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This chapter explores the implications of patrimonial politics in the Dutch East India Company empire in the context of establishing a settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa in the mid-seventeenth century. The Cape extended the reach of Company patrimonial networks with elite Company officials circulating throughout the Indian Ocean empire and consolidating their familial ties through marriage both within the colonies and in the United Provinces. These patrimonial networks extended to the Cape as elite Company officials created families locally or married Cape-born women. As the colony grew, the Company created a class of free-burghers some the wealthiest of whom were tied directly into elite Company patrimonial networks. But from the early eighteenth century onwards these elite Company networks came into conflict with the evolving free-burgher patrimonial networks with which they were in direct competition. This paper argues that local patrimonial networks can evolve in a settler colony that challenge the elite patrimonial networks of the imperial elite.

Democratic renewal in Sri Lanka as well as a cross the Global South depends on strengthening democratic social movements within varieties of patrimonial capitalism. Patrimonial capitalism, emphasising patron–client relations, coincide with weakening democratic institutional cultures and practices. The dominant corruption/anti-corruption narrative is bracketed with elite class strategies aimed at negotiating a ‘managed corruption’. The realm of representative politics creating consent for patrimonial capitalism is shaped by: ethnic and class relations; the weakening of working-class parties; patriarchal cultures within parties; links with criminal networks; opaque finances and the integration of mainstream media with party patronage.

Democratising the realm of representative politics points towards democratic social movements. The internal dynamics of social movements, their relationships with political parties and collective learning are significant factors that shapes the strategic orientation of social movements. State repression of social movements highlights the need for demilitarisation and the abolition of prisons. The global sense of this local struggle relates to transforming financial markets and platform economies towards notions of financial and digital commons. The integration of different realms of politics, such as representative, movement, life and emancipatory politics, is vital for reinforcing solidarity as the basis for counter-hegemonic struggles.

The article shows that the concept of patrimonialism is useful for the analysis not only of nation-states, but also of local and imperial power structures. Highlighting the limits of empires, we consider how local conditions shaped the strategies of colonial states in the process of empire building. We argue that the strength of local patrimonial networks before colonization, coupled with the sequencing of colonial conquests, either facilitated or hindered the French colonial and imperial project. Using a comparative-historical approach based on the analysis of two cases, Algeria and Tunisia, we find that the French colonial state employed markedly differing strategies of domination in each case. In Algeria, the French initially attempted and failed to destroy local patrimonial networks and the social practices associated with them through extensive military action. The failed attempt to destroy local practices resulted in over a century of resistance and bloodshed. When military rule became too costly, the French opted instead to rely on decentralized control that used the very structures they originally sought to eradicate. With constant reminders of the misguided colonial strategy in Algeria, the French used a different form of rule in Tunisia. They incorporated the existing Tunisian bureaucracy into their own political project, using it to limit the power of local patrimonial networks and transforming them instead through the development of capitalistic agriculture. The article illustrates the importance of paying close attention to local patrimonial networks in the analysis of colonial and imperial strategies.

To explore whether supposedly non-modern patrimonial arrangements ever advance the “modern” economy, this essay examines emergent state institutional practices in North America in relation to the domain of public lands from colonial times to the late nineteenth-century U.S. I deconstruct the Weberian model of patrimonialism into four elements – logic, setting, obligations, and resources – in order to show how state grants of land to individuals and corporations (notably railroad companies) constituted patrimonial practices embedded within modern structures. “Modern state patrimonialism” had its origins in royal patrimonialism. Monopolization of resources – by a state rather than an absolutist ruler – continued to offer the basis for patrimonial practice, but state patrimonial resource distribution became less personalistic and more connected to public goals (financing the state, rewarding state service, settlement of territory, development of a national economy, and construction of a transportation system). Recipients of patrimonial distributions often gained considerable control over disposition of resources that they received. In these patrimonialist practices, economic action was constructed in logics of action that occurred outside of “market” transactions. Future research should analyze patrimonial dynamics during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, by identifying state monopolizations of scarce and desirable resources (mineral rights; city water systems; electrical systems; telephone systems; radio, television, and other airwave bandwidth; the internet), and analyzing how the distribution of those resources are entailed, controlled, licensed, or otherwise managed. A research program in the study of modern patrimonialism helps build out an institutionalist sociology of the economy.

