Search results

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the public pension governance practices on the public defined benefit pension (DBP) fund performance.

To provide a holistic evaluation of public DBP performance, this study first employs the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to construct a relative performance measure that simultaneously takes into account the association between investment inputs and performance outputs across DBPs in our sample. A DEA regression model is then constructed to empirically examine the impact of pension governance on public DBP performance.

Using 1,544 hand-collected observations in the USA from 2002 to 2013, the findings show that the public DBP plans with a small board, appointed board trustees, and a separate investment council exhibit better performance.

The effectiveness of pension governance has increasingly drawn public attention, as it affects the performance of the public DBP plans that especially matter to public employees. The empirical findings of this research offer insights into recent calls to reexamine public DBP management practices and to carry out related public pension fund policy reforms.

The examination of public DBP governance practices in this study enriches the governance literature, particularly research on public pension funds, by using public sector data. Second, by applying the DEA method to evaluate the relative performance of public DBP funds, this study obtains a more comprehensive analysis of the public pension governance.

This study aims to examine how the governance structure of the private pension system of Turkey affects the extent of agency problems through a qualitative exploratory analysis of the pension sector employees’ perspectives.

This study is based on qualitative exploratory research, which includes semi-structured interviews with 13 pension sector employees to investigate their perspectives on agency problems within Turkey’s private pension system. Data from interviews are analyzed by using the thematic content analysis method.

This study shows us that agency problems are prevalent in Turkey's private pension system, especially in the relations between pension company employees and participants. This study highlights four vulnerabilities of governance structure: the incapacity of governance structure to prevent pension companies as institutional agents from risky operations and transactions, the ability of local capital groups to use their controlling power for effecting fund management operations, the incapacity of the governance structure to prevent the employment of agents with inadequate qualifications, the lack of proper legal and regulatory framework for ensuring sufficient information disclosure to participants during contract-making and fund selection processes.

Previous research on the agency problems in the private pension schemes mostly investigated the issue from the viewpoint of participants. Thus, exploring agency problems from the agents’ point of view will be a contribution to the literature while illuminating the underlying structural problems within the system.

This study aims to examine whether and how the experience of specialized external governance mechanisms mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 – the actuary and auditor – affect pension plan funding.

This study uses data from annual pension plan regulatory reports (Form 5500), Form 10-K filings, Form DEF 14A filings (company proxy statements) and publicly available data sources. The hand-collected data include information related to the pension plan’s actuary and auditor and various pension plan data disclosed in the company’s financial statement footnotes.

The author finds that more experienced actuaries and auditors are associated with better funded pension plans, especially when the company has higher financial risk or lower board independence. Additional analyses indicate that companies with more experienced actuaries and pension plan auditors are more likely to make higher annual pension plan contributions and hold fewer Level 3 fair value assets.

The dearth of pension plan governance research generally focuses on whether and how internal governance mechanisms affect pension plan funding. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the relationship between external pension plan governance mechanisms and pension plan funding.

Grahl (2006) has commented that current manifestations of institutional shareholder activism are limited by the rise of the shareholder value doctrine in EU member states and the absence of strong legal frameworks restraining corporate practice. Survey studies have pointed to a generally muted response to legislative encouragement that financial institutions engage in reformist activist practices. Several studies have attempted to measure the effect of legislation calling on financial institutions to disclose the extent of their involvement with companies in which they have invested. All such studies have concluded that strong shareholder activism policy would require adjustments to the manner of remuneration of investment managers and intermediaries. For example, a study of pension fund reporting immediately following the introduction of British legislation in 2000 found that most surveyed organisations had disclosed the use of ‘social considerations’ in investment processes (Mathieu, 2000), with little more added by way of elaboration. (The latter observation is also couched a high non-response rate (67 per cent).) More recent studies demonstrate the struggle of pension funds in this regard. Pension funds have tended to follow conservative ‘hands-off’ ownership strategies, whereas activist approaches typically require a very different ‘hands-on’ approach (Johnson & De Graaf, 2009; Eurosif, 2010).

To examine the case for reforming India's current provident and pension fund governance and regulatory structures.

The paper reviews various components of India's social security system with a view to identifying reform needs in their governance and regulatory structures. It then assesses the new pension system to be supervised and regulated by the proposed Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA).

The paper finds that the current arrangements do not provide sufficient incentives for professionalism and system‐wide perspective essential to meet India's social security challenges. Urgently operationalizing the PFRDA, and modernizing the relevant laws and regulations could greatly assist in meeting India's social security challenges. Modernization of Employees Provident Fund Organization is also essential.

