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The purpose of this paper is to better understand the performance improvement outcomes that result from the interaction of a performance regime and its context over more than a decade.

A series of partial free disposable hull analyses are performed to graph variations in performance for 13 services in 444 municipalities in one province for over a decade.

There are few examples of mass service improvements over time. This holds even for relative bottom performers, as they do not catch up to average municipalities over time. However, there is also little proof of service deterioration during the same period.

A limitation results from the high churning rate of the indicators. The relevance of refining indicators based on feedback from practitioners should not be dismissed, even if it makes the task of proving performance improvement more difficult. It is possible that the overall quality of services on the ground improved, or stayed stable despite diminishing costs, without stable indicators to capture that reality.

Not all arrangements incentives and structures of – performance regimes – are equally fruitful for one level of government to steer a multitude of other governments on the generalized path to improved performance.

With the insight that was not available to public managers putting together these performance regimes in the beginning of the 2000s, the authors offer a proposition: mass performance improvement is not to be expected out of intelligence regime. It neither levels nor improves performance for all (Knutsson et al., 2012). Though there are benefits to such a regime, a general rise in performance across all participants is not one of them.

Performance improvements are assessed under difficult, yet common characteristics in the public sector: budgetary realities where there are trade-offs between many services, locally set priorities, no clear definition of what constitutes a good level of performance, and changes in the indicators over time.

This paper aims to explore how marketplace-enabled performances help reconstitute masculinity in the context of transnational mobility.

Grounded in consumer acculturation theory, this paper draws on theories of gender performance to inform a hermeneutic analysis of depth interviews with skilled migrant men.

To navigate experiences of emasculation, participants performed three remasculation strategies: status-based hypermasculinity, localised masculinity and flexible masculinity.

This study offers insights for the design of migrant settlement policy. Further research should investigate the remasculation strategies of low resource migrant men.

This paper makes two contributions to theories of gendered acculturation. First, while studies of acculturation as a gendered performance have shown how marketplace resources support the gendered identity projects of female migrants and the children of migrants, this paper provides the missing perspective of skilled migrant men. Beyond acting as “resistant” cultural gatekeepers of their family members’ gendered acculturation practices, first-generation migrant men emerge as creative, agentic and skilled negotiators of countervailing gender regimes. Second, transnationally dispersed families, migrant communities and country of origin networks emerge not only as acculturating agents which transmit gender regimes but also as audiences which enable the staging of remasculating performances.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the scholarship on public management models and to advance the theoretical conceptualization of the complexity of performance management systems (PMSs). The paper explores how the characteristics of PMSs vary within and across different organizational units in common institutional context, based on the case of a regional authority in Italy.

A framework of analysis considering both objective and subjective factors was derived from a combination of performance typologies in the public sector, namely ideal types of managing performance (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2007) and performance regimes (Jakobsen et al., 2017). The combination of the characteristics of these two models across different Directorates General (DGs) has also been explored through a nested case study (Starman, 2013). Data were gathered via a desk analysis of official documents regarding the planning and programming of a regional authority along with in-depth interviews with top-level managers.

The results highlighted a clear differentiation of PMSs, both within and across DGs. The findings of the study reveal the hybrid nature of PMSs within a common institutional context.

Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of Bouckaert and Halligan (2007) and Jakobsen et al. (2017), the paper provides an integrated approach for analysing PMSs, considering both objective and subjective dimensions. Insights and indications for future research on hybridity at a meso level of public organizations are highlighted.

Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) have become increasingly active in recent years in carrying out “performance audits” of various public bodies. But how does SAIs report on their own performance? The purpose of this paper is to report on a study (commissioned by the UK National Audit Office (NAO)) of how SAIs report on their own performance and explores a possible conceptual framework – a synthesis of work on “performance regimes”, “public value” and “competing values” approaches – which might provide a basis for enhancing such reporting.

The paper is based first on a review of self‐reporting of performance by SAIs in Australia, Canada, the USA, New Zealand and with a specific focus in more detail on the UK's NAO. In Section I, it explores existing self‐reporting practices of a number of SAIs based on their published reports. Section II of this paper is more conceptual. Drawing on notions of “performance regimes”, “public value” and “competing values”, it seeks to re‐conceptualise how SAIs in general, and the NAO specifically, might usefully report on their performance for multiple external audiences.

The conclusions drawn from the first part of the paper include that multiple measures of SAI performance have evolved, including impacts on governments; financial savings; impact on parliament; media impact, etc. The second part concludes tentatively that a synthesis of “public value” and “competing values” might provide a conceptual framework for making more sense of such multiple reporting.

The immediate practical value of this paper should be for SAIs in providing a possible framework for analysing and developing their own performance reporting policies to address multiple dimensions of achievement and meet the needs of multiple stake holders. More widely, this framework can be applied to other public agencies.

There are few, if any, current studies of comparative SAI self‐reporting of performance, so this paper makes a substantial contribution in this area. The conceptual framework developed in the second half of the paper is also unique in synthesising two important streams of thinking about “public value” and “competing values” which has far wider applicability than the study of SAIs.

The purpose of this paper aims to make contributions to the debate on “performance measurement in practice” focussing on how organisational participants respond to the “new regime” of key performance indicators (KPIs) and whether KPIs materialise as intended in a transitional economy.

