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Alternative payment means have been expanding rapidly in recent years. The need to identify the segments of customers that are targetable for both financial and nonfinancial institutions is growing. The purpose of this paper is to use two different methods, discriminant analysis and decision trees, in order to compare the effectiveness of the two methods for segmentation and identify critical consumer characteristics which determine behavior and preference in relation to the use of payment means.

Using data from 321 bank customers, decision tree and discriminant analysis methods are used, first to test the same set of variables differentiating the customers and then to compare the respective results and prediction ability of the two methods.

Results show that discriminant analysis has a better model fit and segments the customers in a more effective way than the decision tree method. In addition, each method shows different variables to differentiate the customer groups.

The findings are limited to the sector and country of the study, as well as the convenience sample that has been used.

Suggestions for financial managers to better understand their customers’ behavior and target the right group are discussed.

This is the first attempt to compare decision trees and discriminant analysis as alternative segmentation methods for payment means.

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

An Act to amend the law relating to employers and workers and to organisations of employers and organisations of workers; to provide for the establishment of a National Industrial Relations Court and for extending the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals; to provide for the appointment of a Chief Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, and of assistant registrars, and for establishing a Commission on Industrial Relations as a statutory body; and for purposes connected with those matters. [5th August 1971]

Marx’s monetary theory is an important part of Marxist economics and an irreplaceable milestone in the intellectual history of the monetary theory. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the main content of Marx’s monetary theory from three aspects: the source and nature of money, the function of money and the historical significance of money.

Moreover, this paper also gives an extended understanding of Marx’s monetary theory from four perspectives: the endogenous credit mechanism of money, the functions of money and demands for money, the financial function of money and the economic and social functions of money.

Lastly, the present paper discusses the practical significance of Marx’s monetary theory from three perspectives, namely, the inspection of “Bitcoin” from the nature and function of money, the definition of demands and the division of supplies at the monetary level, and the prevention of systemic financial risks and the focus of financial supervision.

Marx’s monetary theory is an important part of Marxist economics and an irreplaceable milestone in the intellectual history of the monetary theory. However, for a long time, the contribution of Marx has rarely been mentioned in the intellectual history of monetary theory. Even the book, Political Economy (On Capitalism), has been only summarily concerned with the source and function of money in Marx’s monetary theory, rather than revealing Marx’s outstanding contribution in the monetary theory and the financial connotation of Marx’s monetary theory, and expounding its practical significance.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. is a challenge to conventional antitrust analysis. Conventional civil antitrust cases are decided by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that conduct challenged under the rule of reason is only condemned if the conduct resulted in more competitive harm in the actual world than a world without the alleged violation. Under conventional analysis, the intent of the parties also plays only a supporting role in determining whether the conduct was anticompetitive. A holder of a valid patent has a right to exclude others practicing the patented technology. And, the patent holder is not assumed to have market power because it expended resources in maintaining exclusionary rights. Actavis creates doubts about these propositions in circumstances beyond the “reverse” payment settlement of a patent suit that may have delayed an alleged infringer market entry. This chapter explores whether applying Actavis logic to antitrust litigation can result in condemnation of practices where there is little chance of an anticompetitive effect, where the patent holder likely has a valid and infringed patent, where there is little reason to believe that the patent holder has market power, and where only one party, or no parties, to an agreement have an anticompetitive intent. This chapter also investigates whether Actavis creates new problems with standing analysis, damages calculations, and the balancing of efficiencies against anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, the lower courts have begun to extend the logic of Actavis. This is apparent in the condemnation of no-Authorized-generic settlements.

The past decade, with its unprecedented surge in financial activity and the occurence of financial crises, has been one of increased awareness on the part of both regulatory authorities and market participants of payment system's potential for propagating and amplifying financial shocks, especially in a cross‐border context. This has led the European Commission to propose a Directive aiming at reducing systemic risk in payment systems. Systemic risk is the risk that the illiquidity or failure of one participant in a payment system, and its resulting inability to meet its obligations when due, will lead to the illiquidity or failure of other participants in that system, with, at worst, knock‐on effects in the financial markets at large. This paper draws the background and describes the contents of the Commission's proposal to reduce systemic risk.

