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This research aimed to assess the leadership role of principals in the implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools in the Western Cape, South Africa.

This study employed qualitative research approach to assess the leadership role of principals in the implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools in the Western Cape, South Africa. Data were gathered from a small sample of six principals from six selected secondary schools which were engaged in the implementation of a peace education programme, and data were analysed using thematic content analyses.

Findings of the study suggest that principals possess a low level of understanding or awareness of their leadership role in the implementation of peace education. The study pointed out the constraints such as time constraints and learners' negative attitudes and social influences hinder the effective implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools.

First, the data were self-reported and therefore subject to social desirability bias; participants may have provided socially desirable responses rather than their true belief or experiences. Thus, participants may have overstated their role in and commitment to the peace education programme.

Studies that aim to explore alternative approaches to combat violence, such as peace education, are still limited in South Africa. Hence, this paper served to close that gap by contributing to the growing body of research on the leadership role of the principal in the implementation of peace education in the school and exploring barriers hampering its effective implementation.

Conflicts between herders and farmers in Nigeria in the last five years have been destructive to the corporate existence of Nigerian society and the Nigerian State, especially in Northcentral, Northwestern and Southern Nigeria. This paper aims to investigate the relationships between state responses and peace-building in rural grazing communities in Nigeria using a National Survey on Peace-building in Nigeria conducted by this team using a cross-sectional survey of 1,711 farmers and herders.

The study adopted the political economy of the herder–farmers conflict in Africa to contextualise the problem. Data generated from the study were analysed using chi-square test and binary logistic regression model.

The results showed that protection of victims of herder–farmers conflict (P = 0.024), blockage of sources of illicit weapons (P = 0.000), arrest of leaders (P = 0.043), provision of shelter (P = 0.030), provision of food (P = 0.037), protection of women from sexual exploitation and abuse (P = 0.019) and use of the media were positively related to peace-building in the rural grazing areas. The study further found that when the Federal Government (ß= 0.452, P = 0.018), State Government (ß= 0.522, P = 0.018), private individuals (ß = 0.855, P = 0.000) and cooperative societies (ß = 0.744, P = 0.021) established ranches, peace was likely to be guaranteed as opposed to where herders (ß= –0.355, P= 0.029) were allowed to establish ranches in the rural grazing communities in Nigeria implying that the Federal and State Government must be cautious in the implementation of the Livestock Transformation Plans not to create an impression that it is designed to favour the herders.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is original and the paper has not been submitted to any journal.

This study aims to explore the role of rebel group legitimacy and ideology in durable peace (DP) following peace agreements to end civil wars. It builds on earlier research showing that justice and civil society involvement are critical in achieving DP. This study adds the impacts of rebel group activities and support on DP. Activities include service delivery and mobilization. Support is gauged with outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections held following peace agreements.

Five data sets were used to measure the key variables: DP, inclusive commissions (IC), legitimacy symmetry (electoral outcomes), service delivery and ideological mobilization. A measure of rebel group integration in the political system was also constructed. Impacts of the integration, legitimacy and ideology variables were assessed with a hierarchical regression model (HRM). This study begins with a base model drawn from earlier research showing the key predictors were procedural justice (PJ) and IC. The authors ask about the extent to which the rebel group variables contribute additional variance to the prediction of DP.

The main contributors to the prediction of DP were PJ, IC and integration in the political system. None of the legitimacy or mobilization variables added significant variance to the prediction. Only one of the mobilization variables, forced recruitment, was significant. The decision to integrate into the political system following the agreement did not mediate the relationship between PJ in the negotiation process and DP. Results of a factor analysis showed that DP, PJ, IC and integration formed a cluster with strong loadings on the first factor.

The negative results for the legitimacy and mobilization variables may not be the last word on rebel group influences. Lack of support for the key hypotheses spurs attempts to discover other sources that contribute to the survival of rebel group actors in the political system and, in turn, to DP.

The issues raised by this study contribute to debates about ways to attain peaceful relations among competing groups following a civil war. It appears that attention to factors inside and around the negotiation process (PJ, ICs and conversion) may be more important than rebel group activities outside of these processes. The results call attention, in particular, to the important role played by political integration. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to develop levers for encouraging rebel groups to emerge as political actors in the post-agreement environment.

