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This paper analyzes how different dynamics of changes in piece-rate incentives affect individuals' exerted effort.

The authors constructed an across-subjects three-period laboratory setting where, for each period, they exogenously manipulate the amount of piece-rate incentive paid for correct answer. The same experimental conditions were separately applied to two different laboratory tasks, one boring and the other entertaining.

It was found that performance contingent incentives affect participants' effort provision, while the effect is task dependent and it is much stronger for the boring task. Moreover, a unique increase in the amount of piece rate between periods leads to an increase in performance only for the boring task. A decrease in piece rate incentive between periods negatively affects subjects' performance on both tasks, but only provided that the decrease follows a previous increase.

The paper is the first to study the effect of a sequence of changes in the amount of piece rate incentives on individual effort provided. Our main result highlights the relevance of the order in which the sequence of changes in piece-rate incentive occurs. Results could be useful for the designing of performance rewards in organizations.

Many companies use competition for either monetary or non-monetary rewards to induce employee effort. Pitting employees against each other in a competition could come at a thus far insufficiently considered cost of leading to lower employee cooperation. The authors examine how competition for monetary rewards in the form of tournament incentives or non-monetary rewards in the form of standing in uncompensated public rankings affects employee cooperation with former competitors in a subsequent task where the extent of the cooperation does not affect the welfare or social standing of the person deciding to cooperate. The authors hypothesize that competition in the first task negatively affects cooperation in the second task. The authors further predict that competition leads to psychological pressure, which mediates differences in cooperation. The results support the authors’ hypotheses. In addition, the authors find that the decrease in cooperation results from the behavior of low performers, whereas cooperation by high performers is not affected. The findings are important because they show that inducing effort in one dimension leads to an unintended cost in the form of lower cooperation in another dimension. This cost occurs for both types of competition – competition for monetary payoffs and for non-monetary rewards. Ultimately, the size of this cost depends on the marginal benefit from any cooperation of low performers.

Whereas the Minister of Labour (hereafter in this Order referred to as “the Minister”) has received from the Boot and Shoe Repairing Wages Council (Great Britain) the wages regulation proposals set out in the Schedule hereto;

Whereas the Minister of Labour (hereafter in this Order referred to as the “Minister”) has received from the Brush and Broom Wages Council (Great Britain) the wages regulation proposals set out in Schedules 1 and 2 hereof;

The study aims to focus on developing a methodology of technical calculation for fixation of piece rate for embroidery homeworkers of fashion industry to ensure an ethical livelihood standard. The standardised methodology for wage fixation will ensure better payments for homeworkers with clarity down the supply chain and sustainability of pay scales that will in turn improve the homeworkers’ impecunious living standards. The brands giving living wage will be benefitted in terms of savings on training costs, more stable work force, reliable services and enhancements to the reputation.

Interviews of subcontractors and agents down the supply chain in a target region were conducted to know current practice of wage fixation. The influential parameters were work content, basic living expenses and necessary benefits under government policies. Based on the aforementioned parameters, a formula has been generated. The present study is an attempt to develop a standard methodology to be used for piece rate calculation to ensure fair compensation for homeworkers. Impact of increased earnings of home workers on garment free on board cost has also been analysed.

As there is no uniformity in methodology used for piece rate calculation, and work content is not considered in calculating piece rate, the wage earned per month by homeworkers, minimum wage and living wage are INR 2,860, 6,998 and 8,007, respectively. Homeworkers receive 54-58 per cent of total embroidery labour cost incurred by suppliers. It can be increased up to 75 per cent, which would result in increasing the wage earned per month by homeworkers to INR 4,000.

The impact of implementing the outcome of the study will increase the earnings of embroidery homeworkers and reduce wage inequality in women’s favour, as there are more women than men in embroidery homeworking.

In this chapter, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and one with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the latter, we observe bunching of performance just above the bonus threshold, suggesting workers distort their behavior in response to the discrete bonus. Such bunching behavior increases as workers gain experience. At the same time, the bonus contract induces considerable learning-by-doing for workers throughout the productivity distribution who presumably hope to one day hit the target, and these improvements significantly outweigh the losses to the firm from the bunching. In contrast, under the standard piece rate contract, we find minimal evidence of bunching and only small performance improvements at the bottom of the productivity distribution. Our results suggest that contract design can help foster learning on the job, underscoring the importance of dynamic considerations in principle-agent models.

The goal of this study is to investigate the mediating effect of referral rewards on consumer willingness to recommend poverty-alleviating products and to identify the most effective referral rewards for incentivizing consumers to recommend poverty-alleviating products.

Tournament rewards and piece-rate rewards are designed based on the theory of indebtedness, the related literature and the actual background. SPSS 26.0 and AMOS 17.0 are used to analyze the structural equation model.

According to the structural equation analysis, the following findings were found: under the tournament reward condition, social image, feelings of indebtedness and perceived reward value negatively affect consumer willingness to recommend. Under the piece-rate reward condition, social image and feelings of indebtedness significantly negatively affect consumer recommendation willingness, while perceived reward value significantly positively affects consumer recommendation willingness. The mean recommendation willingness of the tournament reward group is significantly lower than that of the control group. In contrast, the mean recommendation willingness of the piece-rate rewards group is significantly higher than that of the control group.

Based on the study findings, the authors propose that enterprises apply piece-rate rewards to incentivize consumers to recommend poverty-alleviating products when designing such rewards. In this way, the sale of poverty-alleviating products can be improved.

This paper is a study of how people with heterogonous individual characteristics self-select into different compensation schemes. A laboratory experiment is designed in which “workers” can join “companies” that pay according to various schemes: piece rate, revenue sharing, individual tournament, and team tournament. The main findings are: (1) Subjects with high relative performance always prefer individual tournament. (2) Risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose competitive schemes. (3) Individual tournament attracts fewer women than men, which is partially explained by gender-specific social preferences. (4) Compared to people with siblings, only children are less likely to accept any team-based schemes without information about their teammates. (5) The provision of feedback about relative performance can adjust individuals’ biased self-beliefs and then influence their self-selections.

The current study examines the performance effects of financial incentives for a simple, recurrent task designed to simulate an assembly-line setting. The study looks at early performance, improvement and overall performance. For a new task, performance-based incentives appear to improve the initial performance of the task but not subsequent improvement rate (Bailey et al., 1998). The current paper reports on a laboratory experiment whose results confirm the findings of Bailey et al. (1998) but also indicates that for both performance-based and fixed incentives, significant performance improvement takes place well beyond the initial performance of the task, declining gradually over time. This is in contrast with the suggestion of Bailey et al. (1998) that workers with performance-based incentives will choose to improve initial performance rather than subsequent performance. Findings also suggest that improvement peaks earlier for performance-based incentives than for a fixed incentive. Improvement persisted longer and there was better overall performance with the high fixed component quota and piece rate incentives than with the low fixed component quota implying that incentives that impose higher risk (e.g. a low fixed component quota incentive) on workers result in de-motivation and lower performance.

Whereas the Minister of Labour (hereafter in this Order referred to as “the Minister”) has received from the Fur Wages Council (Great Britain) the wages regulation proposals set out in the Schedule hereto;