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Describes how there are unsolved problems within the philosophy of the social sciences, which cannot provide a coherent account of a style of science which is based on either explanation or understanding. No easy combination of elements from the empiricist and hermeneutic approaches is possible because of radically different epistemologies. Shows how, against this background of philosophical insecurity, action science seems to offer new possibilities by incorporating a form of practice of research which is aimed at understanding meaning, while at the same time retaining enough of the characteristics of the ideal of scientific reliability (hard data, explicit inference, public testing) to free it from the danger of uncritically adopting the internal viewpoint of participants. It is free from commitment to empiricist epistemological principles, so that it can combine elements of the explanatory and interpretative poles in a coherent way. Argues that it is a valuable contribution which can advance the discussion within the philosophy of the social sciences.

To discuss systemic thinking in relation to the naturalistic and anti‐naturalistic position in the philosophy of social science. To develop the theme in two parts: I and II.

A cybernetic approach is taken and a discussion on what is the foundation for the philosophy of social science for systemic thinking is developed.

The findings for Part I are that the rationalistic view of knowledge is based on reflection and reason. The empirical viewpoint on knowledge based on observations. The realistic view of knowledge is based on the link between the rationalistic and the empirical point of view. The systemic viewpoint is based on the realistic view of knowledge.

Provided assistance to social scientists who study social systems from the systemic or cybernetic point of view. Gives researchers studying problems/phenomena in social systems a systemic viewpoint.

It positioned systemic thinking in relation to the philosophy of social science.

The purpose of this article is to chronicle the publication events in the 1980s and 1990s that framed the development of the series of controversies in marketing that are known as the “philosophy debates”.

The article uses a participant’s retrospective approach.

The article finds that seven publication events are key to understanding marketing’s philosophy debates. The seven are the publication of the “little green book” by Grid, Inc. in 1976; the philosophy of science panel discussion held at the Winter American Marketing Association Educators’ Conference in 1982; the special issue of the Journal of Marketing on marketing theory in 1983; three articles on the “critical relativist perspective” by the Journal of Consumer Research in 1986 and 1988; the “blue book” by South-Western in 1991; a trilogy of articles on truth, positivism and objectivity in the Journal of Marketing and the Journal of Consumer Research in 1990-1993; and an article on “rethinking marketing” in the European Journal of Marketing in 1994.

Chronicling the key publication events enables readers to understand what the debates were about and provides readers a starting point for further investigating the issues in the debates.

To discuss systemic thinking in relation to the naturalistic position in the philosophy of social science. To develop the theme in two parts: Part I: systemic thinking and the naturalistic position; and Part II: the systemic position.

A cybernetic approach is taken, and a discussion on what is the foundation for the philosophy of social science for systemic thinking and the systemic position is developed.

The findings of Part I have been given. Part II analyses the systemic position and considers the classical controversy in social science between methodological individualism and methodological collectivism (holism). The pre‐condition on which the systemic position is based is given. The ideal requirements set up by the systemic position are presented under the headings: espistemology/methodology; ontology; axiology; and the ethical position.

Provided assistance to social scientists who study social systems from the systemic or cybernetic viewpoint and give a practical analysis of the systemic position. Provides researchers and others working in this field with an investigation of the role and conduct of social scientists.

It positioned systemic thinking in relation to the philosophy of social science.

The purpose of this paper is to spell out the urgent need to correct structural rationality defects in academia as it exists at present, so that it may become actively and effectively engaged in helping us solve the grave global problems that confront us.

The paper spells out an argument for the urgent need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes social wisdom and not just specialized knowledge, problems of living being put at the heart of the academic enterprise.

Natural science needs to become more like natural philosophy; social science needs to become social methodology or social philosophy; and a basic task of academia needs to become public education about what our problems are and what we need to do about them. Almost every part and aspect of academia needs to change.

The implication is the urgent need to bring about an intellectual/institutional revolution in academic inquiry, so that the aim becomes wisdom, and not just knowledge.

There are substantial practical implications for natural science, social inquiry and the humanities, education, social, economic and political life.

There is a need for a new kind of academic inquiry rationally designed and devoted to helping us make social progress towards as good a world as possible. The social implications are profound.

In the author’s view, bringing about the academic revolution, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry, is the single most important thing needed for the long-term interests of humanity.

The purpose is to forward systems theory one more step towards social theory and integrate problem-solving and theory-building, and search for the integration and unity of science by revealing the nature and role of critical systems thinking (CST).

This article describes relations between systems theory and social theory in three parts. First, it examines the links of systems methodologies with three social science approaches as well as the role of CST. Second, the focus of theory and the form of explanation are discussed from critical social science (CSS) perspective. Third, the direction of theorizing of a CST-based systems theory is investigated.

