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The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of media coverage on offenders convicted of occupational fraud and corruption in the UK. It examines the extent of media coverage and provides insights into the experiences of offenders.

The study is based upon interviews with 17 convicted offenders, and on a content analysis of one national and two regional newspapers in the UK.

The findings suggest that offenders convicted of occupational crime and corruption are more likely to experience media coverage than previously assumed and that personal digital criminal legacies create long-term labels which lead to economic strains and social fractures that hinder productive reintegration into society.

The research is limited by a small sample frame in the UK. Nevertheless, the findings suggest further research is required as they have important implications for privacy and rehabilitation.

In particular, offenders and their families need support in dealing with their personal digital criminal legacies, accessing their privacy rights and coping with the strains created by online stigmatisation. From a policy perspective, the existing regulatory framework that supports rehabilitation in the UK, especially the increasingly archaic Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, requires close examination and debate to ensure it is fit for the digital era. The findings also suggest that policies, practices and responsibilities of the public sector in employing offenders need to be examined.

It is a rare study of white-collar offenders after their release from prison. The findings are of relevance to criminal justice policy makers, rehabilitation services and academics.

In this chapter I discuss judicial contributions to Italian penality. I look at the penal incentives produced by interactions between judicial and political classes, and ask whether judges and prosecutors have been forces for punitiveness or moderation. I discuss the relevance of the Italian case for broader analyses of Western penality.

My chapter offers a political-sociological account of judicial contributions to punishment. I analyse the penal incentives created by different national institutional set-ups, specifically addressing judicial contributions to penality using a framework developed by Joachim Savelsberg and Nicola Lacey. The framework examines judicial structure in the institutional context looking at the penal implications of bureaucratisation of the judiciary and the capacity for co-ordination between judges and politicians. I include judicial legitimacy as an additional dimension in this framework.

I conclude that the Italian judiciary have been forces for punitiveness and moderation. Their contributions can be systematised by looking at the waxing and waning of judicial legitimacy, and the consequent expansion and contraction of judicial powers. I claim that judicial legitimacy is also relevant to other (‘non-Italian’) analyses of judicial contributions to contemporary Western penality.

By adding legitimacy to investigations of judicial contributions to penality I provide an organising principle with which to analyse the penal role of Italian judicial actors. I thus allow Italy to be kept in conversation with existing comparative models, without assuming that it either conforms to the models entirely, or that the models should otherwise be eschewed. I use the Italian case to demonstrate the relevance of legitimacy when analysing judicial contributions to Western penality, arguing that changing legitimacy affects the terms and effect of interaction between judicial and political classes.

Drawing from interviews with individuals on parole, this chapter explores experiences of and responses to penal misrecognition. It documents that participants feel fundamentally misrecognised by the parole agency and penal state. They believe that the penal state views them as dangerous, defective and incapable of virtuous self-governance. Yet this is not how they perceive themselves. This leads to a delicate balancing act where participants refuse certain aspects of the penal state while accommodating others. On the one hand, individuals refuse parole’s misrecognition of them and reject the state’s authority to define who they are. On the other hand, they largely acquiesce to parole’s authority to supervise and regulate conduct. Turning to the concept of refusal highlights that individuals do not just attempt to resist penal power; rather, they flatly reject the state’s epistemic constructions. They do this by turning away from parole and by turning towards other forms of sociality beyond the penal state. This creates material and affective distance from parole and opens up space for self-recognition and for receiving positive recognition from others. In this way, individuals seek to minimise, move away from and/or bypass a penal intervention that is ostensibly designed to assist and support them.