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This study aims to develop a Stackelberg Game Model for seeking the optimal subsidy plans with varying levels of government financial capability (GFC). Furthermore, the scenario-based analysis is conducted and will enable governments to identify a comprehensive subsidy plan as follows: improve project performance and optimise social welfare.

A Stackelberg Game Model is developed to optimise the effectiveness of subsidies on the performance of public-private partnerships (PPPs).

According to the scenarios that are generated from the model, governments that are confronting with limited public budgets could reduce the intensity of performance incentives and increase the participation-oriented subsidy. Whilst a participation-oriented subsidy can stimulate private organisations’ willingness to participate in infrastructure PPPs, a performance-oriented subsidy is capable of facilitating the projects’ performances. Intuitively, the performance-oriented subsidy enables the private entities of PPPs to improve their efforts on the projects to realise higher profits. However, the participation-oriented subsidy is unable to affect the level of their effort spent on the projects. To satisfy both parties’ expectations in a PPP, the performance-oriented subsidy needs to be prioritised for a purpose of enabling higher quality outputs.

The game model developed in this study contributes to the literature by offering new insight into the underlying mechanism of governments and private entities, in terms of their decision-making for subsidy planning and contributions (i.e. resource allocation and spending) during the life-cycle of PPPs. This research enriches the government subsidy model by revealing the effects of the GFC and clarifies the impacts of two different schemes of subsidy on the performance of PPPs.

The government has been conventionally viewed as being omnipotent to provide PPPs with a wide range of subsidies. However, the subsidies are not unlimited, due to GFC. In addressing this void, this study has modelled the impacts of government subsidy plans with a consideration of GFC-related constraints. The combined effects of the participation- and performance-oriented subsidies on the project performance of PPPs have been examined.

Introduction The Hungarian economic reform in 1968 was a departure from the centralised, autocratic economic and political system which existed prior to that time. In the old system, those at the different levels of the power structure were absolutely self‐confident about their ability and right to determine what was good for everybody else. They were not interested in the opinions of their subordinates, especially when those opinions concerned poor decision making at higher levels. Human resources were badly managed, and knowledge and skills were misused. This resulted in a lack of commitment by subordinates and also in a lack of interest in doing the right things. Those lacking power and responsibility were depressed with their work and held little hope for future improvement. They were not motivated to improve their performance in the absence of clear, honest performance‐oriented incentive and promotion systems. Personnel departments were more concerned about the political reliability of the people in a company than about their capabilities and skills and the match of these with the company's future plans. Alienation of people, along with dissatisfaction, could have been tapped if anyone had been interested in coping with these problems, which contributed considerably to the growing incompetence in managing the economy and the companies in the changing environment of the '60s. There appeared to be no way out of the crisis other than decentralisation; getting more people involved in decision making and problem solving.

This article surveys budgetary reforms in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which have aimed both at reducing budget deficits and improving public sector performance.(1) It discusses the pressures giving rise to these reforms, recent trends in reducing deficits and the changes to budgetary processes adopted by various countries. Brief reference is also made to changes in expenditure programs. In some OECD Member countries, changes to budgetary processes have been part of an overall program of reform in public sector management. While there are differences of emphasis between countries, there is considerable convergence toward establishing new budgetary processes which have multi-year approach, provide for greater budgetary devolution to ministries and agencies and focus more on managing the performance of government organizations and programs.

Pay for performance has been studied in Western nations, but much less so in China and its non‐public enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the current situation of pay for performance in China's non‐public firms, specifically the importance of pay for performance in the current pay system and reasons for adopting pay for performance plans by the management.

A multi‐case study of non‐public sector, knowledge intensive firms based in Shanghai, China is presented. In total, 12 private‐owned, joint ventures and multinational companies from pharmaceutical, information technology and investment industries are included.

This paper explores that pay for performance has been widely used in non‐public sector as an important component of the employee pay mix. Performance also plays a role as a key norm in employee pay determinant plans. Three major factors are identified as reasons for management to apply pay for performance plans. The first concerns external factors – market practices/best practices; while the other two factors are internal reasons – the need to attract and retain good performers as well as the need to improve employee performance.

This paper discusses the content and context changes of pay for performance practices in China after the economic reforms in 1978 to present. It is now evident that Chinese firms are becoming much more receptive to performance‐oriented rewards.

The COVID-19 pandemic has generated a crisis that has hit the European economy and the currently existing systems. To cope with the crisis, Europe has started an investment aiming the energy transition and crisis. Portugal, Spain and Greece have received the approval of their National Recovery Plans from the European Commission, with a definition of spending up to 2026 through the European Union (EU) Next Generation Found. The study investigates whether the Green Deal policies are relaunched by the plans financed and whether the pandemic has changed and conditioned the priorities of the energy transaction. The study uses the lens of corporate social responsability (CSR) and relapse measurable across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Green Deal policies supported by new European investments in the three countries were analyzed through a content analysis (CA) technique to investigate the associated practical and theoretical elements.