Inspired by the epistemological instruction of Schatzki's practice theory, this paper draws on qualitative data collected through face-to-face interviews, observations and documentary analysis of a single organisation.

KPIs were introduced at PK (a manufacturing concern in Czech Republic) but widely seen as contradictory, inconsequential, top-down and unrealistic. These lead organisational participants to adopt a pragmatic approach towards PM embracing KPIs' subjective assessment and manipulation, common sense or doing the job as given, and superficial compliance (symbolism).

The paper would be interesting to researchers because of its explanation of performance measurement practice in a distinct empirical setting, for its application of a practice theory inspired by Schatzki, and for inspiring new research agendas in transitional economies.

The paper recommends the mobilisation of artefacts, such as various forms of bottom-up discussions, to encourage interactions between organisational members and influence individual beliefs and practical understandings of the intended managerial projects.

The paper has focussed on “organisations of practice” to unravel the “doings” of organisational participants to explore the micro-processes of PM which otherwise would have been ignored. These “doings” and “sayings”, linked by pools of understanding, rules or instructions, and a teleoaffective structure, enabled the authors to unmask inherent tensions and contradictions in a new regime of performance measures such as KPIs.

To discuss some of the reasons why performance measurement systems in public services can lead to dysfunctional consequences even when people operate with the best of intentions.

The paper draws together literature from the UK public sector, from writers in performance measurement and from cultural insights in anthropology to understand why some of these perverse effects occur.

Though many reasons are cited for public service performance measurement regimes, it is clear that control aspects dominate the others. This, when allied to an unthinking use of cybernetic metaphors, is what can lead to dysfunctionality.

The paper should appeal to those who wish to improve the performance of performance measurement systems in public services and to those who wish to understand why things can go wrong.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences that followed the introduction of a performance measurement regime that is introduced into a subdivision of an English police force. The police force under consideration is located in a county that covers over 1,500 square miles and envelops areas as diverse as large urban conurbations, small villages and considerable rural expanses.

Part of this research utilised semi‐structured interviews to gauge officers' reactions to the new system and the impact on their occupational behaviour.

The research found widespread resistance to the new system, due to a perception that the performance indicators did not fully reflect the breadth of the officer role. Similarly, evidence emerged to suggest that performance indicators can play a key role in focussing officers' attention on those core behaviours being measured and encouraging presentational and working styles which, whilst satisfying scoring criteria, might, arguably, be deemed inappropriate.

The research is limited by its focus upon officers working under a pilot project in a solitary subdivision. Further research might seek to draw on the views of larger numbers of officers working under a variety of police performance measurement mechanisms. Such an approach would facilitate the development of guides to best practice in both the formulation and implementation of such regimes and would, conceivably, help overcome officer resistance to such systems.

The paper is original in that acknowledges, and focuses upon, the cultural dynamics of the police officer and uses this approach to chart the challenges of effective implementation of such strategies. As such, the paper should be of interest to middle and senior police managers tasked with implementing effective performance measurement. Furthermore, this paper, although originating from evaluation research, represents a more critical contextualisation of the interviews, which are conducted with officers. In doing so, it seeks to locate the practicalities associated with the introduction of “performance measurement” against the reality of police work.

Networks are many things¹, but certainly an important feature in contemporary government. In an era of collaboration, as Agranoff and McGuire (2003) ² label it, governments are increasingly networked, using and engaging in all sorts of networks to achieve policy goals. Often, working in and through networks is regarded as the best or even only way to solve wicked problems (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). However, at the same time, criticism towards networks as a problem-solving strategy seems to increase in the field: they cost money, are time-consuming, cause transparency and accountability problems and so on (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Kenis & Provan, 2009; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). In the region of Flanders (Belgium), for instance, one of the main political issues is to regain grip on the hollowed out state, where much policy making and policy-making capacity is said to be ‘lost’ in a nebula of networks of which neither politicians nor public managers can make sense anymore.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate regime-switching and single-regime GARCH models for the extreme risk forecast of the developed and the emerging crude oil markets.

The regime-switching GARCH-type models and their single-regime counterparts are used in risk forecast of crude oil.

The author finds that the regime-switching GARCH-type models are suitable for the developed and the emerging crude oil markets in that they effectively measure the extreme risk of crude oil in different cases. Meanwhile, the model with switching regimes captures dynamic structures in financial markets, and these models are just only better than the corresponding single-regime in terms of long position risk forecast, instead of short position. That is, it just outperforms the single-regime on the downside risk forecast.

This study comprehensively compares risk forecast of crude oil in different situations through the competitive models. The obtained findings have strong implications to investors and policymakers for selecting a suitable model to forecast extreme risk of crude oil when they are faced with portfolio selection, asset allocation and risk management.

To consider the extent to which regimes of performance measurement in the public sector are fit for purpose, and the likely outcomes for public services and public sector workers of such performance measurement systems.

The article considers four key issues: the context and content of performance measurement in the public sector, the specific examples of health care and higher education, the limitations of performance measurement systems, and the likely outcomes of performance measurement systems.

Current systems of performance measurement in the public sector are unlikely to have a significant influence on improving services. The most likely outcomes of these systems is further commodification of services and deprofessionalisation of public sector workers.

The article builds on established literature and offers a systematic metaphor‐driven critique of performance management in the public sector, and discusses the implications of this.