Developing measures of the symmetry of rebel group legitimacy and integration in the context of a comparative case study are the primary original contributions of this study. Furthermore, the mode of analysis (HRM) is novel in this literature. This approach builds on and extends the earlier research on factors influencing DP.

Extensive empirical evidence suggests that procedural justice (PJ) and distributive justice (DJ) are key success factors for achieving durable peace negotiations. This paper aims to investigate how complexity affects these factors and the outcomes in negotiations.

The qualitative study is based on an examination of the peace negotiations that led to the 2016 agreement between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo and the Colombian Government. Based on document analysis, the authors examined in detail how and where in the process the principles of PJ and DJ were applied. The authors then examined the implementation progress after 2016 and placed the peace process in the overall context of the Colombian conflict.

The authors found that the principles of PJ and DJ were present in both the negotiation process and the agreement. The negotiations were successful and satisfactory solutions could be found for all issues. The complexity of the conflict is reflected in the limited coverage of the peace negotiations. Not all groups, interests and subconflicts could be included in the negotiations. This limits their contribution to a durable peace in Colombia. Conflicts that remain unresolved also have a negative effect on the implementation of the agreement.

For conflict management, this implies that the negotiations should not be viewed as “one-and-done” but rather as a progressive, ongoing process. The agreement is only the nucleus for achieving total peace. It must be actively advanced and defended.

This study offers new qualitative insights into how PJ and DJ function in negotiations. It also establishes a systematic connection between PJ and DJ and complexity, introduces the notion of coverage and, thereby, opens a new perspective on the management of conflict complexity.

This study aims to contribute to discussions on peace between hostile nonmajor powers by focusing on the behavior of major powers. Specifically, alliances between nonmajor and major powers are explored to determine whether such ties contribute to transitions to higher levels of peace. Moreover, systemic factors involving power dynamics and relationships between major powers are also evaluated.

Multiple data sets which altogether covered the era from 1816 to 2010 were analyzed. All pairs of countries that were former foes were considered. Cox hazard regression was conducted.

Systemic instability is influential at transitions from lowest levels of peace for nonmajor power dyads. Eras where major powers are operating multilaterally appear to play a highly limited role in nonmajor powers attaining stable peace. However, alliances with major powers are relatively more crucial in these discussions for nonmajor powers and contribute to higher levels of peace being attained by nonmajor powers.

Further research in particular with case studies can help to elucidate and extend the statistical findings.

Based on the findings, the design and operations of alliances can create more space to hear a wider range of issues that allies can be facing.

While major powers clearly have considerable capacity and global outreach, there has been little attention to whether and how they contribute to former foes attaining higher quality of peace.

The purpose of this study is to explore the understanding and observance of the program “This School is a Zone of Peace” (SZOP) in schools where conflict and violence are not prevalent.

This paper followed a qualitative research tradition – narrative inquiry. Eight teachers and a school head participated in the study. Data were gathered through nonparticipant observation, photography and focus group discussion with photo elicitation.

The participants elucidated the declaration, “This School is a Zone of Peace,” as a message of assurance to the community that the school is a home for learners that is welcoming and violence free. Furthermore, learners in a school that is a zone of peace are honed holistically with the participation, cooperation and togetherness of the school community members. Teachers at the forefront viewed themselves as mentors, implementers and models. Teachers contended that peacebuilding practices in schools could be sustained through regular implementation, encouraging others to get involved and have commitment.

A handful of articles have illustrated the essence of the School as Zone of Peace program, which pointed out to create a culture of peace in schools; however, it leaned toward the negative conception of peace – the absence of conflict and violence. This study bared additional insights and fresh perspectives of the SZOP initiative observed in schools with different contexts and experiences that may be helpful to policymakers for the enhancement of the adapted program with the goal of peacebuilding to making schools highly functional.

The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 outlines sustainability as associated with peace, good governance and justice. The perception of international tourists about security measures and risks is a key factor affecting destination choices, tourist flow and overall satisfaction. Thus, we investigate the impact of armed forces personnel, prices, economic stability, financial development and infrastructure on tourism.