The energy theme has a relevance compared to other issues in the investment plans envisaged in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The analysis highlights energy efficiency, sustainable energy and reduction of consumption among the main themes. Energetically, sustainable building plays a central role. The study highlights the relationship between Green Deal policies, CSR, SDGs and management tools adopted.

The study strengthens the relationship between the Green Deal, CSR and SDGs by identifying policies that have already been implemented and theoretical and practical gaps on which politicians and scholars will have to investigate and support in the process of development and continuity of the identified pillars.

The purpose of this paper is twofold – on the one hand, to introduce a framework for benchmarking of wine regions and on the other, to analyze the activities of wineries in Bulgaria with a clear focus on tourism.

The research design includes secondary data and content analysis, which are complemented by a survey among wine cellar owners and managers in the country, including respondents from all five wine regions.

The paper has identified several problems that impede wine tourism development in Bulgaria, including: small number of wineries, small share of Protected Designation of Origin wines, ineffective business hours structure and small share of wineries offering additional services beyond tasting or cellar-door sales. On the other hand, wineries in Bulgaria conform to international trends in terms of providing accommodation, restaurant and SPA treatments. The survey revealed that tourism-hosting wineries consider wine tourism an important part of their activity but do not succeed in attracting a sufficient number of visitors, and the share of tourism-related revenues to their total incomes is small.

The survey included all the wineries in the country; in one of the regions (the Black Sea region), however, the response rate was very low, which means that while results and conclusions are representative for the country as a whole, they might not be applicable to this specific region.

The research results refer to an emerging wine destination, which has not been the object of a comprehensive study yet. In addition, the proposed update of an existing benchmarking model reflects recent changes and trends in the wine tourism industry.

Comparative performance measurement (CPM) is a tool that is increasingly advocated by both academics and practitioners yet its systematic implementation via consortium participation is rare. Using logistic regression and content analysis of survey results from Florida’s 297 city managers, the authors found support for performance measurement but limited belief in the utility and cost-effectiveness of CPM in their jurisdictions. Support for performance measurement as a management tool, organizational capacity, and belief in the Tiebout Hypothesis were found to be significant drivers of support for CPM. Graduate education was a significant predictor of assigning high priority to CPM, but community budget format was insignificant. These findings were consistent across both large and small cities. Respondents were skeptical regarding the benefits that might accrue to their jurisdictions relative to the time and resources needed for implementation.

This paper aims to determine the most possible telecommunications regulatory system for the Palestinian Authority by investigating its institutional foundations. The paper highlights the problem of setting sophisticated institutions in fragile states that do not fully control their resources and investigates possible solution in terms of foreign investments.

The paper follows a qualitative research approach in two parts. The first part examines the institutional endowment framework set by Levy and Spiller and Levy and Spiller but considers critique of the framework. It also investigates institutional problems in fragile states in order to identify similar patters identified in Levy and Spiller framework. The second part focuses on the Palestinian Authority institutional foundations. Data are collected through interviews with key stakeholders of the Palestinian telecommunications sector.

The case of the Palestinian Authority shows a mix of political investment cycles and a genuine attempt of regulatory reforms. Endogenous fragility of the government magnified the effect of corruption and the maintenance of business‐politicians ties. Also, the Palestinian telecommunications sector suffers from exogenous fragility in terms of Israeli control of radio spectrum, international gateway, and importing of equipment. Inability of the Palestinian Authority to invoke GATS BTA conflict resolution mechanism and the crucial role foreign investors played to secure release of spectrum for the second mobile operator indicates the need for the Palestinian Authority to attempt attracting foreign investment. However, foreign investments require regulatory effectiveness that the Palestinian Authority lacks; thus eliminating endogenous fragility becomes a prerequisite to exogenous fragility.

This paper sheds light on problems regarding setting up an institution‐based regulatory system in unstable states. It contributes to the argument that “one size fit all” might not be the answer for some countries, especially fragile ones.

Examines the move towards a commercialized, economically driven, health sector in New Zealand. Reforms involve extensive organizational rearrangements and the creation of profit‐driven businesses in place of public hospitals. These institutional rearrangements involve the fabrication of new ways of accounting. Attempts to understand the processes involved in the development of information technologies before they become accepted “facts” of organizational life. The fabrication of new technologies cannot be understood as an autonomous sphere of activity, but has to be understood as part of a complex series of political, economic and organizational contexts. Accountants are viewed not as mere technicians reporting on what is, but as active agents contributing to change. Accounting often acts as an arbiter in social conflict. Nowhere is this more evident than in the way it is being called upon to assist in the implementation of clause 25 of the Health and Disability Services Bill, which requires hospitals in New Zealand to act as competitive profit motivated commercial enterprises while at the same time meeting unspecified social obligations. The creation of a pseudo‐market for health services presents a challenge not only for accountants, but for all New Zealand citizens. The outcomes of the radical reforms are uncertain and some fear that the massive restructuring is in the form of an experiment. It is based on an ideology lacking empirical support. In the end it may be shown to have been impractical in the New Zealand context.