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The purpose of this paper is to identify potential helicopter pilots’ errors during their interaction with the flight deck in the process of starting a helicopter in night-time conditions.

Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach is used for the analysis of the pilot–flight deck interaction. This methodology was used for the identification of errors for 30 pilots during a period of 10 years. In total, 55 errors were identified, and most common errors noted are: error of omission, caused by pilots’ lack of attention or longer periods of no flying, and error of wrong execution, caused by misunderstanding a situation.

Hierarchical task analysis and classification of pilot’s tasks were used for the analysis of consequences, probability of occurrence, criticality and remedial strategies for the identified pilot error.

This paper does not give an ergonomic analysis of the flight deck, as that is not its subject. However, results of the research presented in this paper, together with results presented in references, clearly show that there are disadvantages in the ergonomic design of flight decks.

Based on the identified pilot errors and with respect of existing ergonomic solution, it is possible to begin with the reconstruction of flight decks.

Higher quality of pilot–flight deck interaction must be ensured for both pilots’ and passengers’ safety, as even a slightest error can lead to catastrophic consequences.

The value of this paper lies in the fact that it points to the need for synergy of ergonomic design and human reliability methods.

The purpose of this article is to reveal the reasons for pilot error. Surveys in aviation have attributed 70 percent of incidents to crew error, citing pilot error as the root cause of an aviation accident.

Uses ANT, a theoretical perspective, that has evolved to address the socio‐technical domain and in so doing reveals the “social” as defined by Latour. This perspective challenges the way that agency, the human and non‐human are conceptualised. In this work, complexity theory is used as an integrating concept to complement ANT thereby providing an explanatory framework (with particular emphasis on interrelationship) that enhances understanding regarding the accident aetiology of complex systems and the “social”.

The hegemony of “pilot error” is dispelled revealing a de‐centered causality that is resident within a network space “worldview”.

The network space “worldview” reflects the nonlinearity and complexity inherent within accident aetiology involving complex socio‐technical systems. It reveals how politics and power “inscripted” within the network actors interrelate, and in particular shape situation awareness challenging the hegemony of “blamism” that is associated with “pilot error”.

The paper moves beyond a Newtonian‐Cartesian worldview of accident aetiology to embrace a “relativistic” perspective characterized by nonlinear dynamics, emergent properties and complex interrelationships.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of the technical and operational specifications of the Small Aircraft Transport System (SAT/SATS) to the achieved safety level.

Safety estimation was made with the use of mathematical model of safety of light aircraft in commercial operations developed on the basis of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data. The analysis was conducted for two different SATS business models based on Direct AiR Transport (DART) concept. It allowed for the investigation of the impact of technical specifications of the aircraft included into the SATS fleet as well as the selected elements of the applied business model on SATS safety level.

It was found that the proposed changes to DART system resulted in a significant improvement of safety. Mean Time Between Incidents and Accident (MTBIA) increased by 200 per cent. Additionally, the introduced alterations impacted the weights of particular domains and pilot’s error became less critical than the technical reliability.

It was shown that the application of new requirements influences both the safety level and the cost of operation, which was demonstrated within the ESPOSA and DART projects. Additionally, it was indicated that further effort to improve the light aircraft safety is absolutely necessary.

Originality consists in combining in one mathematical model both the aircraft configuration and the rules for business operation. Optimization of selected parameters of the system leads to a significant reduction in the accident number and to keeping the cost increment at a reasonable level. It was also found that the resulted improvement sometimes cannot be sufficient to consider a small aircraft operation fully safe, mainly owing to the numerous restrictions because of its small weight and loading capacity.

Human error is often cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. Incident surveys in aviation have attributed 70 per cent of incidents to crew error. Although a large proportion of the accidents can be attributed to human error, Reason proposes a view that many accidents are catalyzed by persons not present at the time of the event. In fact, it is this source of latent conditions that pose a most significant threat to the safety of complex systems. Another dimension to human error in aviation are the active errors that can precipitate the alignment or trigger the latent conditions. The risk associated with aviation is a dynamic element that is affected by both latent conditions and situational factors. This dynamic nature is presented here using the cusp model from catastrophe theory. Using Reason’s latent failure model, the descriptive and predictive nature of the cusp model works as a map to illustrate the nature of aviation accidents in terms of “instability” resulting from the alignment of latent conditions and influence of active errors. The SwissAir 111 tragedy of 2 September 1998 is used as a case study to illustrate this model.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce an approach to evaluate the establishment requirements of an flight training organization (FTO) through indicators that are not included in the regulations from the viewpoint of “acquired indicators from FTO experience” (AIs-FTOE).

