Search results

This study aims to test the contributions of a new type of resilience, Trait Negotiation Resilience (TNR; Nelson et al., 2016), to negotiators’ effective behavior, perception of opponent and negotiation outcomes.

A laboratory study (N = 98; 49 dyads) featuring a mixed-motive negotiation task. Participants self-reported TNR (emotional skills, social sensitivity, intrinsic motivation for self-improvement and a sense of purpose to life events) up to a week before negotiating. After the negotiations, they rated their opponents on resilient, effective personal attributes and reported their own subjective value (SV). Trained judges watched the negotiations, coded objective outcomes and rated negotiators on dimensions of effective negotiation behavior. Statistical analyses accounted for dyadic interdependence.

TNR predicted higher levels of effective negotiation behavior, which, in turn, fully mediated TNR’s favorable contribution to negotiated value. TNR also predicted higher levels of SV, and this contribution was partially mediated by perceiving effective personal attributes in the opponent.

The sample size was moderate and it consisted of undergraduate students, most of them female.

Evidence on the contribution of a personality construct to both outcome and process negotiator variables; contribution to the research of specific types of resilience.

Trust plays a significant role in business peoples’ choices of negotiating tactics. This study compares the use of generally accepted negotiating tactics with dubious ones. Findings from a sample of Mexican business people indicate that the type of negotiation (intra‐cultural vs cross‐cultural) is predictive of the level of trust that a negotiator will place in an opponent and of the likelihood of using various negotiation tactics.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of Chinese executives' preferred ethical ideologies and Machiavellianism on their perceived appropriateness of negotiation tactics as they operate in a nation transitioning from a planned economy to a market economy.

A self‐administered survey of a sample 300 Chinese managers with budgetary and personnel responsibilities in Tianjin, China was obtained for the purpose of the present study. A series of regression analyses were conducted to test the proposed relations.

Results from the regression analyses provided partial confirmations for the proposed relationships. Idealism influenced perceptions of false promises, traditional competitive bargaining, and attacking an opponents' network. Perceptions of traditional competitive bargaining, attacking an opponent's network, and inappropriate information gathering were significantly influenced by relativism. Machiavellianism influenced perceptions of traditional competitive bargaining and misrepresentation of information.

Given the existing impediments to sampling and data collection in China, the sampling method used is non‐probabilistic, which calls for consideration of the results as exploratory. The present study's sample is drawn from the Northeastern region of China and since ethical beliefs and orientation in China varies by region, the results of the present study cannot be generalized to the total population of China.

The present study aims to provide the following contribution. First, as most studies in the negotiation ethics literature are focused in Western cultural contexts, this study attempts to fill this gap by investigating the negotiation ethical values of executives from Eastern culture. Second, global firms' executives can better understand the ethical mindset of their Chinese counterparts and utilize this knowledge to efficiently and effectively manage the negotiation process with their counterparts in this important market. Third, public policymakers and researchers can also benefit from this study by understanding the external validity and the degree of ethnocentrism of not only their own code of ethics but also the validity of a universal code of ethic.

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientations on negotiation outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Instability was created by pitting individualists against cooperators (mixed dyads), and by giving only one of the parties information about the other party's orientation. A total of 162 subjects participated in negotiation simulations, where orientation and information were manipulated through instructions from management. The cooperative dyads got better outcomes than did the individualistic dyads. The mixed dyads did as well as the cooperative dyads when the cooperators had information, but did as badly as the individualistic dyads when the individualists had information. The process analyses indicated that the dyads with high outcomes achieved their results because the integrative activities increased over time. In the mixed dyads with informed individualists, the individualists reached higher individual outcome than their cooperative (uninformed) opponents. Thus, naive cooperators can easily be exploited.

The present paper reviews the research literature on trust in bargaining and mediation. Several models of trust within the bargaining process are also described. It is concluded that trust means different things, depending upon the relationship under investigation. Trust among negotiators can refer to a personality trail (how trusting a negotiator is of others) or to a temporary state. Within the state perspective, trust often refers to one of three orientations: (1) cooperative motivational orientation (MO), (2) patterns of predictable behavior, (3) a problem‐solving orientation. Trust between a negotiator and constituents usually refers to a cooperative MO (i.e., shared loyalty) between these two groups. The addition of a mediator can impact both the opposing negotiators' relationship and each negotiator‐constituent relationship; the mediator also has direct and indirect relationships with the parties and their constituents. Future directions for research on trust are identified.