This chapter seeks to highlight the important role that the Iranian diaspora will have in a post-sanctions Iranian economy by mapping its political economy. In a 10-year period of analysis, I show that Iran remained a mostly patrimonial state that also became slightly less statist over, yet showed the potential for liberal economic reform. Thus, even though Iran may seek to incorporate liberal economic policies, patrimonial and statist elements will remain quite strong within Iran’s economy for years to come. The key asset of the Iranian diaspora then will be its integration with Western societies. This depth will allow expatriates to bridge the information gaps that will undoubtedly develop as foreign direct investment increases. Most foreign firms will find this expert guidance quite valuable when attempting to navigate the Iranian political economy.

Based on the authors’ study, the purpose of this paper is to better understand why corruption in the Indonesian public sector is so resilient from three behavioral perspectives: the Schemata Theory, the Corruption Normalization Theory and the Moral Development Theory.

This paper examines corruption trends and patterns in the Indonesian public sector in the past decade through examination of reports from various institutions as well as other relevant documents regarding corruption-related issues to gain a better understanding of the behavioral mechanisms underlying the adoption of corruption into organizational and individual schemata. This paper also uses expert interviews and focus group discussions with relevant experts in Indonesia and Australia on various corruption-related issues.

The authors establish that the rampaging corruption in the Indonesian public sector is an outcome of cumulative decision-making processes by the participants. Such a process is influenced by individual and organizational schemata to interpret problems and situations based on past knowledge and experience. The discussion in this paper highlights the mechanisms of corruption normalization used to sustain corruption networks especially in the Indonesian public sector which will be very difficult to break with conventional means such as detection and prosecution. Essentially, the entire process of normalization will cause moral degradation among public servants to the point where their actions are driven solely by the fear of punishment and expectation of personal benefits. The three pillars of institutionalization, rationalization and socialization strengthen one another to make the entire normalization structure so trivially resilient that short-term-oriented anti-corruption measures may not even put a dent in it. The normalization structure can be brought down only when it is continuously struck with sufficient force on its pillars. Corruption will truly perish from Indonesia only when the societal, organizational and individual schemata have been re-engineered to interpret it as an aberration and not as a norm.

Due to the limited time and resources, the discussion on the normalization of corruption in Indonesia is focused on corruption within the Indonesian public institutions by interviewing anti-fraud professionals and scholars. A more complete picture of corruption normalization in Indonesia can be drawn from interviews with incarcerated corruption offenders from Indonesian public institutions.

This paper contributes to the development of corruption eradication strategy by deconstructing corruption normalization processes so that the existing resources can be allocated effectively and efficiently into areas that will result in long-term benefits.

This paper demonstrates how the seemingly small and insignificant behavioral factors may constitute “regenerative healing factor” for corruption in Indonesia.

The concept of patriarchy, one of the key thinking tools of the 1970s women’s movements, has been used and critiqued in many current and historical projects. This chapter enters the debate in an unorthodox way. Rather than define, defend, or critique the concept of patriarchy, it focuses on its capacity to articulate historically specific forms of relations between gender and generation.

The body of the chapter notes the continuities and differences in the way mastery and social infancy were connected in several episodes of thinking with patriarchy in Western social and political thought. Attempts to bring Roman law into a coherent system in early sixth-century ce, debates between defenders of absolutist rule and proponents of democracy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, nineteenth-century reconstructions of human pre-history and resurgent twentieth-century women’s movements have all left traces in ways of thinking about gender and generational relations today.

In the last two decades, new forms of activism and scholarship drew on the conceptual toolkit surrounding patriarchy. The last section of the chapter highlights two of these areas: research on child rights governance and the total social organization of labor, and writings on patrimonialism. Key insights from this work, the chapter concludes, can be used to argue that a focus on historically specific forms of the interface between gender and generation constitutes a useful aspect of thinking with patriarchy.

