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Describes the winning formula at Neiman Marcus that has made it the No. 1 luxury retailer in the United States in terms of sales per square foot and profitability. Highlights Neiman Marcus' efforts to define who its customers are and are not and to achieve superior focus on its customers by aligning location, price, service, and merchandise to fulfill these customers' every need. Describes ways in which Neiman Marcus prevents typical silo behavior between merchandising and selling and how it ensures that the right merchandise gets to the right customer, despite the challenge of doing this in 36 micromarkets.

To show how a company integrates two strong high-performance functions—merchandising and sales—to get the right merchandise to each customer in more than 30 diverse selling locations while consistently providing exceptional customer service.

The case was developed from two 2-h interviews with the Chief Operating Officer of A-Basin, Alan Henceroth; there is no CEO of A-Basin. The second interview was recorded on a Zoom call to provide accuracy of quotations and information. A variety of secondary sources were used in terms of better understanding the current state of the ski industry, as well as its history.

Arapahoe Basin (A-Basin) is a historic, moderately sized, ski area with proximity to metropolitan Denver, Colorado. For over 20 years A-Basin partnered with Vail, allowing skiers to use the Vail Epic Pass, for which A-Basin received some revenue from Vail for each skier visit. The Epic Pass allowed pass holders unlimited days of skiing at A-Basin. More and more skiers were buying the Epic Pass, thus increasing the customer traffic to A-Basin. However, the skier experience was compromised due inadequate parking, long lift lines and crowded restaurants. The renewal of the contract with Vail was coming due, and A-Basin had to consider whether to renew the contract with Vail. The case is framed primarily as a strategic marketing case. The authors use Porter’s five forces model to assess the external environment of A-Basin, and the authors use the resource-based view and the VRIO tool to assess A-Basin’s internal strengths. Both frameworks provide useful analysis in terms of deciding whether to continue A-Basin’s arrangement with Vail or end the contract and pursue a different strategy. In 2019, after consultation with the Canadian parent company Dream, A-Basin made the decision to disassociate itself from the Epic Pass and Vail to restore a quality ski experience for A-Basin’s customers. No other partner had ever left its relationship with Vail. An epilogue details some of A-Basin’s actions, as well as the outcomes for the ski area. Generally A-Basin’s decision produced positive results and solidified its competitive position among competitors. Other ski areas have since adopted a similar strategy as A-Basin. A-Basin’s success is reflected in a pending offer from Alterra, Inc., to purchase the ski area.

The A-Basin case can be used in both undergraduate and graduate strategic (or marketing) management courses. It is probably best considered during the middle of an academic term, as the case requires students to apply many of the theoretical concepts of strategy. One of the best books to enable students to use Porter’s five forces is Understanding Michael Porter by Joan Magretta (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012). Magretta was a colleague of Porter for many years and was an Editor of the Harvard Business Review. For a discussion of the VRIN/VRIO concept, see Chapter 4 of Essentials of Strategic Management by Gamble, Peteraf and Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2019).

In 2014, after nearly 150 years as one of Portugal's most wealthy and powerful families, the Espirito Santo family completely lost control of its empire, which included Banco Espirito Santo, Portugal's largest bank by market capitalization and second-largest private-sector bank in terms of assets, along with stakes in numerous financial, non-financial, privately held, and publicly traded companies. During the European financial crisis of 2010 to 2014, many of the family's companies required capital investment. To avoid family equity dilution, the family's patriarch, Ricardo Espirito Santo Silva Salgado, engaged in a creative money-go-round structure whereby Banco Espirito Santo would legally raise short-term commercial paper with high interest rates and sell them to third parties that were partially owned by the Espirito Santo family. These third parties then would sell that paper back to the bank's retail clients as safe investments similar to Portuguese deposits. The plan failed, and the house of cards that was the Espirito Santo empire collapsed. Students will consider whether Salgado and the board of Banco Espirito Santo acted appropriately or if they failed their fiduciary duties to the non-family shareholders of the bank.

Pebble Technology Corporation (Pebble) was an early entrant into the smartwatch industry. Pebble’s Founder, Eric Migicovsky, began thinking about creating a smartwatch in 2008 while still an undergraduate engineering student. After selling about 1,500 prototype watches, he was accepted into Silicon Valley’s prestigious Y Combinator business start-up program. Finding it difficult to attract investors, Migicovsky launched a crowdfunding campaign that raised a record-breaking $10.27m on Kickstarter. The case concludes shortly after Apple’s unveiling of its soon-to-be-released Apple Watch. The case provides an opportunity to evaluate Pebble’s various strategic options at the time of Apple’s announcement.

The authors observed over 30 h of video and audio recordings of speeches, interviews and other events involving Pebble’s founder, other Pebble executives, investors and competitors. These recordings are all publicly available. Whenever possible, the authors also reviewed the Twitter feeds, Facebook sites and personal websites of Pebble’s top executives over time. Similarly, the authors followed Pebble’s official website, corporate blog and Kickstarter campaign websites. The authors also drew from numerous media reports. Due to the public nature of the data, no company release is provided nor has any information been disguised in any way.

The case is designed for both undergraduate and graduate students for courses in strategic management.

Data for the case came from public sources, including legal proceedings, court filings, company press releases and Securities and Exchange Commission filings.

In June 2020, former Pinterest employees made public charges of gender and racial discrimination. Despite changes implemented by the company, several Pinterest shareholders filed derivative lawsuits charging the company with breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets, abuse of control and violating federal securities laws. The case provides an overview of the company’s management, board and stock structures, as well as information on the shareholders who sued the company and their concerns. The case raises substantial questions about management’s and board member’s responsibilities in corporate governance, illustrates how stock structures can be used to impede governance and suggests ways to evaluate activist shareholders.

This case is appropriate for graduate, advanced undergraduate or executive education courses in strategy, corporate governance or strategic human resources that discuss corporate governance, fiduciary responsibilities, designing workplace culture or management responses to shareholders. Instructors can apply two sets of theories and frameworks to this case: theories of corporate governance and Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice or loyalty framework in the context of shareholder activism.