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This study examined the human and social capital factors associated with higher post‐succession firm performance in family enterprises in Singapore. We also investigated the moderating influence of the board of directors in terms of its service role as stewards of the enterprise. We found that a successor’s industry experience and diversity of network ties were positively associated with firm performance and boards that focused their role as advisors to the successor enhanced post‐succession firm performance.

Workplace voice is well-established and encompasses behaviors such as prosocial voice, informal complaints, grievance filing, and whistleblowing, and it focuses on interactions between the employee and supervisor or the employee and the organizational collective. In contrast, our chapter focuses on employee prosocial advocacy voice (PAV), which the authors define as prosocial voice behaviors aimed at preventing harm or promoting constructive changes by advocating on behalf of others. In the context of a healthcare organization, low quality and unsafe patient care are salient and objectionable states in which voice can motivate actions on behalf of the patient to improve information exchanges, governance, and outreach activities for safer outcomes. The authors draw from the theory and research on responsibility to intersect with theories on information processing, accountability, and stakeholders that operate through voice between the employee-patient, employee-coworker, and employee-profession, respectively, to propose a model of PAV in patient-centered healthcare. The authors complete the model by suggesting intervening influences and barriers to PAV that may affect patient-centered outcomes.

We review and synthesize the burgeoning literature on institutions and agents engaged in the commercialization of university-based intellectual property. These studies indicate that institutional incentives and organizational practices play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of technology transfer. We conclude that university technology transfer should be considered from a strategic perspective. Institutions that choose to stress the entrepreneurial dimension of technology transfer need to address skill deficiencies in technology transfer offices, reward systems that are inconsistent with enhanced entrepreneurial activity, and education/training for faculty members, post-docs, and graduate students relating to interactions with entrepreneurs. Business schools at these universities can play a major role in addressing these skill and educational deficiencies through the delivery of targeted programs to technology licensing officers and members of the campus community wishing to launch startup firms.

SESSION I: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of product market competition on the oil uncertainty–investment relation.

The authors use firm-level financial data from the COMPUSTAT database, competition proxies from Hoberg and Phillips (2016) and macroeconomic data on crude oil price uncertainty. Corporate investment is measured as capital expenditure scaled by total assets or as the annual change in (net) total fixed assets plus depreciation. Since our panel data covers a short period (22 years) and the regressions include a combination of a lagged dependent variable and firm fixed effects, the authors apply Blundell and Bond’s (1998) GMM system when regressing corporate investment on the interaction between oil uncertainty and competition.

Consistent with the theories in the irreversible investment literature, the authors first show that investments are negatively related to oil uncertainty. Second, they show that firms in competitive industries decrease their investments in response to heightened uncertainty by a higher degree than firms in concentrated industries, suggesting that competition can exacerbate negative investment outcomes when success is uncertain. The authors also examine how competition relates to investment asymmetric reactions to positive and negative oil price return volatilities and find a stronger negative relationships between competition and investment-positive oil price volatility, indicating that increasing the probability of a negative outcome due to uncertainty leads firms to reduce investment to a larger extent.

The findings provide useful insights to guide corporate investment decisions under oil price change uncertainty. In particular, if firms can wait for the resolution of uncertainty before deciding to pursue irreversible investment in a competitive market, they can avoid potentially large losses by foregoing investment when the outcomes are unfavorable. This is because competition brings a greater uncertainty to firm performance if the investment outcome is poor, as firms in competitive industries share a large proportion of industry-wide profits with rivals and, thus, competition could erode profit margins and increases the likelihood of being driven out of the market. Hence, firms in competitive markets should balance between strategic preemptive motives and waiting for the resolution of uncertainty before deciding to pursue investment.

This study is the first to examine the effect of competition on the relationship between investment and oil price uncertainty. Moreover, it is the first to examine the effect of competition on the asymmetric response of investment to oil price uncertainty emanating from positive and negative changes in oil price.