This research used data from 130 countries from 1995 to 2019, which were divided into four income groups. This study employs a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) technique and a novel tourism index comprising five relevant indicators of tourism.

A 1% increase in armed forces personnel expands tourism in all income groups – 0.369% High Income Countries (HICs), 0.348% Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs), 0.247% Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) and 0.139% Low Income Countries (LICs). The size of the tourism-safety coefficient decreases from high to low-income groups. The impact of inflation is significantly negative in all panels, excluding LICs. The reduction in tourism was 0.033% in HICs, 0.049% in UMICs and 0.029% in LMICs for a 1% increase in prices. The increase in the global tourism index is more in LICs (0.055%), followed by LMICs (0.024%), UMICs (0.009%) and HICs (0.004%) for a 1% expansion in the gross domestic product (GDP)/capita growth. However, the magnitude of the growth-led tourism impact is greater in developing countries. A positive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow was found in all panels like 0.016% in HICs, 0.050% in UMICs and 0.119% in LMICs for a 1% increase in FDI inflow. The rise in the global tourism index is 0.097% (HICs), 0.124% (UMICs) and 0.310% (LMICs) for a 1% rise in the financial development index. The increase in the global tourism index is 0.487% (HICs), 0.420% (UMICs) and 0.136% (LICs) for a 1% rise in the infrastructure index.

Empirical analysis infers important policy implications such as (a) establishment of a peaceful environment via recruitment of security personnel, use of safe city cameras, modern technology and law enforcement; (b) provision of basic facilities to tourists like sanitation, drinking water, electricity, accommodation, quality food, fuel and communication network and (c) price stability through different tools of monetary and fiscal policy.

First, it explains the effect of security personnel on a comprehensive index of tourism instead of a single variable of tourism. Second, it captures the importance of economic stability (i.e., economic growth, financial development and FDI inflow) in the tourism–peace nexus.

The purpuse of this study is to answer the following two questions. Do conflict management efforts mitigate the recurrence and severity of civil conflict? If so, how? Do some conflict management strategies fare better than others in these tasks? This study theorizes about the connection between the costliness of a conflict management strategy – with respect to both the disputants and third parties – and civil conflict outcomes. This theory produces two contradictory predictions: that more costly strategies either increase or decrease violence. This study not only adjudicates between these two possibilities but also incorporates the role of timing. The early use of more costly strategies, for example, may encourage disputants to reduce violence in civil conflicts.

To evaluate the predications that the authors derive from their theoretical argument, the authors quantitatively analyze the effect of conflict management strategies’ relative cost on various measures of civil conflict recurrence and severity. The authors first identify the set of international–civil militarized conflicts (I-CMCs) during the period 1946–2010. I-CMCs contain two dimensions – interstate and intrastate – making them the most complex and dangerous form of militarized conflict. To each I-CMC, the authors then link all third-party attempts to manage the I-CMC’s civil conflict dimension. Finally, after developing quantitative indicators, a series of regression equations explore the relationships of primary interest.

Two main findings emerge. First, when third parties use a relatively more costly conflict management strategy to manage a civil conflict (e.g. a peace operation or military intervention, as opposed to mediation), the severity of the conflict increases, while conflict recurrence rates remain unchanged. Second, this study uncovers a trade-off. The early use of a relatively more costly management strategy lowers a civil conflict’s severity in the short-term. It also, however, increases the likelihood – and speed with which – civil conflict recurs. The timing of certain conflict management strategies matters.

Scholars typically isolate conflict management strategies in number (i.e. consider efforts as independent of one another, even those within the same conflict) and kind (i.e. examine mediation but not peace operations). This study, in contrast, includes the following: the full menu of conflict management strategies available to third parties – negotiation, mediation, adjudication/arbitration, peace operations, sanctions and military intervention – over a lengthy time period (1946–2010); theorizes about the relative merits of these strategies; and considers the timing of certain conflict management efforts. In so doing, it highlights a policy trade-off and proposes promising areas for future research.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.