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This article examines the rule issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in August 2015 that requires most SEC-reporting companies to disclose annually the ratio of the annual total compensation of their chief executive officer to the median of the annual total compensation of their employees other than the CEO.

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the operation of the controversial pay ratio disclosure rule against the backdrop of concerns expressed by many commenters on the rule proposal, as well as by the two Commissioners who dissented from adoption of the rule, that the disclosure will not provide meaningful information to investors and will be excessively costly and burdensome for companies to produce.

The SEC fashioned the final pay ratio disclosure rule with a vaguely defined statutory purpose to guide it and a heavy volume of comments on its rule proposal that urged widely disparate approaches to implementation. In overhauling the proposed rule, the SEC sought to satisfy its mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act while providing companies with flexibility in implementing the new rule that it believes will reduce compliance costs and burdens.

This article provides expert guidance on a major new SEC disclosure requirement from experienced securities lawyers.

This study investigates whether the proportion of proprietary directors (blockholders or their representatives) on the board's remuneration committee influences vertical pay inequality in Spanish listed companies and whether this relationship can be conditioned by the concentration of ownership.

The sample contains information on the individual compensation of 1048 directors of 57 Spanish listed firms during the period 2013–2018 making up an unbalanced panel with 3565 observations. Panel data regressions are used to study how the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee influences the remuneration of directors, focusing not on their absolute remuneration levels, but rather on their relationship to the average remuneration of the organization's employees (as a measure of vertical pay inequality within the company). The authors also investigate whether this relationship is conditioned by firm ownership concentration.

The results indicate that the presence of proprietary directors on the remuneration committee acts as a mechanism to reduce vertical pay inequality, even in the context of high ownership concentration.

Unlike the majority of previous research dedicated to the independence of the remuneration committee, this study focuses on the role played by proprietary directors. The results help elucidate the importance of proprietary directors to properly monitor and restrain directors' compensation in contexts of high ownership concentration.

The article examines a current debate over pay ratio rulemaking in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a rule that requires public companies to disclose the ratio of the annual pay of their chief executive officer to the median of their employees’ pay in 2015. The United Kingdom has considered making a similar rule under Prime Minister Theresa May.

The article provides a concise analysis of the current debate over a rule regarding pay ratio in the United Kingdom. It also highlights characteristics and concerns by comparing pay ratio disclosure in the United States.

The United Kingdom seems to have taken the first step toward pay ratio rule, similar to Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the so-called pay ratio disclosure. Some differences can however be found in manifestos and many issues and uncertainties still remain for rulemaking.

This article provides information on a prospect for a pay ratio rule in the United Kingdom.

The typical accounting curriculum focuses on technical knowledge, which makes it challenging to devote time toward developing other important skills, such as examining how accounting rules may impact a company’s financial statements. Recently, the accounting rules for lease transactions changed significantly, and this chapter provides an overview of an assignment used in an intermediate accounting course to engage students in a real-world application. Students had the opportunity to apply accounting rules to a publicly traded company, measure the significance of changes to generally accepted accounting principles, read financial disclosures, reinforce concepts of present value and ratio analysis, and engage in critical thinking. This type of assignment does not have to be limited to leases, and instructors could discuss any accounting rule by following a similar model, whether the rule itself is current or proposed. This would offer students context beyond textbook learning.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

To outline and summarize the new disclosure requirements under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed pay-for-performance rule, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

This article highlights the proposed new disclosure requirements, while briefly discussing the technical requirements under the rule. The article concludes with a summary of the next steps in the rulemaking process followed by our observations of various issues raised by the proposed new disclosure requirement.

While the contours of any new disclosure requirements will depend on the specifics of the final rule, the pay-for-performance rule, as proposed, would represent a significant new annual disclosure obligation for many public companies.

Practical guidance from experienced securities and capital markets attorneys.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive background on the recent legislative, regulatory, and prosecutorial scrutiny of mutual funds and underlying issues such as the level and transparency of fees and costs, distribution and sales practices, and fund governance.

Provides a detailed chronology of events since January 2003 concerning mutual fund scandals such as trading abuses and questionable sales practices and related issues such as revenue sharing, directed brokerage, soft dollars, market timing, late trading, and selective disclosure. The chronology in this issue of JOIC will be followed an article in the next issue that describes reform initiatives that have taken place in response to the scandals.

Despite criticism and scrutiny of equity mutual funds following poor performance in 2001 and 2002, meaningful efforts to achieve reform began to lose momentum in mid‐2003. Then concern with mutual fund abuses was reignited in September 2003 when New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced a settlement with Canary Capital that involved market timing, late trading, and selective disclosure. Since then there have been numerous disclosures of fund trading abuses and questionable trading practices, and the resulting uproar has triggered significant efforts to reform the manner in which funds and their service providers conduct business.

This comprehensive chronology provides an essential reference by bringing together all the events and underlying issues related to mutual fund scandals, abuses, regulation, compliance, and reform efforts since January 1, 2003.

Extensively public concern on “Huge Executive Compensation” makes it urgent to investigate the reasonability of high executive compensation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of compensation contracting based on the specific responsibility of executives. More specifically, this paper is to examine whether high compensation is helpful to mitigate agency problems.

Considering that board secretaries of listed companies are responsible for information disclosure in China, this paper examines the effect of board secretaries’ excess compensation on firms’ disclosure quality using listed company data from 2007 to 2015. The first measure of disclosure quality is based on the disclosure violation behavior of firms, and the second is KV value that represents the extent to which the investors relay on the stock trading volume. To provide additional confidence that the findings are robust, this paper further conducts two indirect tests based on rumors and cost of equity capital.

The results show that board secretaries’ excess compensation is negatively associated with the probability of information disclosure violation and also negatively associated with firms’ KV value, suggesting firms that pay high compensation to their information providers are more likely to provide high-quality disclosures. Besides, this paper further finds that board secretaries’ excess compensation is negatively related to the incidence of rumors, the number of rumors incurred or the cost of equity capital.

Overall, the findings provide support to the efficient contracting of executive compensation, which implies that highly paid board secretaries would be better information providers than those poorly paid.

This paper provides empirical evidence that firms’ disclosure quality can be improved by modifying the compensation contract of information providers. This may indicate a new way to improve the quality of disclosures, so as to mitigate the agency problem.

In spite of the public criticism on executive excess compensation, the high compensation is not always a signal of manipulation, collusion and self-interest. It also can be a signal of individual talents and great efforts. Board secretaries are worth to be highly paid if they can improve firms’ disclosures, thereby reducing the incidence of rumors and reducing the cost of equity capital.

This paper is the first research to examine the effectiveness of compensation contracting based on information providers’ disclosure responsibility in the Chinese context. It documents a positive relation between board secretaries’ excess compensation and corporate disclosure quality.