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The purpose of this paper is to advance a conceptual comprehensive framework to analyze synergy management pitfalls in mergers and acquisitions (M & As). The framework highlights the main dimensions of synergy management, the most relevant synergy pitfalls and the ways to overcome them.

A greater recognition of synergy management literature in M & As is developed. A framework is provided integrating the compatible elements of previous broad areas of research and the main findings of studies on several topics related to synergy.

Prior literature has suggested that synergy is an important motivation of M & As, has tended to be overestimated and has been difficult to achieve. Specifically, there are three relevant synergy pitfalls: the “mirage,” a tendency to overestimate synergy potential, the “gravity hill,” the underestimation of the difficulties in synergy realization and “amnesia,” a dangerous lack of attention to the realization of synergy. An effective synergy management requires an analysis of five dimensions: the steps of the M & A process, the several values of synergy, the forbidding effects of poor synergy management, the potential causes of synergy inflation and the selection of solutions to synergy pitfalls.

The comprehensive framework suggests insights and guidelines to help managers to overcome pitfalls in synergy management. Managers will learn the following lessons: “when” pitfalls should embrace synergy management; “where” pitfalls may occur; “why” pitfalls may occur; “what” consequences can result in a value of “realized synergy” lower than the “expected synergy”; and “how” actions, tools and behaviors can overcome hidden dangers in synergy management.

The study changes the focus from a single, generic synergy trap to three more analytical, useful synergy pitfalls: the mirage, the gravity hill and the amnesia. By shedding light on synergy management pitfalls, this paper enriches M & A literature and enhance practical solutions to reduce pitfalls in synergy decision making.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and rank policy and regulatory framework factors and inherent pitfalls in the delivery of Tanzanian public–private partnerships (PPPs) affordable housing schemes. The strength of interactions between pitfalls is established, with practical solution proposals offered.

Primary data were collected from questionnaires administered to 28 Tanzanian stakeholders. Semi-structured interviews with public and private sector respondents then complemented survey findings with proposed solutions. The quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics, mean scores, parametric tests and correlation analyses. Directed content analysis was used for the interview transcripts.

Results show that “current PPP policy and guidelines need further improvement” and “Tanzania has a PPP policy and clear regulatory framework” were rated higher as policy and regulatory factors. In contrast, “poor planning skills and analytical capacity”, “high cost of building materials” and “inadequate access to housing finance” were the critical pitfalls. Most practical solutions were broadly financial in nature, or related to training, project management or PPP-enabling environment.

The paper provides solutions that can be tailored to international practitioners interested in understanding the effects of PPP policy, regulatory issues and pitfalls on Sub-Saharan Africa and other similar developing economies.

The paper seeks to show pitfalls in the application of analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to efficiency analysis and performance measurement as well as ways to steer clear of these pitfalls.

The paper outlines guidelines for avoiding pitfalls in the application of the AHP to efficiency analysis and performance measurement.

The pitfalls discussed in the paper can be understood as a type of critical reflection of best practice, since they stem from the experiences of the application of the AHP in the area of efficiency analysis and performance measurement.

The pitfalls discussed are based on a limited number of projects covering only a few industries. Further work may be required to test the general validity of these findings.

The ways to steer clear of these pitfalls can guide a decision maker to a proper application of the AHP in the area of efficiency analysis and performance measurement.

The paper goes beyond the multi criteria decision‐making literature where only general criticism of the AHP is found and the area of efficiency analysis and performance measurement is neglected.

The authors observe that actionable guidelines are missing from many reference works on business process management (BPM). Also, success factors are mostly not contextualized in the different phases and concerns of a BPM initiative. The purpose of this paper is to address this research gap.

The research design builds on a literature survey for building an integrated framework for BPM that is referred to as integrated BPM. It integrates lifecycle phases, capability areas and governance aspects. Then, the authors consolidate insights from expert interviews.

As a result, the authors provide a list of various activities that are associated with the different elements of BPM. Furthermore, the authors describe pitfalls for each of the elements that have been avoided in order to make the BPM initiative a success.

The findings emphasize the potential to study BPM success and its factors on a more fine-granular activity level.

The list of activities and the list of pitfalls are directly applicable for practitioners.

The research on the integrated BPM framework consolidates insights from prior research and extends it with an expert perspective on pitfalls.

Conventional wisdom dictates that if you represent a corporate entity (or even a senior corporate official) involved in a securities or other regulatory investigation ‐ whether by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Commodities Futures Trading Commission, New York Stock Exchange, National Association of Securities Dealers or one or more of the state attorneys general or other federal or state regulators ‐ it is important to cooperate fully in the investigation, even if that means “confessing” to corporate wrongdoing. Indeed, there are many benefits to cooperation, such as potentially avoiding criminal prosecution or an enforcement proceeding altogether or negotiating reduced penalties. And for regulated industries or regulated entities, there may be no choice but to provide full cooperation in order to avoid making an enemy of your regulator. But there are important potential pitfalls as well to cooperating with governmental or self‐regulatory investigations ‐ pitfalls that sometimes outweigh the benefits of cooperation. These potential pitfalls include bringing problems to the government’s attention about which it might not learn otherwise, or strengthening the government’s case against your client by doing the regulators’ work for them, such as by marshalling the evidence against your client for use by the regulators. And more and more, regulators are requiring entities to waive the protections of the attorney‐client privilege and work‐product doctrine as one of the prices you need to pay to be treated as a cooperator. If a regulatory authority insists on a privilege waiver, any documents turned over to the agency also may be available to potential third‐party litigants, such as the class‐action bar, or other government entities. In fact, the regulatory agency itself may use the formerly privileged materials to support a complaint against your client. Because of these potential pitfalls, the cooperation road may resemble a minefield at times, with the client one wrong step away from disaster. For that reason, it is critical for counsel to avoid reflexively choosing to cooperate in a regulatory investigation aimed at his or her client. Although cooperation may turn out to be the right approach to many regulatory investigations, each situation must be analyzed based upon its own individual facts so that the benefits of cooperation can be balanced appropriately against the pitfalls before making an informed decision as to what is best for the client in any particular circumstance.