Although the establishment requirements of an FTO can be determined through regulations, it was realized that the pilot training process can be achieved in a safe, sustainable and economical manner through indicators that are not included in the regulations. These indicators were obtained through experience in the operation process of the FTOs. In this study, the indicators (obtained from the regulations and experiences) affecting the efficiency of FTOs, that were or would be operational, were determined, and the effects of the indicators on the organization were examined and presented in detail. The case study was carried out in the Department of Flight Training (ETU-P) of Eskişehir Technical University which has an FTO.

In accordance with the results, the necessity indicators were defined, and the indicators that were not included in the regulations were called as AIs-FTOE. Identified AIs-FTOEs were classified into three main headings: natural and artificial obstacles, meteorological conditions and physical and technological resources. Detailed indicator data results were presented after examinations.

When literature on FTOs was examined, it was seen that there is a need to identify and classify indicators that affect the efficiency of FTOs. To the authors’ knowledge, this study will be the first in the literature that presented information based on an active FTO in detail. Thus, the AIs-FTOEs identified in this study will serve as a roadmap for the FTOs to be established and are to be used as parameters to evaluate efficiency for the established ones.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this paper will be the first paper in the literature describing the indicators that can be evaluated in terms of efficiency, sustainability and economy of FTOs.

Flight simulators are one of the noticeable breakthroughs in aerospace engineering. One of the main compartments of flight simulators is its control loading system (CLS). The CLS functions as a generator of virtual aerodynamic control-loads over control columns of a simulator. This paper aims to present the design of a high-fidelity six six degrees of freedom (6DOF) nonlinear CLS for the Boeing-747 aircraft simulator.

An introduction to CLS for flight motion simulators are first recapitulated. Afterward, the commanding devices are explained through schematics available in an engineering sense. This paper then presents in detail, the active control loading strategy and hardware design for the CLS, while also introducing the aerodynamic model structure. The satisfactory computer numerical simulations are presented before the paper ends up in concluding remarks.

The multiple input multiple output (MIMO) 6DOF nonlinear CLS for Boeing-747 flight simulator has been successfully developed. The outcome of computer simulations in real-time verifies practicality of the design strategy. The research presented in this paper could be a simple roadmap for prototyping high-fidelity 6DOF nonlinear CLS for flight motion simulators.

The available control architecture and hardware technologies cannot enable a high-fidelity load realization in a CLS. The existing research has not yet presented a 6DOF nonlinear MIMO CLS architecture along with the underlying controller setup for a high-fidelity load realization. In this paper, the design of a high-fidelity 6DOF nonlinear MIMO CLS for flight simulator of a large transport aircraft has been accomplished.

AMERICAN‐OPERATED air transport services flew 24,668,414 miles in the first six months of 1932 with 67 accidents, or 368,185 miles per accidentit is shown in the semi‐annual study of civil aircraft accidents in scheduled air transport services for the period January to June, 1932, published herewith. Only 6 of these accidents involved passenger fatalities.

The purpose of the present study is to introduce the elements characterising the work context of high responsibility teams (HRTs) operating in high reliability contexts such as medicine or aviation. Based on these elements, the authors reflected on the function of teamwork in these contexts, which is strongly dominated by a notion of flexibility under complexity, based on the technical, normative, and governance dimensions of teamwork.

Problem‐centred interviews (n=11) based on semi‐structured guidelines were conducted. Subsequently, a survey was conducted using a questionnaire inventory in six different HRT work contexts (n=551).

The interviews and survey results show significant differences regarding, for example, hierarchy or stress posed on the HRTs. However, they also demonstrate relevant similarities regarding, for instance, dimensions of complexity occurring in the teamwork contexts. Both differences and similarities influence how the support systems of the teamwork dimensions should be set up.

The study provided an excellent overview of similar and differing characteristics of the work context of different HRTs. However, it represents six specific HRTs and might not be generalisable to teams in other high reliability organisations, such as in the energy sector.

It is recommended that the characteristics of work contexts in HRTs should be taken into account in order to set up support systems of teamwork dimensions that enable teams to transfer the prevalent safety discourse into safety practice.

The innovative approach, which combines qualitative and quantitative data, provided insights that can be used to support team functioning in the team's specific work context.