The purpose of this study is to examine two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, the authors state oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. This study further investigates the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e. topics that touch on one’s power position versus topics that are related to the tasks one needs to perform) in this relationship. Finally, the authors state a moderated mediation hypothesis where they expected that the negotiation topic would moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies.

A vignette study (N = 279) and a negotiation game (N = 138) were conducted where the power within dyads was manipulated.

Study 1 showed that powerholders prefer collaborative strategies, whereas powerless negotiators prefer competitive strategies. Perceived threat of the negotiation mediated this effect. Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 showed that the negotiation topic moderates the effect of power on negotiation strategies providing further support for the collaborative approach of power. Finally, Study 1 provided partial support for the moderated mediation hypothesis.

Both Studies 1 and 2 are experimental studies. A field study should try to replicate these results in the future.

This study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature. The results might be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to show the moderating role of negotiation topic in the relationship between power and negotiation.

In negotiation, pressures to reach an agreement are assumed to influence both the processes and the outcomes of the discussions. This paper metaanalytically combined different forms of time pressure to examine its effects on negotiator strategy and impasse rate. High time pressure was more likely to increase negotiator concessions and cooperation than low pressure as well as make agreements more likely. The effect on negotiator strategy, however, was stronger when the deadline was near or when negotiations were simple rather than complex. The effects were weaker when the opponent was inflexible and using a tough negotiation strategy. The effects on cooperative strategies were weaker when incentives for good performance were available than when they were not. Although time pressure in negotiation has significant effects, situational factors play a major role on its impact.

In a simulated organizational conflict, concession behavior by a negotiator's opponent was manipulated to examine how subsequent third party intervention would influence negotiator perceptions of process control, decision control, distributive justice, and the third party. Negotiators whose opponents made large concessions reciprocated by also making large concessions, suggesting a high level of movement toward agreement by the disputants; subjects whose opponents made few concessions reciprocated in kind, resulting in little movement toward agreement. Third parties, however, imposed outcomes on all negotiators prior to negotiated agreements. Perceptions of decision control, distributive justice, and the necessity of third party intervention were influenced by whether disputants were close to reaching an agreement on their own or not. Outcome imposed by the third party influenced almost all measures. The study suggests that behavior by the disputants (in the form of movement toward agreement), and not just behavior by the third party, can influence ratings of both procedures and outcomes.

Two experiments investigated negotiators' information search strategies as a function of other's personality (cooperative vs. competitive vs. unknown) and own social value orientation (pro‐social vs. selfish). In Experiment 1, participants selected questions about other's intention to cooperate or to compete. In Experiment 2, participants generated questions themselves, which were coded as asking about cooperation or competition. Consistent with the false‐consensus hypothesis (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and inconsistent with the triangle hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), selfish negotiators who had no information about the other's personality asked more questions about other's intention to compete, and pro‐social negotiators asked more questions about other's intention to cooperate. Furthermore, both selfish and pro‐social negotiators engaged in confirmatory information search. Implications in terms of a self‐fulfilling prophecy are discussed.

This study aims to propose and evaluate a novel framework of strategic adaptability in dyadic negotiations. The authors define strategic adaptability as a reaction to a cue that leads to shifts between integrative and distributive strategies. Based on the literature on turning points, phase models and strategic negotiations, the authors developed an initial framework identifying five distinct strategic adaptations.

To verify the framework, the authors analyzed two negotiation simulations with a diverse set of negotiation students. Negotiations were content-coded, and adaptations were labeled.

The authors found a consistent pattern across two studies. Overall, 12% (study 1) and 18% (study 2) of all speaking turns were identified as strategic adaptations. The findings empirically confirmed four of their strategic adaptation types: adapt to deadlock, follow adaptation by opponent, adapt to priority of issue under discussion and adapt to new information on issue. Moreover, findings of this study revealed two new types of strategic adaptability: delayed adaptation to opponent and adapt to understand opponent. Study 2 additionally revealed that strategies vary with the negotiation phase, and negotiation outcome seems to benefit more from the constellation rather than the frequency of adaptations. Furthermore, lower-scoring negotiators tended to adapt to the opponent’s strategy instead of initiating a change in strategy.

The findings of this study provide preliminary insights into how strategic adaptations unfold. These findings present future research opportunities to further test the framework's robustness, increase the knowledge of individual and cultural factors, explore the relationship with negotiation outcomes and develop educational interventions to enhance strategic adaptability.