Search results

This study aims to identify the main challenges to achieving humanitarian logistics in the context of United Nations peace missions in sub-Saharan Africa and to present suggestions for overcoming the logistical gaps encountered.

The methodological approach of the work focuses on the comparative case study of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic and The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2014 to 2021. The approach combined a systematic literature review with the authors’ empirical experience as participant observers in each mission, combining theory and practice.

As a result, six common challenges were identified for carrying out humanitarian logistics in the three peace missions. Each challenge revealed a logistical gap for which an appropriate solution was suggested based on the best practices found in the case study of each mission.

This paper presents limitations when addressing the logistical analysis based on only three countries under the UN mission as a case study, as well as conceiving that certain flaws in the system, in the observed period, are already in the process of correction with the adoption of the 2016–2021 strategy by the UN Global Logistic Cluster. The authors suggest that further studies can be carried out by expanding the number of cases or using countries where other bodies (AU, NATO or EU) work.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first comparative case study of humanitarian logistics on the three principal missions of the UN conducted by academics and practitioners.

The purpuse of this study is to answer the following two questions. Do conflict management efforts mitigate the recurrence and severity of civil conflict? If so, how? Do some conflict management strategies fare better than others in these tasks? This study theorizes about the connection between the costliness of a conflict management strategy – with respect to both the disputants and third parties – and civil conflict outcomes. This theory produces two contradictory predictions: that more costly strategies either increase or decrease violence. This study not only adjudicates between these two possibilities but also incorporates the role of timing. The early use of more costly strategies, for example, may encourage disputants to reduce violence in civil conflicts.

To evaluate the predications that the authors derive from their theoretical argument, the authors quantitatively analyze the effect of conflict management strategies’ relative cost on various measures of civil conflict recurrence and severity. The authors first identify the set of international–civil militarized conflicts (I-CMCs) during the period 1946–2010. I-CMCs contain two dimensions – interstate and intrastate – making them the most complex and dangerous form of militarized conflict. To each I-CMC, the authors then link all third-party attempts to manage the I-CMC’s civil conflict dimension. Finally, after developing quantitative indicators, a series of regression equations explore the relationships of primary interest.

Two main findings emerge. First, when third parties use a relatively more costly conflict management strategy to manage a civil conflict (e.g. a peace operation or military intervention, as opposed to mediation), the severity of the conflict increases, while conflict recurrence rates remain unchanged. Second, this study uncovers a trade-off. The early use of a relatively more costly management strategy lowers a civil conflict’s severity in the short-term. It also, however, increases the likelihood – and speed with which – civil conflict recurs. The timing of certain conflict management strategies matters.

Scholars typically isolate conflict management strategies in number (i.e. consider efforts as independent of one another, even those within the same conflict) and kind (i.e. examine mediation but not peace operations). This study, in contrast, includes the following: the full menu of conflict management strategies available to third parties – negotiation, mediation, adjudication/arbitration, peace operations, sanctions and military intervention – over a lengthy time period (1946–2010); theorizes about the relative merits of these strategies; and considers the timing of certain conflict management efforts. In so doing, it highlights a policy trade-off and proposes promising areas for future research.

Conflicts between herders and farmers in Nigeria in the last five years have been destructive to the corporate existence of Nigerian society and the Nigerian State, especially in Northcentral, Northwestern and Southern Nigeria. This paper aims to investigate the relationships between state responses and peace-building in rural grazing communities in Nigeria using a National Survey on Peace-building in Nigeria conducted by this team using a cross-sectional survey of 1,711 farmers and herders.

The study adopted the political economy of the herder–farmers conflict in Africa to contextualise the problem. Data generated from the study were analysed using chi-square test and binary logistic regression model.

The results showed that protection of victims of herder–farmers conflict (P = 0.024), blockage of sources of illicit weapons (P = 0.000), arrest of leaders (P = 0.043), provision of shelter (P = 0.030), provision of food (P = 0.037), protection of women from sexual exploitation and abuse (P = 0.019) and use of the media were positively related to peace-building in the rural grazing areas. The study further found that when the Federal Government (ß= 0.452, P = 0.018), State Government (ß= 0.522, P = 0.018), private individuals (ß = 0.855, P = 0.000) and cooperative societies (ß = 0.744, P = 0.021) established ranches, peace was likely to be guaranteed as opposed to where herders (ß= –0.355, P= 0.029) were allowed to establish ranches in the rural grazing communities in Nigeria implying that the Federal and State Government must be cautious in the implementation of the Livestock Transformation Plans not to create an impression that it is designed to favour the herders.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is original and the paper has not been submitted to any journal.

