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The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of Baumol’s work on entrepreneurship has had on framing the economic development puzzle.

In many ways, the intuition behind the paper is straightforward. Entrepreneurs allocate their time and attention based on the relative payoffs they face in any given social setting. If the institutional environment rewards productive entrepreneurship, then the time and attention of entrepreneurial actors in the economy will be directed toward realizing the gains from trade and the gains from innovation. If, on the other hand, there are greater returns from the allocation of that time and attention toward rent-seeking and even criminal activity, alert individuals will respond to those incentives accordingly. The simplicity of the point being made is part of the brilliance in Baumol’s article. As with other classics in economics, once stated the proposition seems to be so basic it is amazing that others did not put it that way beforehand.

It has been 25 years since Baumol published his paper in the Journal of Political Economy, and as pointed out, it has had a significant scientific impact. But to put things in perspective, James Buchanan’s “An economic theory of clubs” published in 1965 has accumulated roughly 3,500 citations, F.A. Hayek’s “The use of knowledge in society,” published in 1945 has over 12,000, and Ronald Coase’s “The problem of social cost” published in 1960 has over 28,000 citations. So Baumol’s paper would put him in rather elite company. The great strength of the paper is to focus the attention on the relative payoffs of productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurial activity. But one of the most significant disappointments of the subsequent history of this paper is a methodological one. The comparative case study approach that Baumol employed did not result in a renewed appreciation for narrative forms of empirical research in political economy. It could legitimately be argued that the sort of questions about the fundamental institutional causes of economic growth and development can only be captured with these more historical methods. Attempts to force fit this analysis into a set of methodological tools which have already revealed themselves to be inadequate to do justice of the role of institutions and disregard the underlying cultural norms and beliefs that characterize human sociability.

In this paper, the authors will focus on the contribution made by Baumol’s 1990 paper on the field of comparative political economy, and in particular on the literature on transitional political economy. Section 2 places Baumol’s argument in the context of the failure of neoclassical growth theory. Section 3, the authors argue that although the Baumol framing was an improvement over the old comparative economic systems literature, contemporary transitional political economists have failed to fully realize the implications of the institutional revolution. They have therefore been unable to understand the causes of the heterogeneity of outcomes among those countries that transitioned from communism to the market economy in the 1990s. In Section 4, the authors argue that the political economy of transition will gain from a more sophisticated view of the economic process of the market economy, an appreciation of the entrepreneurial function, and a deeper understanding of the role of formal and informal institutions and their effect on entrepreneurship. The authors will illustrate the point with some examples from the recent history of the Russian political and economic transition. Credible commitment problems and the deficiencies of the institutional reforms of the early 1990s were responsible for the failure of reallocating the entrepreneurial talent that existed in the Soviet economy to productive economic activities. The framework can therefore be used to solve the puzzle of why the announced liberalization of Russian markets and privatization of previously state-owned resources led to economic stagnation, the growth of black markets, and the rise of organized crime, instead of economic development through the operations of smoothly operating markets. Section 5 briefly concludes.

Recent studies have shown that the contribution of small firms to employment and GDP is increasing. A large amount of work has also established the significance of social and economic variables for entrepreneurial decisions. Very little is known, however, about how government policies and programs influence entrepreneurial activity, and whether these effects are consistent across countries. Using original data from a representative sample of 10,000 individuals and from more than 300 open-ended interviews in 10 countries, this article provides some suggestive evidence that government intervention aimed at enhancing the underlying environment of entrepreneurial decisions may be more effective than intervention designed to provide safety nets.

When managers wish to raise external capital, investors must be able to trust that brokers and managers will not cheat them out of their money. To what extent is government regulation necessary for the existence of advanced financial transactions and, for that matter, the well functioning of markets in general? A growing literature argues that strong state enforcement is needed to foster financial markets (La Porta et al, 1997, Glaeser et al, 2001). The problem of contractual performance and, more generally, the problem of social order are some of the most enduring questions in the social sciences. German sociologist Georg Simmel may have put it most eloquently in his 1910 essay when he asked, “How is Society Possible?” but the question is rooted in a discourse dating back at least to Thomas Hobbes’s (1651) Leviathan. Hobbes contended that social order was impossible without external enforcement, and in a similar manner many modern commentators in law and finance maintain that the state must play an active role for markets to function. In his study of emerging financial markets in post‐Soviet Russia, Timothy Frye (2000:2) argues that, “politics underpins social order”.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how culture affects economic development on Native American reservations by examining how culture directs the attention of entrepreneurs and interacts with formal governance institutions.

This paper combines theoretical insights from economic sociology, market process economics and institutional economics as a basis to evaluate entrepreneurship and economic development on Native American reservations. Culture, as a web of social meanings, shapes what opportunities entrepreneurs are alert to, influences how they perceive transaction costs and determines whether institutions achieve their intended ends. Historical and contemporary case studies are used to build analytical narratives to corroborate the theoretical approach.

The federal government has imposed many formal institutions on reservations, which have disrupted traditional governance and property rights structures. If formal institutions do not comport with the underlying culture, those institutions do not facilitate positive entrepreneurship and economic growth. Despite the barriers, entrepreneurs across several reservations have leveraged their cultural and social ties to create robust informal economies. In some cases, imposed institutions have fostered rent-seeking and have given rise to a culture of rent-seeking.

