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Purpose – To consider the possibility that research ethics committee perceptions of risk is tainted by their social distance from marginalised social groups and their lack of familiarity with carrying out fieldwork with criminally involved individuals. And to reflect on the potential for the negative perceptions create a vicious cycle by corroding trust and creating an over-reliance on a rigid interpretation of the ethical guidelines leading to tighter restrictions on researcher conduct.

Methodology/approach – Drawing on our experience of carrying out longitudinal research with a group of hard to reach drug using offenders the chapter uses case studies to offer a reflexive account of the practical problems raised by the research.

Findings – It provides examples of the way the ethical boundaries can be stretched and broken by the circumstances of the research. This arises, in part, from the tension of maintaining a trustful relationship with the participant or taking action that is in their interest and abiding by the ethical guidelines. The vicious cycle could be broken by changing the approach to ethical procedures by placing the care of the participants at the heart of the process and by giving due weight to their social circumstances. An ethics of care approach would shift the way researcher obligation to the participants and the project is conceptualised.

Originality/value of paper – The paper makes a valuable contribution to the debate about the negative impact of bureaucratic procedures on academic research among marginalised groups.

This essay charts an intellectual journey. Geoffrey M. Hodgson became an institutional economist in the 1980s. He explains how he discovered institutional economics and what strains of institutional thought were attractive for him. Another issue raised in this essay is how institutional researchers organize and move forward. Hodgson argues for an interdisciplinary approach, but this is not without its problems.

Political economies evolve institutionally and technologically over time. This means that to understand evolutionary political economy one must understand the nature of the evolutionary process in its full complexity. From the time of Darwin and Spencer natural selection has been seen as the foundation of evolution. This view has remained even as views of how evolution operates more broadly have changed. An issue that some have viewed as an aspect of evolution that natural selection may not fully explain is that of emergence of higher order structures, with this aspect having been associated with the idea of emergence. In recent decades it has been argued that self-organization dynamics may explain such emergence, with this being argued to be constrained, if not overshadowed, by natural selection. Just as the balance between these aspects is debated within organic evolutionary theory, it also arises in the evolution of political economy, as between such examples of self-organizing emergence as the Mengerian analysis of the appearance of commodity money in primitive societies and the natural selection that operates in the competition between firms in markets.

This article identifies the concept of market value as a standardizing concept that coordinates the actions of market participants in relatively inefficient real estate markets. The paper also identifies different levels of discourse that reflect the organizational/institutional complexity of the real estate appraisal profession. The standardizing effect of market value includes a cognitive and fiduciary component. Using this framework, the paper traces the influence of Richard T. Ely’s institutional economics – and its legacy in the form of the research program of Urban Land Economics at the University of Wisconsin – on the formation and development of the standards of appraisal and ethical practice. This complexity is traced historically from the early part of the 19th century to the formation of the professional organizations and the establishment of their standards, and also through a series of reform efforts in the 1960s and 1980s that were articulated in the academic community. The paper illustrates the manner in which Institutional Economics has been influential in the continuing development of the real estate appraisal profession and suggests reasons for its continuing relevance.

In 1978, Philip Klein wrote about institutional economists of the Veblen-Commons-Mitchell-Ayres variety: Whatever we call ourselves, we are not given much credit generally among our fellow economists, but I think there is evidence that an ever-wider group of economists has begun to hear what we are saying and to accept a number of our premises…institutionalism must be viewed as either never having died or as being in the process of a resurrection which I suggest will endure (Klein, 1978, p. 252).Klein’s optimism seems justified by the following quote from Joseph Stiglitz’s new book, Globalization and its Discontents: Old-fashioned economics textbooks often talk about market economics as if it had three essential ingredients: prices, private property, and profits. Together with competition, these provide incentives, coordinate economic decision making, ensuring that firms produce what individuals want at the lowest possible cost. But there has also long been a recognition of the importance of institutions (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 139; emphasis in original).Klein and other original institutionalists should be buoyed when they hear such a statement from a recent Nobel Prize winner. One problem, however, is that the “old-fashioned textbooks” are still being published in 2003. The quote also raises a question: just who recognized the importance of institutions and when did they recognize it? Statements such as the above by Stiglitz irk original institutionalists, but why? Is it because he underestimates the prominence of perfect competition in current texts, because he is understating original institutionalists’ positions as “keepers of the faith,” or both? In any case, we may not be able to hoist the V(eblen)-C(ommons) banner and claim total victory but, increasingly, more of economics today is institutional economics. A recent article by Allan Schmid demonstrates that indeed though everyone is not an institutionalist in the Veblen-Commons mold, “good economists find it useful to embrace some of its various elements” (Schmid, 2001, p. 281).