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In mid-February 2009, amid the global financial crisis, the news was grim. The U.S. economy had been in recession since December 2007. If the downturn lasted into early spring, it would become America's longest postwar recession. The economy had shed 3.5 million jobs over the previous 12 months, the worst 12-month period on record. Bank lending was plummeting; the few banks with funds available were holding onto them. With this massive shift into liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) and away from lending of any sort (even for productive uses or, in many cases, the working capital firms needed to survive), the economy would likely grind to a halt. On this brisk mid-February day in Washington, Timothy Geithner and Ben Bernanke rolled up their sleeves and reevaluated their plans to address the nearly impossible task of righting the ship. In terms of monetary and fiscal policy, were they doing all they could to halt this epic slide? Were they doing too much?

A hedge-fund strategist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the “new normal” that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is—the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Spain, and Ireland and those in Germany—how would they evolve over the next year? Was the dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates likely to persist, or would the coming year see a continuation of the modest reconvergence that has occurred since mid–2012? He knew many factors influenced long-term interest rates; he would have to use his entire toolkit to address this issue. The evidence was in no way clear-cut. Some factors pointed toward lower German rates, some toward higher, some toward a widening of euro zone spreads (even a dissolution of the euro zone as we know it?), and some toward reconvergence.

Corporate social responsibility, sustainability and business ethics.

This case has been designed for undergraduate students, with two target audiences. The first is business and management students following modules in corporate social responsibility (CSR), sustainability and business ethics. Here the accent is on allowing the students to explore and debate how CSR agendas are emerging within a specific sector of the retail economy. The second is students pursuing fashion, clothing, textile, retailing and consumer studies degrees and here the focus is on how some of the leading fashion goods retailers are addressing CSR. More generally the case can also be used on “Contemporary Issues” modules within general business and management programmes.

This small case offers an exploratory review of the emerging CSR issues currently being publicly addressed by the world's leading fashion goods retailers. It includes a brief introduction to CSR; a brief thumbnail sketch of the fashion goods industry; details of the method of enquiry; a description of the CSR issues currently being publicly addressed by the top ten fashion good retailers on their corporate web sites; and some critical reflections on the CSR agendas being pursued by these retailers. The case study is novel in two ways. First, it focuses upon what is an emerging market issue rather than on emerging markets per se though a number of the issues raised in the case have major implications for emerging economies. Second, it addresses the CSR issues being addressed by a number of the leading fashion goods retailers and as such it a not a case which relates to individual decision making. While the case is principally focussed upon the retail sector it ranges across the whole of the supply chain.

The paper provides an accessible review of the CSR issues and agendas currently being pursued by the leading fashion goods retailers and as such it will be of interest to academics, students and practitioners who are interested in both the fashion industry and corporate sustainability.

Teaching notes are available, please consult your librarian for access.

This case reviews different varieties of currency crises and two in particular: United Kingdom in 1992 and Hong Kong in 1998. These were two very different types of crises, and understanding them could serve the protagonist well when future crises occurred.

The case has the following learning objectives: to understand the dilemmas that an emerging market MNC faces during pre-and post-acquisition scenarios; understand and appreciate the basic tensions that arise when two different companies with different cultural setups are integrated; understand the importance of creating a culture integration road map to leverage the synergies of two successful companies; and understand the role of leadership in leading and managing change.

Asian Paints Ltd. has been a market leader in the Indian paint market for over five decades (since 1967). Over the years, starting in 1978, the company has steadily spread its footprint in the international arena as well. As of 2017, Asian Paints was a leader in 10 overseas markets, one of the top 3 paint companies in the Middle East, the largest paint manufacturing company in South Asia, and served 60 markets across the world. The international business contributed to around 12% of the company’s group turnover. In line with its long-term vision and to consolidate its presence in emerging markets, the company acquired Causeway Paints, a leading paint company in Sri Lanka, in April 2017. Asian Paints had a presence in Sri Lanka since 1999. Mr. Jatin Upadhyay, International Business Unit Head for Asian Paints, had played significant roles in the past in such acquisitions and was well aware of the impending challenges that came with such acquisitions. How would the integration of the two distinct entities be made possible without losing the overarching objective? How would the transition be managed? How would the cultural transition take place? What and how would the role be handled by the General Manager (GM) of Causeway Lanka? How would the new organisational structure support the transition? The case illustrates the complex management challenges that arise when a leading enterprise from a different country (Asian Paints) acquires a leading company in a different country, in this case, Causeway Paints, Sri Lanka.