Looks at some possible pitfalls in introducing and operating a programme of action learning by drawing on the authors’ own experiences and those of their friends and colleagues.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how stock characteristics influence investor trading behavior and psychological pitfalls.

This study employs the methods of Solt and Statman (1989) and Kumar (2009) to examine investor trading activities.

Good companies do not usually have good stocks, while lottery-type stocks show better price performance than other stocks. Due to the representativeness and affect heuristics, the stocks of good companies are frequently transacted, while the low-priced stocks are infrequently transacted. Moreover, investors may display the gambler’s fallacy in the trade of stocks of good companies and the overconfidence and self-attribution bias in the trade of lottery-type stocks.

Investors trading lottery-type stocks demonstrate greater maturity than those that trade stocks of good companies; however, psychological pitfalls still dominate investor trading behavior.

The representativeness heuristic of “stocks of good companies are good stocks” results in the inclusion of stocks of good companies in a portfolio and poorer price performance, whereas the inclusion of lottery-type stocks in a portfolio brings higher returns within a short period of time.

Compared to earlier studies that focussed on the price performance of stocks of good companies and investor trading behavior in relation to lottery-type stocks, this study aims to investigate the influence of stock characteristics on price performance, trading activities, and psychological pitfalls.

While the corporate rebranding momentum is accelerating, corporate decisions are not currently informed by strong theory and academic research in this area. To broaden the understanding, the purpose of this paper is to generate empirical insights into the key pitfalls in the corporate rebranding process.

An exploratory qualitative study included 14 personal semi‐structured in‐depth interviews with executives involved in the corporate rebranding of a leading telecommunications firm, and a review of relevant archival materials.

The analysis highlighted common reports of four key pitfalls in corporate rebranding. These are: disconnecting with the core; stakeholder myopia; emphasis on labels, not meanings; one company, one voice: the challenge of multiple identities.

This presents a single case study but one which provides empirical insights that advance theoretical thinking in corporate rebranding, and highlights interesting avenues for further research.

This study highlights: the importance of marketing and organisational research in designing new corporate brands; the value of engaging staff in the rebranding process from a very early stage; the need to ensure that internal processes and systems encourage employees to endorse the new corporate brand values through their attitudes and behaviours.

Corporate rebranding campaigns are not only expensive exercises, but also critical for sustaining competitive advantage in light of changing corporate priorities. This is one of very few papers that provide insights on the pitfalls in the corporate rebranding process.

The overall aim of the research is to provide an assessment of the level of the reported success of foresight project results of a multinational company in Turkey.

The model of assessment is based on an integrated framework characterized by approaching foresight as a project and associating it by the redefined pitfalls in, and success factors of, corporate foresight projects in order to facilitate better conversion of their results into actual changes in corporations. A multinational company in Turkey (Siemens Turkey) is chosen for the exploratory case study. The exploratory assessment model was designed via the use of a survey questionnaire, a case study, and interviews of managers (who were involved in the corporate foresight project).

Results of the individual assessment of corporate foresight project at the company were labeled as “successful”. There needs to be given an overall attention to the process‐oriented elements of the foresight project. Pitfalls in the foundation phase accumulated the highest problem area, suggesting that the total project would eventually suffer.

One of the limitations of the study is the use of a single case with an attempt to assess the pitfalls of the foresight projects. The exploratory study may include premature conclusions about the assessment of corporate foresight project results, yet a single case can imply generalizable insights. The authors believe this research suggests some potentially significant insights for foresight studies and their applications.

The study may help to support the reliability of the foresight studies as they have been implemented and might bring a new methodological challenge on the quality and success of the corporate foresight project results.

The approach described the factors affecting the success of corporate foresight activities with respect to understanding the pitfalls of foresight projects. Taking reference to such a framework, foresight results may be better delivered and disseminated in corporations with concrete results and actual changes in organizations. The model of assessment may be used to analyze the level of the reported success of foresight project results in companies implementing foresight activities.

Although foresight studies within businesses has become more important and widespread with its systematic and continuous/participatory approach, based on a variety of methods, it is still a partially explored area in terms of research with mainly descriptive studies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons why the concept of a “strategic early warning system” (SEWS) has not been widely introduced and why it fails to be implemented successfully in German corporations. The aim of such systems is to detect changes in an organizational environment ahead of time by scanning the environment for “weak signals”, which come in the form of trends.

The questions that arise, particularly because the concept of SEWS is not entirely new, are: What are the pitfalls in implementing these systems, why do they occur, and how can they be overcome? To answer these questions, a single case study was conducted.

The study suggests that the failure of SEWS is due mainly to a lack of participation of potential future users in the implementation phase, a lack of joint understanding of the nature of trends, differing and unrevealed requirements of trends by various interested parties, a broad misconception of the “weak signals” concept and trends, an excessively heavy reliance on alleged “hard data”, a lack of interaction among users, and finally a “missing link” to the strategic functions in an organization.

The results of the study are limited due to the fact that they are derived from a single case study.

The identification of pitfalls contributes to the research on implementing SEWS and this can also be linked to “strategic issue management” and the foresight process.