This paper looks at Native American entrepreneurship and institutions in the broadest sense. However, there is a large amount of diversity within the cultural and governance structures of Native American communities. Future research could examine specific tribes or reservations in more detail.

This paper elucidates cultural and institutional barriers to productive entrepreneurship on Native American lands. Policymakers must understand these root causes if they are to facilitate economic growth.

This paper’s combination of theoretical perspectives helps explain the widespread economic development issues on Native American lands.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the full opportunity cost of population policies by contrasting standard models of optimal population, which consider individuals to be homogeneous laborers, with a view that considers individuals' capacity for entrepreneurship. This paper therefore examines this relationship between population and economic growth with entrepreneurship considered.

The paper draws on James Buchanan's dichotomy of the organismic theory of government finance vs the individualistic theory and applies this dichotomy to population planning. This framework reveals entrepreneurial capacity is only compatible with the open-ended individualistic view. Lastly, the paper utilizes considers the number of potential entrepreneurs lost to China's one child policy and considers the case of Jack Ma as a concrete example of the potential opportunity cost of policies which seek to curb population growth.

The analysis shows it is impossible for either natural scientists or economists to determine a welfare-enhancing population policy. Creative and entrepreneurial individuals contribute to the economy in ways not captured by standard models. The implication is policies seeking to curb population growth may inhibit economic growth by reducing potential entrepreneurs. Politicians cannot measure the opportunity cost of forgone entrepreneurs, and therefore the costs of such policies are unseen.

While economists have examined the potential gains from creativity, this contribution is unique in that it highlights the inherent open-endedness involved in entrepreneurship means the opportunity cost of a forgone individual cannot be know because market conditions created by entrepreneurs do not exist absent the entrepreneurs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the institutional context of the entrepreneurial discovery of blockchain applications.

This paper draws on institutional and entrepreneurial theory to introduce the economic problem entrepreneurship in the early stages of new technologies, examines the diversity of self-governed hybrid solutions to coordinating entrepreneurial information and draws policy implications.

To perceive a valuable and actionable market opportunity, entrepreneurs must coordinate distributed non-price information under uncertainty with others. One potential class of transaction cost economising solution to this problem is private self-governance of information coordination within hybrids. This paper explores a diverse range of entrepreneurial hybrids coalescing around blockchain technology, with implications for innovation policy.

This paper points to the problem of how the defining of the innovation problem as either choice-theoretic or contract-theoretic changes the remit of innovation policy. Innovation policy and blockchain policy should extend beyond correcting sub-optimal investments or removing barriers to action, to incorporate how polices impact entrepreneurial choices over governance structures to coordinate information.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long partnered with universities and other nonprofit organizations to perform early-stage, military-related research using research centers established under long-term contracts known as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Over the last 25 years, there has been a shift in the type of arrangement used to University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) that this paper argues is the result of bureaucrats acting as evasive entrepreneurs in response to changing regulations.

Extending the theory of evasive entrepreneurship to bureaucrats, the author shows how regulations increase the cost of bureaucratic action and incentivize the creation of substitute actions to avoid those regulatory costs and capture benefits. Qualitative evidence from DOD documents is used to support the contention that UARCs serve the same function as FFRDCs. Quantitative evidence on the number of FFRDCs and UARCs and their funding illustrates how bureaucrats respond to political restrictions.

Bureaucrats have little to no recourse to respond to budgetary cuts or spending ceilings. In the case of FFRDCs, spending ceilings were introduced starting in the 1960s and led to a decline in the number of DOD FFRDCs. Bureaucrats can however strategically evade new regulations by reorganizing transactions justified by existing federal law that contradicts new regulations. Once FFRDCs were federally regulated in 1990 there were strong incentives to create substitute arrangements leading to the creation of UARCs in 1996 that have ultimately replaced FFRDCs as the research center of choice for the DOD.

The article makes three contributions. First, it applies the concept of evasive entrepreneurship to a political context and then use that framework to understand the creation and establishment of the DOD's UARCS. Second, the organizational features and purpose of UARCs are analyzed. Third, the evidence provided shows how regulations resulted in a shift in the DOD's R&D strategy toward working with universities.

The purpose of this paper is to study if the employees’ optimism-pessimism ratio predicts their creativity.

In total, 134 employees reported their optimism and pessimism, and the respective supervisors described the employees’ creativity.

The relationship between the optimism-pessimism ratio and creativity is curvilinear (inverted U-shaped); beyond a certain level of the optimism-pessimism ratio, the positive relationship between the ratio and creativity weakens, suggesting that the possible positive effects of (high) optimism may be weakened by a very low level of pessimism.

Being cross-sectional, the study examines neither the causal links between the optimism-pessimism ratio and creativity nor other plausible causal links. The study was carried out at a single moment and did not capture the dynamics that occur over the course of time involving changes in optimism/pessimism and creativity. Future studies may adopt longitudinal or quasi-experimental designs.

Managers and organizations must consider that, even though positivity promotes creativity, some level of negativity may help positivity to produce creativity.

This study suggests that scholars who want to study the antecedents of creativity (and innovation) must be cautious in focusing only on the positive or the negative sides of individuals’ characteristics, and rather they must explore the interplay between both poles. Individuals may experience both positive and negative states/traits (Smith et al., 2016), and this both/and approach may impel them to think divergently, to challenge the status quo and to propose “out the box” and useful ideas.