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The subject of food and drug legislation is again before Parliament. It is proposed, under MR. JOHN BURNS' Food and Drugs Bill (see this Journal, August, 1913), to empower the Local Government Board to make Regulations which shall define an article of food or a drug with regard to its nature, substance, and quality. The Board will only issue Regulations of this kind after making such enquiry as in its opinion may be necessary.

The purpose of this paper is to study the control and synchronization of the hyperchaotic finance system.

A single controller scheme is introduced. The Routh-Hurwitz criteria and the structure of solution of first-order linear differential equations are adopted in analysis of control and synchronization.

Two single controllers are designed and added to the new hyperchaotic finance system. The stability of the hyperchaotic finance system at its zero equilibrium point is guaranteed by applying the appropriate single controller signal based on Routh-Hurwitz criteria. Another effective controller is also designed for the global asymptotic synchronization on the hyperchaotic finance system based on the structure of solution of first-order linear differential equations. Numerical simulations are demonstrated to verify the effectiveness of the proposed single controller scheme.

The introduced approach is interesting for control and synchronization the hyperchaotic finance system.

BEFORE the war Japanese industry concentrated on the production of large quantities of cheap articles. Today it is so quality‐conscious that every week there is a Government broadcast to the whole nation to stress to workers and management the fact that quality control is the business of everybody. The six countries which comprise the Common Market are equally pressing ahead with the same subject, intent upon supplying the customer with what he requires at the price he is ready to pay.

Describes the traditional money laundering methods of physical currency smuggling and the more common use of financial and other institutions. Shows how the pressure on vulnerable institutions to ensure control of conventional money laundering has induced criminals to expoit the potential of electronic money. Lists the advantages of electronic money for laundering: it has no bulk, is easily transferred, and is anonymous. Discusses how internet banking and internet casinos allow criminals to launder electronic money. Indicates the need for effective counter measures to these illegal practices, the work of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, and the difficulty of controlling the popular pastime of internet gambling in the USA.

Comments on the Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and on the Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC, both of them concerned with preventing use of the financial system for money laundering. Analyses the background of the 2001 Directive and the changes it makes compared to the 1991 EC Directive. Describes the 1991 Directive as a landmark in the fight against money laundering, but indicates why it is no longer effective: many states have already gone beyond its minimum standards, the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations have been revised, and the Amsterdam European Council Action Plan. Describes how the money laundering threat has evolved since 1991, including the shift from the traditional financial sector to non‐financial professions or enterprises.

Addresses the conflict between banking secrecy and the fight against money laundering. Looks back at the origins of banking secrecy in the Swiss havens for German Jews’ money in the 1930s, and at the various reasons given justifying secrecy. Shows how banking secrecy has been lifted in response to the perceived need to prevent its being used as a money laundering device. Moves on to review banking secrecy in China, where it is enshrined in law but is not absolute: there are 11 institutions that have the right to enquire into an individual’s savings deposits, and recent legislation has been passed against money laundering.

Deals with the background and main content of the three rules adopted in January 2003 by the People’s Bank of China (PBC): Rules for Anti‐Money Laundering by Financial Institutions, Administrative Rules for the Reporting of Large‐Value and Suspicious RMB (Renminbi) Payment Transactions, and Administrative Rules for the Reporting by Financial Institutions of Large‐Value and Suspicious Foreign Exchange Transactions. Defines money laundering and outlines the principles of anti‐money laundering, the PBC as supervisory authority, customer identification obligations, the large‐value and suspicious reporting systems, account information and transaction record keeping, and legal responsibilities for offences against rules.

Traces the evolution of criminal law against money laundering to the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, which required member countries to stipulate a domestic offence of concealing drug trafficking proceeds; this was ratified in China and followed by the Decision on Suppressing Drug Dealing 1990. Outlines subsequent Amendments of the Chinese Criminal Code which from 1997 have expanded money laundering control; the predicate offences cover smuggling, organised crime, terrorism and drug‐related crime, and sentences have been increased. Explains the principles behind this legislation, including the concept of scienter as the mens rea, ie the obligation to know that money has originated from a predicate offence, and the five types of money laundering behaviour under the Code; punishments involve loss of freedom, fines, and confiscation of illegal gains.

Traces the history of the important obligation of financial systems and other vulnerable professions to report any suspicious transactions in order to combat money laundering. Contrasts the 1988 Statement of Principle of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, which did not oblige banks to report suspicious transactions (reflecting the then deeply rooted concept of bank secrecy) with the 10 June 1991 EC Council Directive, which stipulates mandatory reporting. Shows how the institutions mandated to report suspicious transactions have widened out from banks to non‐bank financial institutions, and thence to non‐financial institutions. Outlines criteria for suspicious transactions, the work of Financial Intelligence Units, and implementation of suspicious transactions reporting in some European Union countries.

To call for the legislature to pay more attention to the professional laundering and to improve the capability to attack money laundering.

By describing the phenomena that money laundering crimes nowadays often involves lawyers, notaries and accounts, to analyze the necessity and rationale of bringing these professionals under the obligations of anti‐money laundering, and to present a reasonable solution to the contradiction between professional privilege and anti‐money laundering obligations.

In order to keep a balance between the fight against money laundering and the protection of professional privilege, we should make a difference among the professional activities: when professional activities are linked judicial proceedings or in the course of ascertaining the legal position of clients, they would be exempted from the obligation of anti‐money laundering; when they perform financial or company law activities, they should assume anti‐money laundering obligations.

This paper presents a reasonable solution to the contradiction between professional privilege and anti‐money laundering obligations, which would be beneficial to the legislature.