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This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context.

This paper investigates the relationships between performance-related pay and WE. Two studies were used to investigate these relationships, finding that performance-related pay links directly to WE. Indirectly, performance-related pay links to pay satisfaction, which in turn links to WE. Also, performance-related pay links to pay level which in turn links to pay satisfaction, which in turn links to WE. The links between performance-related pay and WE are weak, showing that, performance-related pay is not sufficient alone; there must be satisfaction with pay level and adequate reward for performance.

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This paper is an investigation of the pay-for-performance link in executive compensation. In particular, we document main issues in the pay–performance debate and explain practical issues in setting pay as well as data issues including how pay is disclosed and how that has changed over time. We also provide a summary of the state of CEO pay levels and pay mix in 2009 using a sample of over 2,000 companies and describe main data sources for researchers. We also investigate what we believe to be at the root of fundamental confusion in the literature across disciplines – methodological issues. In exploring methodological issues, we focus on empirical specifications, causality, fixed-effects, first-differencing, and instrumental variable issues. We then discuss two important but not yet well-explored areas, international issues, and compensation in non-profits. We conclude by examining a series of research areas where further work can be done, within and across disciplines.

This chapter provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an encompassing econometric approach in order to explain the differences in previous outcomes that may be due to differing methodological approaches. The main stylized fact is that autonomy and pay-for-performance are positively associated. Additionally, autonomy is positively related to job complexity and uncertainty suggesting that the relationship between these latter variables and pay-for-performance could be through autonomy. After controlling for autonomy, the positive relationship between pay-for-performance and job complexity disappears, while that between pay-for-performance and uncertainty becomes more negative.

We document three new facts about gender differences in executive compensation. First, female executives receive lower share of incentive pay in total compensation relative to males. This difference accounts for 93% of the gender gap in total pay. Second, the compensation of female executives displays lower pay-performance sensitivity. A $1 million dollar increase in firm value generates a $17,150 increase in firm-specific wealth for male executives and a $1,670 increase for females. Third, female executives are more exposed to bad firm performance and less exposed to good firm performance relative to male executives. We find no link between firm performance and the gender of top executives. We discuss evidence on differences in preferences and the cost of managerial effort by gender and examine the resulting predictions for the structure of compensation. We consider two paradigms for the pay-setting process, the efficient contracting model and the “managerial power” or skimming view. The efficient contracting model can explain the first two facts. Only the skimming view is consistent with the third fact. This suggests that the gender differentials in executive compensation may be inefficient.

This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial services industry. Considering that financial firms can inflict systemic shocks across the economy, it has been argued that they must conduct ethical and sustainable business in accordance with ESG principles. This study examines whether ESG efforts are beneficial to managers.

The authors use CEO compensation and ESG performance ratings data for all US financial firms (SIC 6000–6799) from 2015 to 2019. Employing fixed effects regressions, the authors test whether lagged ESG performance is related to CEO compensation, after controlling for other firm characteristics such as size, financial performance, leverage and CEO stock ownership.

The authors find that lagged ESG ratings are strongly associated with all forms of compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in the composite ESG rating is associated with a 14%–16% increase in the total pay. Among the three ESG pillars, only S (social) and G (governance) exhibit persistent and significant associations with both short- and long-term executive pay. The authors also document the significant moderating effects of ESG on the relationships among firm performance, size, leverage, ownership and executive pay, identifying how ESG is associated with compensation.

The authors conclude that managers receive ESG incentives implicitly and explicitly. The novel finding of direct and indirect associations between ESG and top executive compensation contributes to the growing ESG literature on the financial sector and ongoing debate about the explicit inclusion of ESG targets in compensation design.

It appears that the role of money as a motivator in work tasks has increased substantially during the past decade. This applies particularly to managerial and executive grades. First, why this might be the case is discussed. Second, the literature on the early research into the pay of the chief executive is reviewed, since a major point of consideration was the relationship between CEOs′ pay and firms′ performance. Third, the evidence on profit sharing and company performance is examined, as it appears that this form of linkage has increased in the last decade, particularly for managerial and executive grades. Fourth, a model for testing the relationship between managerial remuneration and the performance of the firm is presented. This model is then applied to internal and external measures of performance for a sample of 147 firms in the UK electrical and office equipment industry for the year 1987, and conclusions are drawn.

While there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.

Using data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).

The authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.

Inevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.

The study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.

This paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

This study aims to examine whether chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder wealth is related to the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive contracts.

Using hand-collected performance measure data in a sample of S&P 500 firms across the period 1994–2010, this study investigates the sensitivity of CEO bonus and cash pay to shareholder wealth of firms that use non-financial performance (NFPM) measures of varying types and contractual weights in their bonus contracts along with financial measures (NFPM firms) in comparison to that of firms using financial measures only (FPM firms).

This study finds evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in NFPM firms than in FPM firms. These results are driven by the use of CEO individual goals and operational efficiency. Furthermore, when using environmental, social and governance factors, the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in terms of accounting performance only. This study also finds that using NFPM enhances pay-performance sensitivity more as their contractual weights increase and as financial risk increases.

These findings are important to stakeholders, and especially regulators in understanding incentive effects of alternative performance measures. This study also sheds light on what types of non-financial measures are better in helping firms align CEOs’ incentives to shareholders’ interests.

