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Fragmentation can inhibit joint goals and performance measures. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the level of fragmentation between public, private and third sectors in a hybrid organization's performance management systems and the effects of this fragmentation to propose hypotheses and new research methods for future studies.

The inductive research design was based on a mixed method approach. As empirical data, a survey, interviews and documents were used in this case study examining a hybrid organization called Welfare Alliance.

The results showed low-level fragmentation in the performance management system of the hybrid. Although the level of fragmentation was low-level, it affected the hybrid's ability to implement joint performance goals and measures. Performance management practices suffered as a consequence.

As a theoretical contribution to research addressing performance management in hybrids, the study proposes new concepts and theoretical hypotheses concerning fragmented performance management systems in hybrids. These theoretical hypotheses propose how performance goals and measures can become fragmented because they isolate service production units and activities from each other. The proposed hypotheses for future studies also attempt to provide explanations for how fragmentation can spread from one management function to another (i.e. from goal setting to performance measurement).

This study examines unexplored horizontal accountability types between public, private and third sector actors within a hybrid organization. The case organization was applying a novel alliance model to generate service paths for heterogeneous clientele consuming cultural, educational, health and social services. It was first to do so in Finland.

This research is on a case study that used documents and interviews to examine the design of the horizontal accountability. The descriptive analysis focused on identifying what type of formal accountability system was designed (i.e. who is the account holder, and who is accountable and for what and why).

An imbalanced accountability system was identified because accountability obligations were unevenly distributed between public, private and third sector actors. The private sector was the most accountable for performance, and the third sector (i.e. voluntary sector) was the least accountable. As account holders, the public, private and third sector actors were judging their conduct as account providers. This created a biased horizontal accountability system. The hybrid's accountability system was dynamic because the contracts made to establish the hybrid included opportunities to change horizontal accountability if future changes to the external environment affect too drastically the potential to achieve the hybrid's goals.

Three new concepts are proposed for studying dysfunctional accountability systems: dynamic, biased and horizontally imbalanced accountability.