare. In sharp contrast, a paternalistic regulation might either improve or worsen social welfare. Another important result is that the social welfare gains from new policies do not only depend on the size of the internalities and externalities, but also depend on the extent to which current policies already correct the problems. We link our analytical expressions to the graphical approach used in most previous studies and discuss the information needed to complete cost-benefit analysis of tobacco regulations. We use our model as a framework to reexamine the evidence base for strong conclusions about the size of the internalities, which is the key information needed.