The analysis suggests that the need for greater professionalism and system‐wide perspective should be accorded high priority by India's provident and pension fund organizations. The analysis in the paper is quite aggregative and qualitative. This underscores the need for more robust database and greater focus on empirical evidence‐based policies in this area.

The paper will provide a better appreciation of the governance and regulatory issues involved in reforming India's provident and pension funds. It will also provide a base for other researchers to identify and undertake more detailed analysis of specific aspects such as ways to internationally benchmark administration and compliance costs of provident and pension fund organizations; achieving coordination among PFRDA, banking, insurance, and capital market regulators.

This article aims to highlight the gap between the legal responsibilities and the practice of pension fund trustees in Ireland.

The paper relies on primary and secondary data analysis of trustee practice and enforcement cases to highlight the gap between law and practice.

The article finds that there is an inconsistency between legal requirement and practice in the calibre of trustee and trustee training across Irish occupational pension schemes. This has adverse consequences for pension governance and performance.

The findings raise the question as to whether there should be mandatory qualifications for trustees or mandatory standardised trustee training in a prescribed format, with which trustees should comply. It also questions whether there should be a governance code for trustees to ensure a minimum standard or target level of competence and good governance on the part of pension scheme trustees.

There is a distinct lack of emphasis in the literature and in practice on the inconsistency between the extent of the responsibilities which trustees ultimately carry, and the legal exposure this potentially creates for trustees who unduly rely on other trustees or third parties in the trustee decision making process.

Public pension plans in the U.S. are seriously underfunded, especially following the financial market crisis of 2008-2009 which resulted in large investment losses. However, funding levels vary widely across plans. Pension boards of trustees make key management decisions in pension systems and these decisions have significant effects on funded levels, yet our empirical knowledge of board management is limited. This study explores the effect of board composition on pension funding levels. Existing theoretical debates lead to differing expectations, and previous studies have mixed results. Our research uses a panel data set of large public pension plans from 2001-2009. We also collect data for pension board composition from this time period. We find that increasing political appointees and employee members on the board increases the funding performance of the pension system.

Institutional history is important in the context of understanding the control of pension systems. This history has both theoretical and practical value for developing policy choices at the micro and macro levels. The central theme is that we can raise the quality of thought about options for the future if we better understand the past. The paper synthesizes previous work, and draws upon archive research and unpublished case studies by the author.

This study aims to explore the views of pension beneficiaries and fund managers regarding greater involvement and investment autonomy and the attitudes toward diverse responsible investment criteria. The conventional form of investing is usually vulnerable to high financial market volatility events and financial crises, and most importantly, it has proven insufficient in addressing important social issues. A newly introduced investment culture known as impact investing strives for social gains in the long term rather than the maximization of financial returns by aiming to tackle social problems. However, some in the field claim that implementing such investment policies compromises the fiduciary responsibility of pension funds’ trustees to manage trust funds in the best interest of beneficiaries.

This study uses qualitative methods to explore the perception of proposed pension policies, such as beneficiaries’ greater involvement in determining pension investment policies that can have a positive long-term impact on their lives and on the provision of investment autonomy. For this purpose, the study investigates beneficiaries’ positions regarding responsible investment criteria from a freedom-of-choice perspective. The study sample consists of members and managers of a Dutch pension administrative organization with a cooperative structure. Three semi-structured, homogeneous discussions with focus groups containing between seven and nine participants each are conducted. The data are coded both deductively and inductively, following the framework approach, which is a qualitative data analysis method.

Participants demonstrate positive attitudes toward greater involvement and freedom of choice. However, the findings also indicate that members and pension fund managers have different views regarding responsible investment criteria. Members have more favorable attitudes toward responsible investment than do managers.

This research is limited to focus group discussions with managers and members in the Dutch healthcare sector.

How little the current pension system matches people’s investment preferences is a matter of concern, and the main implications of this research thus center upon designing a more democratic pension system for the future. Greater involvement by pension fund beneficiaries, whose roles are currently limited, would help legitimize responsible investing. This research implies that pension policies should be designed to align with the preferences of pension fund beneficiaries and be accompanied by diverse intervention strategies.

Pension reforms that encourage pension beneficiaries to exert greater influence in determining pension policy will help shrink the democratic deficit in collective pensions.

This study contributes to the literature on pension fund governance and long-term responsible investing by examining the attitudes toward impact and sustainable investments and by making suggestions for future research. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the attitudes of pension fund participants toward targeted impact investments.