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In this paper, we review the literature on pay variation (e.g., pay dispersion, pay compression, pay range) in organizations. Pay variation research has increased markedly in the past two decades and much progress has been made in terms of understanding its consequences for individual, team, and organizational outcomes. Our review of this research exposes several levels-related assumptions that have limited theoretical and empirical progress. We isolate the issues that deserve attention, develop an illustrative multilevel model, and offer a number of testable propositions to guide future research on pay structures.

Uses longitudinal data from the NLSY79 to examine the effect of a broad variety of performance‐based pay schemes and fringe benefits on male and female wages between 1988 and 1998. Specifically, analyzes whether the offer of various performance‐based pay schemes and fringe benefits functions as an alternative work incentive, eliciting greater effort and raising wages or, instead, it is accompanied by lower wages, as predicted by compensating wage theory. The results indicate that, while most performance‐based pay schemes are associated with higher wages to differing extents across gender, tips are commonly accompanied by lower wages among men. Similarly, while the offer of a retirement plan appears to as a work incentive raising male and female wages, workers are willing to trade wages for jobs offering life and medical insurance.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of two key team‐based pay characteristics – namely reward allocation procedures (i.e. reward based on norms of equity, equality or some combination of the two) and incentive intensity – on both the amount and type of help given to one another among members of outcome‐interdependent teams.

A total of 180 undergraduate students participate in a laboratory simulation with a 2 × 3 experimental design. Servicing virtual “clients,” participants receive pre‐scripted requests for assistance from anonymous teammates. ANOVA and hierarchical regression analyses are used to test the hypotheses.

Relative to equity‐oriented group‐based pay structures, equality‐oriented pay structures are found to be associated with both significantly more help giving in general and more of the type of help likely to enhance group‐level competencies (i.e. autonomous help). Incentive intensity strengthens the effects of reward allocation on the amount (but not the type) of help giving.

While the short time frame of the simulation poses a significant threat to external validity, the findings suggest that team‐based compensation practices may provide organizational leaders with an important tool by which to shape critical, helping‐related team processes, with potentially important implications for both team learning and performance.

Managers interested in promoting capacity‐building and helping among team members should avoid allocating team rewards strictly on the basis of the individual contribution.

This paper provides the first empirical findings regarding how alternative modes of team‐based reward distribution may influence key group processes among members of outcome interdependent teams.

This research paper analyses the extent to which national systems are following “new pay” trends, or whether there are still traditional features, which reflect the specificity of employment in the public sector and the psychological contracts of public servants.

The data used in this paper was based on an online survey of six countries and was completed by pay experts in each case.

Previous comparative research on civil service pay systems has focused mostly on specific aspects of pay but this paper looks at a wide range of pay characteristics. It finds that although there have been changes in pay systems in the six countries studied, the “new pay” model has not been fully adopted and traditional reward systems are still strong, with the exception of Sweden and to a lesser extent the UK and Denmark. This is related to the importance that civil servants attach to their psychological contract in which equity and collectivism remain central values

The paper demonstrates that cultural factors and psychological contracts are important in influencing both practices and attitudes towards change in reward systems across countries and that traditional identities of public service are still evident.

Explained pay dispersion theory (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002) contends that the consequences of pay dispersion depend on two critical contingencies: (1) the presence of legitimate or normatively acceptable dispersion-creating practices, and the (2) identifiability of individual contributions. In this chapter, the first 20 years of empirical evidence and theoretical offshoots of this theory are reviewed. Other recent studies on the outcomes of horizontal and vertical pay dispersion are also evaluated. The review concludes with an evaluative summary of the literature and the identification of several potential fruitful areas for future research.

Using the NBER Shared Capitalism Database comprised of over 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms, we investigate worker attitudes toward employee ownership, profit sharing, and variable pay. Specifically, our study uses detailed survey questions on preferences over profit sharing, forms of employee ownership like company stock and stock option ownership, as well as preferences over variable pay in general, to explore how preferences for these different types of output-contingent pay vary with worker risk aversion, residual control, and views of co-workers and management. Our key results show that, on average, workers want at least a part of their compensation to be performance-related, with stronger preferences for output-contingent pay schemes among workers who have lower levels of risk aversion, greater residual control over the work process, and greater trust of co-workers and management.