The target audience for this case study is the students pursuing a post-graduate programme in management or an executive post-graduate programme in management. The case can also be used for management development programmes for experienced participants who are interested in understanding the possible scenarios that may arise after an acquisition when managing an international subsidiary in a different cultural setting.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 6: Human Resource Management.

This case traces Under Armour from its founding in 1996 through 2008 when the company entered the hyper-competitive non-cleated athletic footwear market. In 1996, with an innovative product and locker room access to college and pro players, Kevin Plank started Under Armour. He turned a struggling t-shirt company into a dominant player capturing 75% of the performance apparel market. In 2006, Under Armour successfully entered the athletic footwear market with a line of football cleats. Under Armour was the first company to disrupt Nike's dominance of the football cleat market by gaining 25% of the market within a year of introduction. In 2008, Under Armour entered the non-cleated athletic footwear market with a cross-trainer sneaker line and a $4.4 million Super Bowl ad. Unlike prior introductions, Nike responded aggressively to Under Armour's move into sneakers. Despite increased sales, Under Armour's costs increased, and profits and stock price decreased. The case concludes by asking students to evaluate Under Armour's next move. An extensive exhibit provides an overview of the athletic footwear industry in 2008.

The Beringer Wine Estates Company has been expanding its market share in the premium segment of the wine industry in the 1990's. After operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant Nestlé food company for almost a quarter of a century, the firm was sold in 1996 to new owners, in a leveraged buyout. For the next year and a half, management and the new owners restructured the firm and expanded through internal growth and strategic acquisitions. With a heavy debt load from the LBO, it seemed prudent for management to consider a significant rebalancing of its capital structure. By paying off a portion of its debt and enhancing the equity account, the firm would achieve greater financial flexibility which could enhance its growth rate and business options. Finally, a publicly held common stock would provide management with another “currency” to be used for enhancing its growth rate and overall corporate valuation. With the equity markets in turmoil, significant strategic decisions had to be made quickly. Should the IPO be completed, with the district possibility of a less than successful after market price performance and these implications for pursuing external growth initiatives? A variety of alternative courses of action and their implications for the financial health of the Beringer Company and the financial wealth of Beringer stockholders are integral components of this case.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence. Instead of improving the company's position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving. Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy. Students will take the view that Paul “Flip” Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

Students will: 1. Assess the importance and negative financial impact of past strategic moves, and suggest possible future strategic directions and the expected benefits of such changes. 2. Learn quantitative valuation methods for a company in Chapter 11 and their effects on stakeholders. 3. Learn the elements of a plan of reorganization, including the capital structure, treatment of multiple creditor groups, and management compensation. 4. Discuss sources and uses of capital during a Chapter 11 turnaround.

Hedge fund Magnetar Capital had returned 25 percent in 2007 with a strategy that posed significantly lower risk to investors than the S&P 500. Magnetar had made more than $1 billion in profit by noticing that the equity tranche of CDOs and CDO-derivative instruments were relatively mispriced. It took advantage of this anomaly by purchasing CDO equity and buying credit default swap (CDS) protection on tranches that were considered less risky. Now it was the job of Alec Litowitz, chairman and chief investment officer, to provide guidance to his team as they planned next year's strategy, evaluate and prioritize their ideas, and generate new ideas of his own. An ocean away, Ron Beller was contemplating some very different issues. Beller's firm, Peloton Partners LLP, had been one of the top-performing hedge funds in 2007, returning in excess of 80 percent. In late January 2008 Beller accepted two prestigious awards at a black-tie EuroHedge ceremony. A month later, his firm was bankrupt. Beller shorted the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis hit, and was paid handsomely for his bet. After the crisis began, however, he believed that prices for highly rated mortgage securities were being unfairly punished, so he decided to go long AAA-rated securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans (between prime and subprime), levered 9x. The trade moved against Peloton in a big way on February 14, 2008, causing $17 billion in losses and closure of the firm.

This case analyzes the strategies of the two hedge funds, focusing on how money can be made and lost during a financial crisis. The role of investment banks as lenders to hedge funds such as Peloton is explored, as well as characteristics of the CDO market and an array of both mortgage-related and credit protection-related instruments that were actively used (for better or worse) by hedge funds during the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008.

Describes Nintendo's rise to dominance in the home video game industry in the late 1980s. Then presents the challenges Nintendo faced in 1990 as 16-bit processors entered the market against the 8-bit Nintendo Entertainment System.