The total defence (TD) concept constitutes a joint endeavour between the military forces and civil defence structures within a TD state. Logistics is essential for such joint collaboration to work; however, the mismatch between military and civil defence logistics structures poses challenges for such joint collaboration. The purpose of this paper is to identify logistics concept areas within the TD framework that allow for military and civil defence collaborations from a logistics operations perspective.

Pattern-matching analysis is used to compare patterns found in the investigated case with those prescribed from the literature and predicted to occur. The study seeks to identify logistics concepts within TD from the literature and from the events describing the Swedish response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Pattern matching thus allows for the reconciliation of logistics concepts from the literature to descriptions of how the response was handled, albeit under a TD framework.

Findings show quite distinct foci between the theoretical and observational realms in terms of logistics applications. While the theoretical realm identifies four main logistics concepts, the observational realm identifies five logistics conceptual themes. This goes on to show an incongruence between the military and civil parts of the TD.

This study provides basis for further research into the applications and management of logistics activity within TD and emergency response.

Logistics applications within TD have not, until now, received much attention in the literature. Given this knowledge gap, this study is of original value.

This study aims to explore the role of rebel group legitimacy and ideology in durable peace (DP) following peace agreements to end civil wars. It builds on earlier research showing that justice and civil society involvement are critical in achieving DP. This study adds the impacts of rebel group activities and support on DP. Activities include service delivery and mobilization. Support is gauged with outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections held following peace agreements.

Five data sets were used to measure the key variables: DP, inclusive commissions (IC), legitimacy symmetry (electoral outcomes), service delivery and ideological mobilization. A measure of rebel group integration in the political system was also constructed. Impacts of the integration, legitimacy and ideology variables were assessed with a hierarchical regression model (HRM). This study begins with a base model drawn from earlier research showing the key predictors were procedural justice (PJ) and IC. The authors ask about the extent to which the rebel group variables contribute additional variance to the prediction of DP.

The main contributors to the prediction of DP were PJ, IC and integration in the political system. None of the legitimacy or mobilization variables added significant variance to the prediction. Only one of the mobilization variables, forced recruitment, was significant. The decision to integrate into the political system following the agreement did not mediate the relationship between PJ in the negotiation process and DP. Results of a factor analysis showed that DP, PJ, IC and integration formed a cluster with strong loadings on the first factor.

The negative results for the legitimacy and mobilization variables may not be the last word on rebel group influences. Lack of support for the key hypotheses spurs attempts to discover other sources that contribute to the survival of rebel group actors in the political system and, in turn, to DP.

The issues raised by this study contribute to debates about ways to attain peaceful relations among competing groups following a civil war. It appears that attention to factors inside and around the negotiation process (PJ, ICs and conversion) may be more important than rebel group activities outside of these processes. The results call attention, in particular, to the important role played by political integration. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to develop levers for encouraging rebel groups to emerge as political actors in the post-agreement environment.

Developing measures of the symmetry of rebel group legitimacy and integration in the context of a comparative case study are the primary original contributions of this study. Furthermore, the mode of analysis (HRM) is novel in this literature. This approach builds on and extends the earlier research on factors influencing DP.

This paper aims to provide a case study of complex conflict management within the arms race on the Korean Peninsula. Exploring the complex nexus of nuclear weapons, asymmetry and a qualitative arms race, the study explains how the arms race between Seoul and Pyongyang has promoted stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Presenting the limits of arguments that the US security guarantee is the factor that saved the two Koreas from going to war again, this paper explores the utility of the inter-Korean arms race as a stabilizer that promotes indirect negotiations. While presenting Korean anomalies, this paper analyzes the three stages of the inter-Korean arms race – especially its nuclear weapons, its asymmetry and the nature of arms races – and provides extant explanations on the causes and consequences of the qualitative arms race. These key elements drive the states’ strategic motives.

Using the case of the inter-Korean qualitative arms race and US extended nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, the study shows the complexities of conflict management today. This paper identifies three contributing factors – US nuclear weapons, asymmetry and the qualitative characteristic of the arms race – to explain the enduring stability on the peninsula despite the arms race’s intensification. The paper finds that although US nuclear-extended deterrence plays a critical role, it does not capture the full context of the ongoing, dynamic inter-Korean arms race; a prolonged arms race between the two Koreas has become a new regularity; the qualitative characteristic of the inter-Korean arms race, which is driven by technological advancement, contributes to stability in the arms race; and as the constant mismatch in priority technologies becomes more severe, the changes to the existing asymmetry could increase instability.

