Search results

Friedman and Schwartz have argued that the Great Depression was primarily caused by mistakes in monetary policy. This paper presents evidence supporting this view. Four percent money growth over the period 1929–1941 is found to prevent the Great Depression completely. Indeed, had such a policy been followed, real income would have grown nearly as rapidly in the 1930s as it grew in the 1920s.

Based on the proceedings of a conference organised by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago, 1999. The Editors demonstrate, through contributions from business historians and economists, that “advanced research” has superceded the neo‐classical theory of the firm.

The editorials of the then-new Business Week during the 1929–1933 contraction offered sophisticated Keynesian policy prescriptions: against a laissez-faire response, against deflation, against balanced-budget fetishism, for monetary expansion. These editorials, which seem to have been largely forgotten, likely played a considerable role in the dissemination of Keynesian economics in the United States in the 1930s. This chapter reviews the editorials and their congruence with Keynes’s writings. The magazine’s archives, including surveys of their readers, suggest that the editorials were among the most read and most valued parts of the magazine. The magazine cultivated an elite executive readership at that time, so the editorials may well have been important in gaining business support for Keynesian policies in the early New Deal.

The past two decades have witnessed a transformation in the corporate human resource (HR) function – moving away from a role of balancing multiple interests toward a narrower focus on business objectives – yet we know little about how this change occurred. This study finds that the functional backgrounds of senior HR managers played an important role in determining the changing health benefits of large corporations. Managers with finance backgrounds controlled costs more than those with traditional HR backgrounds and contracted with fewer health plans – yet surprisingly without measured differences in health care quality management. These results suggest that more attention should be paid to the backgrounds of managers in the wider evolution of HR.

The Great Depression reached a turning point in the currency crises of 1931, and the German banking and currency crisis was a critical event whose causes are still debated. We demonstrate in this paper that the crisis was primarily domestic in origin; that it was a currency crisis rather than a banking crisis; and that the failure was more political than economic. German banks failed in 1931, but the problem was not primarily with them. Instead, the crisis was a failure of political will in a time of turmoil that induced a currency crisis.

During the contraction from 1929 to 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This chapter introduces that hitherto dormant data and presents aggregate series constructed from it. The new data series will supplement, and in some cases, supplant the data currently used to study banking panics during the period, which were published by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 1937.

Eugene Meyer governed the Federal Reserve Board during most of the Great Contraction. Yet his role and import are almost unknown. He was not misguided by incorrect policy indicators or the real bills doctrine; the usual explanations for the failure of monetary policy. Meyer urged the adoption of expansionary policies and created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to assist banks, especially nonmembers. However, the diffusion of power enabled the district bank Governors to stifle his efforts, although an expansionary policy was finally adopted in 1932. His unquestioning commitment to gold and lack of operational authority are the reasons policy failed.

Being a relatively newer member to the school of Austrian economics, I have seen the world of the economics profession and its many schools of thought through many lenses. Having this different perspective, I disagree with Pete Boettke on his ideas for ways to change the procedural way the Austrian school does economics. We need to be empirical about not just the economy, but of the history of economic thought. I believe the main goal should not be higher impact factors, but true progression of scientific knowledge. More focus on what we are doing, and less on counting articles.