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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between countries’ values of individualism/collectivism and organizations’ top management team (TMT) pay structures. Individualistic countries are expected to prefer more hierarchical TMT pay structures and collectivist countries are expected to prefer more egalitarian TMT pay structures. The manuscript also investigates the international implications of the relation between TMT pay structures and organizational performance. Specifically, it is proposed that a country’s level of individualism/collectivism will mediate the relation between TMT pay structure hierarchy and organizational performance.

A pooled sample of data from 56 organizations in 12 countries was used to investigate the research questions. Individualism/collectivism was measured using country specific individualism/collectivism scores and top management pay structures were operationalized using Gini coefficients. Organizational performance was evaluated using return on assets.

Support was found both for a preference for more hierarchical TMT pay structures in individualistic countries, and that a country’s level of individualism/collectivism mediates the relationship between an organization’s top management’s pay structure and company performance.

Findings demonstrate that organizations use pay structures consistent with their environments. Results suggest cultural dimensions can contribute to understanding cross-national TMT pay structures and that national culture plays a significant role in the relationship between TMT pay structure and company performance.

This study extends prior balanced scorecard (BSC) research by incorporating the effects of uncertainty, payment schemes and the strength of causal relations proposed in the performance measurement model (PMM) on the budgetary dynamics. Our analysis was restricted to two strategic business units (SBU), engineering projects and electricity distribution service, from a Brazilian electric power concessionaire. We postulate a mediated moderation association between uncertainty (treatment), bonus scheme (mediator), dispersion of payment scheme and the strength of causal relations proposed in the PMM (moderators) on budgetary slack (outcome). Additionally, we postulate that the use of accounting-based measures (ABM) also mediates the effect of uncertainty on budgetary slack. We gathered monthly observations from 102 indicators containing the target and achievement values throughout 2002–2006. Managers were later asked to answer questionnaires about the possible cause–effect relations between these indicators, then 215 causal maps of the department and corporate indicators were drawn up. Econometric analysis provided evidence that the budgetary slack observed is directly impacted by uncertainty, and this impact is moderated by the dispersion of payment scheme. However, we did not find any evidence that supported the mediation process proposed between uncertainty, ABM and budgetary slack. Incomplete implementation of BSC and the level of analysis adopted are possible explanations for that.

A widespread consensus in strategy literature argues that firms acquire positions of advantage and competitive capability by assembling or “organizing” sets of uniquely complementary resources, activities, or assets. In this regard, value is created not only in identifying unique and valuable combinations of existing resources, but also in seeing unique and valuable ways to modify or cospecialize these assets. With the envisioned strategic bundle defined, the manager must then determine how to form, organize, and create this bundle. In particular, the manager must decide which assets, activities, and resources must be “owned” and which can be accessed contractually. We argue that although integration does have certain advantages over market transactions, it does not necessarily lead to the expansion of the scale and scope of the firm, because firms would also fail, particularly as they become larger in size. While established theories articulate this organizational failure puzzle in terms of incentive explanations and measurement difficulties, recent advancement in organizational economics and business strategy sees this as a result of influence activities, and social comparison and social attachment processes. These elements can serve as new building blocks for a more comprehensive theory of the nature and the boundary of the firm. Three future research trajectories – both theoretical and empirical in this realm – are suggested.

The purpose of this paper is to study bank executive compensation and securitization, two important strategic developments in finance that are central to the debate on the cause of the crisis.

We study the relationship between securitization and executive pay in a sample of US banks from 2001 to 2010, using a series of multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses.

Bank Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay exhibits a positive pay-for-performance relationship. Since the crisis, this relationship is weakened. For banks that securitize, we find that prior to the crisis, higher securitization activity led to higher CEO compensation levels. While we do not find that securitization is related to bank CEO pay gap (the difference between CEO and the next-highest paid bank executive), we do see that bank ratings are a factor in pay gap and compensation level.

Bank regulatory ratings influence the relationship between compensation and securitization. Also, the relationship differs pre- and post-crisis.

Our study is unique for several reasons. First, we look at the relationship between compensation and securitization over a time period that includes the recent financial crisis. Second, we include an analysis of pay gap. Third, we include bank regulatory ratings, which are proprietary and therefore not available for use in many banking studies.