The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of why some firms tie compensation to worker performance as well as the variation in type of performance pay system across firms.

The study first presents a theoretical framework that motivates n empirical study of performance‐related pay. The data are based on Norwegian establishment surveys from 1997 and 2003. The empirical analysis addresses determinants of adoption of performance pay systems.

Performance‐related pay is more prevalent in firms where workers of the main occupation have a high degree of autonomy in how to organise their work. Performance pay is also more widespread in large firms, but is less common in highly unionised firms and in firms where wages are determined through centralised bargaining. Results show that performance pay is on the rise in Norway, even after accounting for changes in industry structure, bargaining regime, and union density. Finally, it is found that the incidence of performance‐related pay relates positively to product‐market competition and foreign ownership.

The paper provides new empirical evidence on the use of performance‐related pay. The results support an interpretation of incentive pay as motivated by agency problems, and provide new evidence on the relationship between payment schemes and institutions such as unions and bargaining framework.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the situation of performance management, to be more precise, the usage and attitudes towards pay‐for‐performance on the example of Estonian schools and brings out practical implications for implementing pay‐for‐performance in Estonian general educational schools.

Altogether 298 headmasters and 2,165 teachers participated in this research. The goal of the research was to map the situation of the usage of pay‐for‐performance in Estonian schools and to find out teachers' and headmasters' opinions about the most effective pay‐for‐performance system.

Despite the great expectations of performance management and pay‐for‐performance, it is not being used in many Estonian general educational schools. However, the findings of this research show that both headmasters and teachers have quite positive attitudes towards pay‐for‐performance that gives a favourable platform for implementing pay‐for‐performance in the Estonian educational sector.

The study was mainly quantitative with only a few open questions, which raises limitations for finding complete answers and explanations to questions raised. Therefore, case studies need to be done to find answers to some interesting research questions.

With the view to raising the performance of the Estonian educational system and to guarantee its sustainability, a new course concerning schools' and pupils' individual development must be taken. It can be achieved through performance management and pay‐for‐performance, which also helps to raise teachers' motivation. A central feature of the pay‐for‐performance is that pay must be in accord with performance and must provide an incentive to promote the success of the organisation.

From the perspective of top management heterogeneity, this paper aims to study the impact of the psychological traits of executive pay bandwagon on earnings management in the listed companies of China.

This paper applies the ratio of executive pay to the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, namely, the comparing coefficient, as an alternative variable of executive pay bandwagon, and earnings management as the behavior choice of executive pay bandwagon, to examine whether executives in the listed companies of China have comparing mentality, and whether the result is influenced by executive heterogeneity by using the multiple linear regression models.

The lower the executives’ compensation is than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, the stronger the incentive the executives have to compare with others whose pay is higher, increasing the extent of earnings management in the future, and executives tend to use real activities manipulation rather than accrual-based earnings management to increase their performance-based compensation. As pay bandwagon is a kind of executives’ individual psychological reaction, in a large extent, its behavioral performance is likely to be affected by executive heterogeneity. Specifically, when the proportion of male executives, young executives or low educated executives is relatively high, or executives are located in remote cities, there will breed more earnings management behaviors induced by pay bandwagon. Further study shows that pay bandwagon is positively correlated with rigging compensation based on real earnings management and pay bandwagon also has significantly negative effects on the firms’ future value creation.

Pay bandwagon is an important inducement of executives’ earnings management, with implication that for executives with different characteristics, one should pay attention to the subjective psychological perception and expectation of their pay in the future studies related to executives’ compensation incentives.

This study introduces the research within sociology, psychology and experimental economics, and considers the executives’ subjective perception of their pay, to explore the internal mechanism that executives affect firm performance via a specific earnings management method and to implement self-interested behavior due to pay bandwagon. And this is the first study to select several typical executive individual characteristics to investigate the influence of executive heterogeneity on pay bandwagon and its economic consequences.