This paper offers a diverse perspective to the literature on conflict management and captures the complexities of 21^st-century conflict management. Through a thorough examination of the inter-Korean arms race, it brings readers’ attention to the nested dynamics within the arms race and shows how an intensifying arms race can promote stability. Furthermore, the paper explains the implications for potential instability – fueled by the comprehensive mix of a dynamic qualitative arms race and the US extended nuclear deterrence – in the Indo-Pacific region.

This study aims to contribute to discussions on peace between hostile nonmajor powers by focusing on the behavior of major powers. Specifically, alliances between nonmajor and major powers are explored to determine whether such ties contribute to transitions to higher levels of peace. Moreover, systemic factors involving power dynamics and relationships between major powers are also evaluated.

Multiple data sets which altogether covered the era from 1816 to 2010 were analyzed. All pairs of countries that were former foes were considered. Cox hazard regression was conducted.

Systemic instability is influential at transitions from lowest levels of peace for nonmajor power dyads. Eras where major powers are operating multilaterally appear to play a highly limited role in nonmajor powers attaining stable peace. However, alliances with major powers are relatively more crucial in these discussions for nonmajor powers and contribute to higher levels of peace being attained by nonmajor powers.

Further research in particular with case studies can help to elucidate and extend the statistical findings.

Based on the findings, the design and operations of alliances can create more space to hear a wider range of issues that allies can be facing.

While major powers clearly have considerable capacity and global outreach, there has been little attention to whether and how they contribute to former foes attaining higher quality of peace.

Extensive empirical evidence suggests that procedural justice (PJ) and distributive justice (DJ) are key success factors for achieving durable peace negotiations. This paper aims to investigate how complexity affects these factors and the outcomes in negotiations.

The qualitative study is based on an examination of the peace negotiations that led to the 2016 agreement between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo and the Colombian Government. Based on document analysis, the authors examined in detail how and where in the process the principles of PJ and DJ were applied. The authors then examined the implementation progress after 2016 and placed the peace process in the overall context of the Colombian conflict.

The authors found that the principles of PJ and DJ were present in both the negotiation process and the agreement. The negotiations were successful and satisfactory solutions could be found for all issues. The complexity of the conflict is reflected in the limited coverage of the peace negotiations. Not all groups, interests and subconflicts could be included in the negotiations. This limits their contribution to a durable peace in Colombia. Conflicts that remain unresolved also have a negative effect on the implementation of the agreement.

For conflict management, this implies that the negotiations should not be viewed as “one-and-done” but rather as a progressive, ongoing process. The agreement is only the nucleus for achieving total peace. It must be actively advanced and defended.

This study offers new qualitative insights into how PJ and DJ function in negotiations. It also establishes a systematic connection between PJ and DJ and complexity, introduces the notion of coverage and, thereby, opens a new perspective on the management of conflict complexity.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

This paper aims to study recent approaches to peacemaking, particularly by Turkey and Russia, in a changing world and their implications for UN-led peace processes. The authors analyze the factors that allow parallel processes to UN mediation to emerge and discuss their influence.

The paper presents two in-depth case studies of mediation in Syria and Libya, where the UN, as well as Russia and Turkey, were actively involved in peacemaking.

The authors find that parallel processes to UN mediation emerge if the UN process does not show progress toward a negotiated settlement and other third parties have leverage over the conflict parties. However, whether these parallel processes pose a fundamental challenge to the UN-led process depends on how sustained the third parties’ leverage over the conflict parties is. If it lasts, it puts the UN in a difficult position to either participate in the parallel process and contain it but thereby also legitimizing it, or to abstain from participating but thereby risking to lose control over the mediation process.

Analyzing different approaches to mediation helps to better understand current dynamics of multiparty mediation, including an increased questioning of the effectiveness of UN mediation, and provides insights on how the UN may adapt to keep its relevance in a changing world.

The paper is based on original first-hand data gathered between 2018 and 2022 through more than 50 interviews with UN officials, negotiation team members, political and civil society actors from Syria and Libya, (former) state officials and experts from Russia and Turkey, as well as external observers.