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The theoretical basis for this case is a focus on vertical integration, first-mover advantage and competitive dynamics. Vertical integration is based on Williamson’s (1979) theory of transaction-cost economics as it relates to vertical integration; the discussion on first-mover advantage is built off of Suarez and Lanzolla’s (2005) dynamics of first-mover advantage; and the analyzes on competitive dynamics derives from the MacMillan et al. (1985) early empirical tests of interfirm rivalry dynamics.

The authors conducted extensive research using the following sources: IBISWorld, MergentOnline and academic journals, trade magazines and websites. Additionally, the authors successfully piloted the case on more than 350 undergraduate students enrolled in a business and corporate strategy course.

Peloton used vertical integration to control the creation of its own software, bikes, exercise classes and retail outlets. In doing so, Peloton was one of the first companies in the industry to have near full control of the production process (Gross and Caisman, 2019). Due to this integration, Peloton was one of the fitness equipment industry leaders. However, Peloton’s high level of vertical integration coupled with rapid growth led to lackluster profitability. Given the rise in popularity of in-home exercise equipment, Peloton had room to continue its growth, but the question remained whether it was strategically positioned to do so.

This case is best taught in undergraduate and graduate strategy courses. For undergraduate courses, it could be incorporated into lessons on competitive dynamics, internal analysis and first-mover advantage and strategic positioning. For graduate courses, it could be incorporated into lessons on vertical integration and delving more in-depth into the long-term sustainability of having a first-mover advantage.

This study aims to explore the use of consumer-generated online product reviews as a source of brand associations in a sport setting.

A total of 800 reviews were collected and categorized into 13 brand association dimensions derived from previous literature. Reviews were further categorized into three valence types (i.e. positive, negative and neutral) via a correspondence analysis.

A correspondence analysis revealed that positive product reviews were highly linked to performance and product-related attributes, while negative reviews were related to conformance associations. Additionally, the results showed that product-related (90.8%) attributes, experiential benefits (89.1%) and functional benefits (86.6%) were the most frequently communicated brand associations. The findings of this study underline the credibility of assessing brand associations from the consumers’ experience, through online consumer reviews.

The findings of the current investigation contribute to existing knowledge by examining consumer-based brand equity (CBBE) in an online setting. Previous, CBBE literature suggests that brand associations are held in the minds of the brand's consumers. To date, however, few studies have examined brand associations generated by consumers and instead have relied upon brand association dimensions developed by the researcher as opposed to the consumer (Ross et al., 2006). This, study however, utilized online sport product reviews as a source of consumer derived brand associations, and, therefore, will further the knowledge as to how brand associations are identified and measured.

Hedge fund Magnetar Capital had returned 25 percent in 2007 with a strategy that posed significantly lower risk to investors than the S&P 500. Magnetar had made more than $1 billion in profit by noticing that the equity tranche of CDOs and CDO-derivative instruments were relatively mispriced. It took advantage of this anomaly by purchasing CDO equity and buying credit default swap (CDS) protection on tranches that were considered less risky. Now it was the job of Alec Litowitz, chairman and chief investment officer, to provide guidance to his team as they planned next year's strategy, evaluate and prioritize their ideas, and generate new ideas of his own. An ocean away, Ron Beller was contemplating some very different issues. Beller's firm, Peloton Partners LLP, had been one of the top-performing hedge funds in 2007, returning in excess of 80 percent. In late January 2008 Beller accepted two prestigious awards at a black-tie EuroHedge ceremony. A month later, his firm was bankrupt. Beller shorted the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis hit, and was paid handsomely for his bet. After the crisis began, however, he believed that prices for highly rated mortgage securities were being unfairly punished, so he decided to go long AAA-rated securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans (between prime and subprime), levered 9x. The trade moved against Peloton in a big way on February 14, 2008, causing $17 billion in losses and closure of the firm.

This case analyzes the strategies of the two hedge funds, focusing on how money can be made and lost during a financial crisis. The role of investment banks as lenders to hedge funds such as Peloton is explored, as well as characteristics of the CDO market and an array of both mortgage-related and credit protection-related instruments that were actively used (for better or worse) by hedge funds during the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008.

