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The purpose of this paper is to propose two performance-based capital budgeting (PBCB) approaches. The proposed approaches aim to assign limited capital within different firms based on their performance. These approaches have been applied to capital budgeting process of the technical and vocational training schools of Semnan Province, Iran for the fiscal year 2014–2016. Although the current capital of each decision-making unit (DMU) is secured in the first approach, the second approach provides possibility of sharing the capital between DMUs.

Data envelopment analysis which is a broadly used mathematical programming technique for assessing performance of DMUs is utilized for the first phase of both approaches. The proposed models are based on linear programming. Different scenarios are presented and their pros and cons for the capital budgeting process are discussed.

The proposed approaches are applied to capital budgeting process for a fiscal year of technical and vocational training schools of Semnan Province, Iran. The budget allocation of the previous year has been found to be non-optimal in terms of budget consuming. This emphasizes reconsideration of budget allotment within schools. The results show a high potential for producing more outputs. The second approach that provides the possibility of sharing and realloting of budget between schools based on their performance may be crucial for those schools that are not performing efficiently because there is possibility of losing budget in each given year in contrast with the previous years.

This paper proposes two linear programming-based approaches for the PBCB. The author not only deals with static framework but also proposes dynamic structured models. Using performance-based budgeting in organizations has been emphasized by authorities in Iran for many years. Using the proposed approaches, different suggestion and policy recommendation for decision makers in process of capital budgeting process within period of study are provided for technical and vocational training schools of Semnan Province, Iran.

In 1998 and 1999, the Office of Student Financial Assistance of the Department of Education and the Patent and Trademark Office of the Department of Commerce, were designated as Performance-Based Organizations (PBOs), respectively. This paper examines the transformation progress of the agencies, as they attempt to convert to high-performing organizations by utilizing and establishing new and more flexible systems of performance-oriented business practices and processes.

The paper compares and contrasts the different approaches and tools used to improve management and organizational performance, as well as concentrate on human resources, procurement, budget, customer service, and internal controls. The document explores whether or not these agencies have improved their performance as a result of these flexibilities and examines the organizational and cultural challenges encountered as the agencies move from a restrictive and bureaucratic system, to a more liberal system of management and internal controls.

The Performance-Based Organizations (PBOs) concept is to have federal agencies focus on the customer, deliver high quality products, and devise more efficient operations. Therefore, the paper further examines whether or not the PBO legislation has been effective in changing the performance of federal organizations by granting administrative and managerial flexibilities aligned with corporate (agency) strategies, performance, and pay.

This paper aims to use Stones’ strong structuration theory (SST) that combines Giddens’ duality and Archer’s analytical dualism to deal with the paradox of embedded agency, focussing on resistance, in the budgeting literature. It also applies this framework to an illustrative case study that examines a failed attempt to implement performance-based budgeting (PBB) in the Egyptian Sales Tax Department (ESTD).

The authors have used SST as an analytical framework. Longitudinal case study data were collected from interviews, observations, discussions and documentary analysis and from publicly available reports and other media issued by the World Bank.

The SST framework identifies the circumstances in which middle managers as embedded agency have limited possibilities to change their dispositions to act and identify opportunities for emancipation in the wider social context in which they are embedded. The official explanation for the failure to implement PBB in Egypt was obstruction by middle managers. The findings of this study provide an alternative explanation to that published by the World Bank for the failure to institutionalise PBB in Egypt. It was found that the middle managers were the real supporters of PBB. Other parties and existing laws and regulations contributed to the failure of PBB.

As a practical implication of the study, the analysis presented here offers an alternative interpretation of the failure of the Egyptian project for monitoring and evaluation to that published by the World Bank. This case and similar cases may enhance the understanding of how and when monitoring and evaluation technologies should be introduced at the global level to manage conflicts of interest between agencies and beneficiaries.

This paper contributes to the extant management accounting literature on the use of ST in addressing the paradox of embedded agency in making or resisting structural change. It uses SST to integrate Giddens’ ST with critical realist theory, incorporating duality and dualism in a stronger model of structuration. The SST framework offers a means of analysing case studies that result from interactions and conjunctures between different groups of actors at different ontological levels. The paper also examines the issue of embedded agency in budgeting research using an illustrative case study from a developing country, Egypt.

Faced with reduced budgets and rising service expectations, public authorities are increasingly cooperating with private businesses. This paper examines an alternative procurement- and service delivery concept, Performance-based Logistics (PBL). It has been introduced by the US and UK armed forces. However, other nations, such as Germany, are still reluctant to follow. This article has two aims: First, to identify the conceptual characteristics of PBL, and second, to analyze potential reasons why although PBL is popular in some nations, others are so reluctant to introduce it. This will be done using a mixed method approach. The concept of PBL will be introduced by deductively developing a conceptual model of PBL using a business model framework. The analysis of PBL application will be performed using an in-depth case study from the German defense sector. This will be framed by a literature review and concluded by managerial recommendations.

The purpose of this paper is to present a case study on the use of performance-based contracting in the outsourcing of a reliability-centered maintenance program of a Gulf oil refinery.

A case study method is used whereby data are collected through semi-structured interviews, informal discussions with executives from the participant companies, in addition to official documents and secondary materials.

The case analysis reveals the use of a risk–reward payment scheme and key performance indicators (KPIs) deployed to support the management of the outsourced maintenance function. The financial incentive scheme was clearly designed to motivate the outsourcing contractor to achieve more financial benefits when meeting a defined set of KPIs while also delivering operating cost savings and other qualitative benefits to the outsourcing company. Managing the outsourced function also involved the use of routine budgetary control systems, in addition to other informal control mechanisms such as trust, knowledge sharing, mutual understanding and co-operation between the two collaborative partners.