This study contributes to prior research on benefits of non-financial information within the context of executive compensation. This study presents original results about the effects of contractual weights of non-financial measures and financial risk on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. This study also presents new insights regarding how different types of non-financial measures affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

The article aims to provide an insight into the perspectives and possibilities of implementing the performance‐related pay in the Estonian general educational schools. It also aims to test two propositions regarding factors that influence school performance and teachers' and school managers' opinions about performance management.

A total of 298 school managers and 2,165 teachers from general educational schools in Estonia participated in the study. The factor, regression and correlation analysis, independent samples t‐test and one‐way ANOVA analysis were used to study claims related to school management and performance and educational processes.

The results of the analysis show that besides teachers' activities and effectiveness factors, various school management factors play an important role in the shaping of the school performance and the opinions towards the implementation of performance appraisal and performance‐related pay.

The main limitation to the research is that it is difficult to measure the schools' outcome. Second, the study was mainly quantitative, with only a few open questions and thus, the respondents were neither able to give full answers nor provide explanations. Therefore, further case studies are needed to obtain a more precise overview.

Although performance‐related pay is seen as an important management tool for increasing schools' outcome, there is no clear overview as to how the school managers and teachers in Estonia look at the issue and which factors should be considered in implementing performance‐related pay.

The purpose of this paper is to enrich the finding by Aguinis et al. (2018) that there is little overlap between the extremes of firm performance and the extremes of CEO pay using a novel approach to characterize the distribution of pay and performance. The authors aim to shift the focus of compensation researchers from fruitlessly trying to link pay to performance to theory-rich accounts of pay that take into consideration the idiosyncratically motivated and socially embedded nature of CEO compensation.

The authors’ approach in this commentary is conceptual. They synthesize compensation literature from different fields such as economics, finance, sociology, strategic management and corporate law, as well as the empirical findings from the focal paper to support their characterization of the current state of the literature and future directions it should take.

The authors synthesize discussion of CEO pay down to three dimensions of CEO responsibilities and motivations. They argue that a realistic pay design should take into account that CEOs have limited control over performance, they are accountable to multiple stakeholders and they are motivated by financial as well as nonfinancial incentives.

The commentary presents researchers with high-order framing of CEO pay that goes beyond debating over methodology or narrowly focusing on limited behavioral drivers of pay setting. Instead, the authors encourage researchers to take advantage of their three-legged framework to theorize about CEO pay.

El objetivo de este comentario es enriquecer el hallazgo de Aguinis y otros (2018) de que existe poco solapamiento entre los extremos del resultado organizativo y los extremos de la retribución del CEO utilizando una aproximación novedosa para caracterizar ambas distribuciones. Queremos cambiar el foco de los investigadores de tratar inútilmente de vincular retribución y resultados hacia explicaciones basadas en teoría que tomen en consideración la naturaleza idiosincrática y socialmente embebida de la retribución del CEO.

Nuestra aproximación es conceptual. Sintetizamos la literatura sobre retribución de diferentes campos como la economía, las finanzas, la sociología, la gestión estratégica o la legal, así como los resultados empíricos del artículo central de este número para sostener nuestra caracterización del estado del arte de la literatura y las direcciones que debería tomar en el futuro.

Sintetizamos la discusión sobre la retribución del CEO en tres dimensiones de responsabilidad del CEO y motivaciones. Argumentamos que un diseño realista de la retribución deben tener en cuenta que los CEO tienen un control limitado sobre los resultados, son responsables antes varios grupos de interés (stakeholders), y están motivados por incentivos financieros y no financieros.

Nuestro comentario va más allá del debate sobre la metodología, o de un enfoque estrecho sobre los determinantes conductuales de la fijación de la retribución. Por el contrario, animamos a los investigadores a utilizar nuestro marco de tres pilares para teorizar sobre la retribución del CEO.

O objetivo deste comentário é ampliar os achados de Aguinis et al. (2018) de que há pouca correlação entre os extremos da performance da empresa e da remuneração do CEO, usando uma abordagem inovadora para caracterizar a distribuição do pagamento e performance. Nosso objetivo é mudar o foco dos pesquisadores em remuneração, de indevidamente vincularem remuneração à performance, para teorias bem desenvolvidas sobre remuneração que considerem a natureza da remuneração do CEO como motivada de maneira idiossincrática e dependente do seu contexto social.

Nossa abordagem nesse comentário é conceitual. Nós sintetizamos a literatura sobre remuneração de diferentes áreas, como economia, finanças, sociologia, gestão estratégica e direito corporativo, bem como os achados empíricos do artigo central desse comentário, para dar suporte à nossa caracterização do estado da arte e das direções futuras que a literatura deveria tomar.

Nós sintetizamos a discussão sobre a remuneração do CEO em três dimensões de responsabilidades e motivações do CEO. Nós argumentamos que um plano de pagamento realista deve levar em conta que os CEOs têm controle limitado sobre os resultados, eles são responsáveis perante os stakeholders, e eles são motivados por incentivos financeiros e não financeiros.

O nosso comentário apresenta aos pesquisadores uma estrutura conceitual para remuneração de CEOs que vai além do debate sobre a metodologia, ou do foco limitado nos determinantes comportamentais da configuração da remuneração. Ao invés disso, incentivamos os pesquisadores a utilizar nossa estrutura de três pilares para teorizar sobre o pagamento do CEO.