Women's sport is said to be experiencing a moment of progress exemplified by the ‘professionalising’ of teams, leagues and events (McLachlan, 2019; Pavlidis, 2020; Taylor et al., 2020). The current ‘professionalising’ moment is celebrated as a measure of incremental change that demonstrates that women's sport is progressing in the right direction (Sherry & Taylor, 2019; Taylor, 2020). In this chapter, we pursue critical questions of progress in relation to professionalisation in women's road cycling. Cycling as a sport commenced in the late 1800s, and women were able to earn money from riding and racing their bicycle. However, the evolution of women's cycling has not been a linear process, (McLachlan, 2016) and despite increased ‘professionalisation’ of women's road cycling, women cyclists lack proper wages, safe working conditions, significant prize money, and suitable economic and career opportunities. Our work draws from data of 15 semi-structured interviews with riders and from extensive fieldwork of elite women's road cycling races in seven different countries in 2019. Our findings illustrate that despite the general perceptions of progress of women's professional road cycling, the cyclists' experiences and rationalisations of their conditions reflect deeper struggles. We argue that struggles over rewards, resources, and recognition are all evidence of the ‘unimpeded sexism’ in sport (Fink, 2016, p. 3), and as such, the professionalising of women's sport does not guarantee transformation of the gender order.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of breakaway success in road cycling races.

Descriptive statistics were computed, and a logit model of breakaway success was estimated based on a new kind of statistical data describing the development of each of the 268 breakaways that occurred in the 76 regular stages of the Tour de France 2013 to 2016.

Breakaway success partly depends on the physics of cycling: breakaways are more successful when the stage is hilly or in mountain than flat. In addition, the likelihood of breakaway success depends on strategic moves such as attack timing and the percentage of riders with a teammate in the breakaway.

Understanding why certain breakaways succeed and others do not is useful to comprehend cycling performance and to help coopetitive temporary organizational forms such as breakaways optimize their strategic behavior. A limitation is the focus on the Tour de France only.

The present study adds to the literature on temporary organizational forms, coopetition and cycling performance by analyzing within-stage data in cycling and, as such, enabling to capture its strategic dimension.

We use normal accident theory to analyze the financial sector, especially that part of the financial sector that processed home mortgages, and the mortgage meltdown. We maintain that the financial sector was highly complex and tightly coupled in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown. And we argue that the meltdown exhibited characteristics of a system or normal accident; the result of a component failure (unusually high mortgage defaults) that, in the context of unique conditions (which included low interest rates and government policy encouraging home loans to less credit-worthy households), resulted in complex and tightly coupled interactions that financial elites and government officials were ill-equipped to control. We also consider the role that agency and wrongdoing played in the design of the financial system and the unfolding of the mortgage meltdown. We conclude that a fundamental restructuring of the financial system, so as to reduce complexity and coupling, is required to avert future similar financial debacles. But we also conclude that such a restructuring faces significant obstacles, given the interests of powerful actors and the difficulties of labeling those responsible for the meltdown as wrongdoers.

I. The Gendarmerie: Historical Background The Gendarmerie is the senior unit of the French Armed Forces. It is, however, difficult to give a precise date to its creation. What can be asserted is that as early as the Eleventh Century special units existed under the sénéchal (seneschal), an official of the King's household who was entrusted with the administration of military justice and the command of the army. The seneschal's assistants were armed men known as sergents d'armes (sergeants at arms). In time, the office of the seneschal was replaced by that of the connétable (constable) who was originally the head groom of the King's stables, but who became the principal officer of the early French kings before rising to become commander‐in‐chief of the army in 1218. The connétable's second in command was the maréchal (marshal). Eventually, the number of marshals grew and they were empowered to administer justice among the soldiery and the camp followers in wartime, a task which fully absorbed them throughout the Hundred Years War (1337–1453). The corps of marshals was then known as the maréchaussée (marshalcy) and its members as sergeants and provosts. One of the provosts, Le Gallois de Fougières, was killed at Agincourt in 1415; his ashes were transferred to the national memorial to the Gendarmerie, which was erected at Versailles in 1946.