The evidence presented in the case description and analysis may assist in increasing the understanding of how outsourcing relationships in maintenance business are managed and evaluated. The case findings may also provide the opportunity for further research investigating the use of performance measurement systems and incentive-based schemes in a variety of maintenance contracts.

The case study presents new empirical evidence on the use of performance risk–reward payment schemes in the management of an outsourcing relationship. Findings reported in the study will add to the existing literature on maintenance performance measurement and management practices in outsourcing relationships.

World poverty is well documented. It is estimated that 1.2 billion people live on less than a dollar a day (Bryant & Kappaz, 2005, p. 17). Another one and a half billion people, who are not among the “extreme poor”, suffer “chronic financial hardship and a lack of basic amenities such as safe drinking water and functioning latrines”. Together, these two groups makeup around 40 percent of humanity (Sachs, 2005, p. 18). Nor is the position improving: Joseph Stiglitz notes that “over the last decade of the twentieth century, the actual number of people living in poverty actually increased by almost 100 million”, at a time when total world income was increasing by an average of 2.5 percent annually (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 5). The position of children – the generation of the future – is of particular concern.

In the United States, the 1993 Government Performance and Result Act (GPRA) has increased public demand for governments not only to produce and deliver public goods and services, but also to demonstrate program effectiveness, which is the ultimate goal of a public program's existence, mission, and spending. This public management approach parallels the results-oriented management, which aims to strengthen organizational effectiveness and emphasize the need to integrate all major activities and functions, an activity that will direct them toward advancing organization-wide strategic goals or fundamental policy agendas (Kettl, 1997). Managers use program outputs and outcomes as implementation benchmarks to identify implementation means or directions (Kettl, 1997). By reporting performance measurement results to the public and policy makers, public managers are held accountable for the tax-dollars spent to produce and deliver public services in the most efficient and effective way (Aristigueta, 2007). Performance measurement results, especially those related to outcome achievement, are partially useful in budget allocation from the perspective that the tax-dollars spent are tied to desirable outcomes rather than to program input costs that may or may not correspond with public desires (DuPont-Morales & Harris, 1994).

The purpose of this study is to understand the efforts of key social actors in influencing the reform of Iranian public universities budgeting system, from incremental to performance-based budgeting (PBB), the tensions that arose as competing efforts of institutional change were undertaken, and ultimately the impact of these efforts on the extent to which the Iranian government transitioned to a system of PBB in public universities.

Data comprises of semi-structured interviews with managers and experts involved in the budget setting process and an analysis of budgetary policy documents, reports and archival material such as legislation. An institutional work lens is employed to interpret the findings.

While actors advocating the change were engaged in institutional work directed at disrupting the old budgetary rules by disassociating the rules moral foundations and creating new budgetary rules (through new legislation), universities undertook subtle resistance by engaging in extended evaluation of the new proposed PBB rules thereby maintaining the old budgetary rules. The reforms undertaken to introduce PBB in Iranian universities achieved minimal success whereby incremental budgeting continued to constitute by far a larger percentage of the budget allocation formula for university budgets. This finding illustrates change and continuity in university budgetary systems resulting from institutional work of actors competing to control the basis of resource allocation under the proposed PBB system by proposing contradicting models.

The findings highlight the importance of understanding the interplay of institutional work undertaken by competing social actors as they seek to advance their goals in shaping budgetary reforms in the public-sector. Such an understanding may inform policy makers who intend to introduce major reforms in public-sector budgeting approaches.

Unlike prior studies that largely focused on how organization-level budgeting practices responded to changes in public budgeting rules (i.e. at the site of implementation of the rules), this paper highlights how strategies of change and resistance are played out at the site of setting budgetary norms.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between intellectual capital, sharia governance and Islamic bank performance based on the maqasid sharia index, as well as the moderating effect of sharia governance on the relationship between intellectual capital and maqasid sharia index.

Dynamic panel regression is used with the two-step generalised method of moments with data from the Bankscope database for 2014–2018.

The results show that higher intellectual capital efficiency improves Islamic bank performance based on maqasid sharia. Larger board sizes are also found to improve Islamic bank performance. By contrast, higher sharia supervisory board quality and larger independent boards can reduce Islamic bank performance. In the moderating relationship, sharia governance is proven to moderate the relationship between intellectual capital and Islamic bank performance.

This study used a sample that is restricted to Islamic bank and only used value-added intellectual coefficient to measure intellectual capital. Thirdly, the quality of the sharia supervisory board only involves the presence, size, expertise and doctoral qualification of the sharia supervisory board.

This research: analyses the relationship between intellectual capital, sharia governance and Islamic bank performance in one research framework; uses maqasid sharia index-based Islamic bank performance benchmarks; and examines the moderating effect of sharia governance on the relationship between intellectual capital and maqasid sharia index.

Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is an acquisition reform that is intended to improve weapon systems logistics by reducing cost, improving reliability, and reducing footprint. PBL is an extension of a broad process of rationalizing and, in many cases, outsourcing government services. As with other examples of governmental service outsourcing, measurement issues arise in the gap between governmental objectives and service measurement, and in the contrast between clear profit-centered vendor metrics, and more complex mission-oriented governmental metrics. Beyond this, however, PBL presents new challenges to the relationship between governmental agencies and their service vendors. In many cases, weapons systems logistical support involves levels of operational risk that are more difficult to measure and more difficult to value than other government services. We discuss the implications of operational risk and other measurement issues on PBL implementation.