To examine and draw lessons from the experience of creating and implementing a unique e‐government payments system (“Gorod”) in a little‐studied area of the world.

An interpretivistic methodology is used based on interviews of system developers, discussion forums, collection and tabulation of Gorod web site data, and contemporaneous sources.

Gorod permits hundreds of thousands of citizens in about 25 Siberian cities to make in‐person or electronic payments on a single, unified bill to a wide range of public and private service suppliers. While Gorod does improve municipal payments collections, cities where banks run Gorod have been less successful than those with more neutral public‐private partnerships.

Diffusion of innovation theory (DIT) provides a useful framework for examining a system at this level of granularity.

By joining public and private activities in one system, and by creating an infrastructure for the expansion of e‐government as the population transfers its activity to the internet, Gorod suggests a viable means for bringing e‐government to countries with less developed payment means and lower levels of internet penetration. When appropriate incentives are in place, e‐government technologies can have successful diffusion without requiring an extensive, top‐down program.

This subject is unknown in the Western academic literature. While exhibiting typical characteristics suggested by DIT, Gorod also shows a means of overcoming the “chicken and egg” network externalities problem.

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate some reflections on the potentially contradictory relationship between the adoption of innovative payment instruments and the prevention and fight against financial crime. The ideal addresses of the paper are regulators in these two fields (Central Banks; Financial Intelligence Units).

The paper is largely based on reflections coming from the author's background as a central banker with a long experience in the statistical analysis of financial data with an anti‐money laundering (AML) focus.

The paper takes the move from the present and prospective characteristics of the payment means and moves on to analyse briefly the possible implications of their evolution in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The analysis shows how some factors that make innovative payment instruments desirable may, at the same time, represent elements of weakness in the prevention of financial crime.

The paper addresses a number of theoretical and systemic issues but no specific data or calculations are provided to evaluate alternative regulatory scenarios. Further studies could offer a more quantitative approach, in an attempt, for instance, to estimate the costs and benefits of the evolution of the praxis and legislation in the field of payment system and AML.

The paper openly tackles the cross effects of regulation in the financial sector, specifically addressing the potential risk factor represented by loosely regulated innovations of the payment instruments. The argument is intended to highlight both the importance of technological evolution and the necessity of a proper supervision over potential loopholes and unguarded passages that could be exploited by financial criminals.

The paper addresses questions of particular relevance in the present, fast developing world of advanced technological payments and global financial crime. The author underlines explicitly how these two fields share some common features; an original argument is developed with reference to the possible risk of unwanted spillovers between these two areas of public interest.

The Secretary of State for Social Services, in conjunction with the Treasury so far as relates to matters with regard to which the Treasury have so directed, in exercise of his powers under sections 7 and 13 of the Family Allowances Act 1965, sections 1(3) and 52 of the National Insurance Act 1965 and section 27 of the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1965, as amended, in the case of the said sections 7, 52 and 27, by section 2 of the National Insurance &c. Act 1969 and, in the case of the said sections 7, 13, 52 and 27, by section 138 of the Post Office Act 1969, and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, hereby, in consequence of the last‐mentioned Act of 1969, makes the following regulations which, by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 48 of Schedule 9 to the said last‐mentioned Act of 1969, are excepted from the requirements of section 108 of the National Insurance Act 1965 (preliminary draft of regulations under that Act to be submitted to the National Insurance Advisory Committee) and section 62(2) of the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1965 (proposal to make regulations under that Act to be submitted to the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council):—

An Act to repeal the Industrial Relations Act 1971; to make provision with respect to the law relating to trade unions, employers' associations, workers and employers, including the law relating to unfair dismissal, and with respect to the jurisdiction and procedure of industrial tribunals; and for connected purposes [31st July 1974]