Organizational justice research has become the main paradigm of research in the field of HRM. The purpose of this paper is to outline a number of underlying challenges to which this paradigm is ill-suited. It broadens the traditional understanding of what is meant by fairness within the HRM literature to help explain how justice judgements are formed and may be used to influence societal-level fairness processes. It develops a framework to aid the understanding of the fairness of decisions that individuals or organizations make.

The paper presents a conceptual review of the main paradigms used in fairness research. It draws upon the organizational justice literature as the dominant paradigm in HRM research, and conducts a cross-disciplinary review that introduces a range of theories less frequently used by HRM researchers – specifically capability theory, game theory, tournament theory, equity sensitivity theory, theories of intergenerational equity, and burden sharing. It demonstrates the relevance of these theories to a number of areas of organizational effectiveness.

The paper shows that researchers are now augmenting the organizational justice research paradigm under two important pressures – awareness of hidden structures that preclude the option for real fairness; and new variables that are being added to the consideration of organizational justice.

HR functions have invested significant resources in employee engagement or insight units, but if their policies trigger significant inequality of outcomes, perceived problems of justice, a lack of burden sharing, no sense proportionality, organizations may not be able to achieve other important HR strategies such as sustaining and deepening employee engagement, developing organizational advocacy, building an employer brand, or being seen to have authenticity in its values. The framework suggests a broadened educational base for HR practitioners around fairness. It also suggests that there may be complex employees segments concerning perceptions of fairness.

The cross-disciplinary perspective taken on fairness helps deconstruct the judgements that employees likely make, enabling organizations and individuals alike to ask more critical questions about their respective behaviour.

While the effect of vertical pay dispersion on the voluntary turnover rate of vice presidents (VPs) has received attention, the existing research conclusions are still divided. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relationship between vertical pay dispersion and voluntary turnover rate of VPs in a Chinese context using data from listed firms.

Integrating tournament theory and social comparison theory, this study examines the non-linear effect of vertical pay dispersion on VPs’ voluntary turnover rates using empirical data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2016.

The results reveal a U-shaped relationship between vertical pay dispersion and the voluntary turnover rate of VPs. After further incorporating the moderating effect of the board governance structure, the effect is found to be enhanced in firms with more efficient board governance (i.e. smaller board size, higher board turnover and higher proportion of outside directors). Further analysis indicates that the aforementioned conclusions mainly exist in non-state-owned enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises.

The findings deepen the understanding of the costs and benefits associated with vertical pay dispersion, enrich the research findings on pay dispersion and contribute to the integration of previously inconsistent findings.

Existing research concerning the impact of unions on relative wages provides evidence for the existence of significant union/non‐union wage differentials. However, union practices are deemed to have a more pervasive effect on the overall distribution of wages, reducing wage differentials across and within establishments. Attempts to explore union effects on wage dispersion in the context of the Italian labour market. Several indicators of wage dispersion are computed, using both industry and establishment level data, in the attempt to ascertain the different routes through which union presence affects the structure of wages. The empirical evidence shows that Italian trade unions have pursued “egalitarian” objectives and have succeeded in shaping pay policies which, through central and local negotiations, raise low wages and reduce wage differentials both among skill categories and across establishments.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of wage dispersion on sickness absenteeism observed in Belgian firms.

The authors use detailed linked employer-employee panel data for the period 1999-2006 that allow the authors to compute a conditional wage dispersion indicator following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology and to estimate the relationship between sickness absenteeism and wage dispersion while controlling for time-invariant workplace characteristics.

The authors find a positive and hump-shaped relationship between intra-firm wage dispersion and sickness absenteeism, the turning point of this relation being extremely high. In addition, the magnitude of the influence of wage dispersion on sickness absenteeism is found to be stronger in firms employing a larger share of blue-collar workers.

The results could therefore suggest that wage dispersion, suggestive of larger pay-for-performance mechanisms, decreases worker satisfaction and the workplace climate in general. Only a minority of workers, who are less sensitive to equity and cohesion considerations, would be less absent as pay-for-performance increases.

While numerous approaches analyse the link between wage dispersion and firm productivity, very few studies we are aware of are devoted to the relationship between wage dispersion and sickness absenteeism. Yet, the outcomes in terms of productivity and sickness absenteeism may be different. Furthermore, the influence of wage dispersion on sickness absenteeism does not seem unambiguous from a theoretical point of view. To the authors knowledge, it is the first time that this relation is analysed with Belgian data.