First, CST is a hidden assumption of system dynamics (SD)/systems thinking (ST). Second, systems theory is positioned in CSS. Third, CST integrates traditional and soft systems methodologies (SSM), and connects systems science and social science. Fourth, this article reveals hidden links between systems approaches and three corresponding social science approaches. Fifth, the theoretical focus of a CST-based systems theory could be formal/structure theory and/or substantive/content theory. Sixth, the form of explanation could be structural/mechanismic explanation combining causal and interpretive explanations. Seventh, a CST-based systems theory may adopt abduction, which complements a defect in deduction and induction in a difficulty of nonlinearity.

It illustrates a graph of the competing approaches in systems science corresponding to paradigms in social science.

The purpose of this paper is the conceptual expansion of the science-theoretical foundations of information science, i.e. to develop new thought schemes for information science.

The design of the paper is as follows: first, the paper will discuss the foundation of the systemic paradigm (SP). Then the authors will consider the history of information science related to the philosophy of science. In the remaining part of the paper, the authors will investigate information science and its relation to the philosophy of science, focusing on SP.

In conclusion, the authors will summarise the seven criteria for the application of SP in information science.

Paradigms in information science have rarely reflected upon the use of a SP in information science.

The practical use of the seven criteria in information science Criterion 1: make your premises, suppositions, prerequisites and motives explicit. Criterion 2: make your moral/ethical results and consequences explicit. Criterion 3: research should be evaluated in relation to the transcendence of knowledge. Criterion 4: emphasise methodical pluralism, i.e. empirical generalisations and conceptual generalisations. Criterion 5: emphasise proximity and in-depth studies. Criterion 6: look for patterns and patterns which combine. Criterion 7: look for the power behind the patterns.

The opinion is that scientists to a great extent should seek knowledge on the basis of a belief, a specific way of thinking, and by means of specific methods. To make the authors belief explicit makes the way of thinking visible. What the authors achieve, and possibly the only thing the authors can achieve, is to reaffirm the conscious belief. This does not make reality more real, but it could put the authors in a better position to see through the authors way of thinking when faced with scientific problems. This indicates that a scientific study should emphasise all three entities: “The Context of Discovery”, “The Context of Justification” and “The Context of Solution”. These three entities, according to SP, make up the unity of the scientific process.

The seven criteria entail that Kuhn’s argumentative chain (where he tries to find out why theory A is preferred to theory B on a rational pretext) does not concur with SP. This indicates that a scientific study should emphasise all three entities: “The Context of Discovery”, “The Context of Justification” and “The Context of Solution”. These three entities, according to SP, make up the unity of the scientific process.

In a recent essay entitled “Value‐relevant Sociology”, David Gray (1983:405–416) argues that if sociology has to be socially relevant, “it is essential that sociology becomes consciously value‐relevant, not value‐free.” He maintains that sociologists cannot analyse the consequences of social structure, forces, and change in a value‐free context if their works are to be relevant for social policies. He then goes on to say, “Between the extremes of value‐free, non‐relevant, sometimes trivial, sociology on the one hand, and immediate response to pressing socioeconomic problems and prevailing political winds on the other, where does the significant sociology lie?” (1983:406). For Gray, both extremes are inappropriate for a worthy academic discipline.

Much of the contemporary methodological literature tends to be self-referential and frequently ignorant of the breadth and depth of philosophical assumptions underpinning various methodological positions. Without a clear understanding of the philosophical underpinnings, logically deriving applicable validity criteria becomes very difficult (if not impossible). As a result, the purpose of this paper is to present a critical review of historical and more recent philosophical arguments for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research in social science.

A targeted review of seminal philosophy of science papers dealing with ontological and epistemological assumptions of, and relation between, natural and social science.

The paper highlights the link between ontological/epistemological assumptions and methodological choices in social science. Key differences between the natural and social science are discussed and situated within the main paradigms.

The paper draws attention to a range of difficulties associated with the adoption of the natural sciences and the related positivist approaches as a role model for work in the social sciences. Unique contributions of interpretive and critical approaches are highlighted. The paper may be of value to scholars who are interested in the historical context of the still-ongoing qualitative-quantitative debate.

The purpose of this paper is to give an outline of the main topics of an introductory course in complexity and social sciences.

This paper consists of a survey of the main issues and some of the classical literature for an audience with no background in philosophy of science, social philosophy, the literature on complex systems and social choice.

In the didactical framework of the article, it would be more accurate to speak of learning objectives rather than findings. The learning objectives are the acquisition of the basic knowledge for understanding the features, the possibilities and the limitations of scientific explanations and predictions and their applications in the long-term perspective of complex social systems.

Again, the implications are didactic. The basic knowledge that constitutes the learning objective of the course serves to give students the instruments for recognizing the main opportunities and obstacles in social forecasting.

The practical implications of this paper include making students aware of complexity-related problems in their working environment and of the opportunities and constraints involved in solving them.

Operators who are aware of the main issues involved can contribute to a more balanced approach to social forecasting: avoiding to raise unrealistic expectations and making more efficient use of the available instruments.

This paper summarizes an original combination of elements from the philosophy of science, epistemology, social philosophy and social choice.