Based on the authors’ study, the purpose of this paper is to ascertain the best approach to mitigate corruption in the Indonesian public sector. To do so, the paper uses three behavioral perspectives: the Schemata Theory, the Corruption Normalization Theory and the Moral Development Theory.

This paper is part of the authors’ study to examine corruption patterns in Indonesia in the past 10 years through examination of reports from various institutions as well as other relevant documents addresses corruption-related issues to explore various options for mitigating corruption through behavioral re-engineering. For the purpose of gaining various perspectives on anti-corruption measures, this study also uses expert interviews and focus group discussions with relevant experts in Indonesia and Australia on various corruption-related issues.

The authors establish that despite the fall of the New Order regime nearly two decades ago, corruption remains entrenched within the post-Suharto Governments. The normalized corruption in Indonesia is a legacy of the New Order regime that shaped societal, organizational and individual schemata in Indonesia. The patrimonial style of leadership in particular within the regional governments resulted in increasing rent-seeking activities within the decentralized system. The leadership style is also believed to have been supporting the normalization of corruption within the public sector since the New Order era. The three-decade-old systematic normalization of corruption in the Indonesian public sector can only be changed by means of long and systematic de-normalization initiatives. To design the best intervention measures, decision makers must first identify multiple factors that constitute the three normalization pillars: institutionalization, rationalization and normalization. Measures such as periodical reviews of operational procedures, appointment of leaders with sound morality, anti-corruption education programs, administering “cultural shocks”, just to name a few, can be part of multifaceted strategies to bring down the normalization pillars.

The discussion on the options for de-normalization of corruption in Indonesia is focused on corruption within the Indonesian public institutions by interviewing anti-fraud professionals and scholars. A better formulation of strategic approaches can be developed by means of interviews with incarcerated corruption offenders from the Indonesian public institutions.

This paper contributes to the development of corruption eradication strategy by suggesting options for de-normalizing corruption in the Indonesian public sector so that resources can be allocated more effectively and efficiently to mitigate the problem.

This paper highlights the importance of behavior-oriented approaches in mitigating corruption in the Indonesian public sector.

This paper considers the East India Company’s emergence as a territorial power from the 1760s until the revocation of most of its commercial functions in 1834. While this period has been a key episode for historians of the British Empire and of South Asia, social scientists have struggled with the Company’s ambiguous nature. In this paper, I propose that a profitable way to grasp the Company’s transformation is to consider it as a global strategic action field. This perspective clarifies two key processes in the Company’s transition: the enlargement of its territorial possessions; and the increased exposure of its patrimonial network to intervention from British metropolitan politics. To further suggest the utility of this analytic perspective, I synthesize evidence from various sources, including data concerning the East India Court of Directors and the career histories of Company servants in two of its key administrative regions, Bengal and Madras, during this period of transition.

There is an emerging consensus within the literature on failed and failing states that state failure is contagious across borders. For its part, the literature on regionalisation claims that states within the same region tend to form clusters of security – or insecurity – so that geographical proximity is closely associated with inert security relationships. This article – along with the individual contributions in the volume it introduces – seeks to bridge these two literatures, which otherwise rarely talk to each other. The approach taken throughout the volume is largely qualitative and case-oriented, yet methodologically diverse, while the articles have a shared comparative ambition. This introductory article examines the debate on failing states and contextualises the volume's contributions within that debate. It then does the same in relation to the debate on regional security, before moving on to examine the role and impact of emerging regional responses to insecurity. When we examine recent state-building initiatives, the effectiveness of external actors seems limited, while existing power holders – and the conflicts between them – are at the centre in processes for building states. This calls for studying the practice of state-building, and for rooting policies in viable practices, even when the driving actors are not inherently benign. To a considerable degree, a state's strength and functionality are relational: the state can only be understood in relation to significant other states. Within regions, hegemonic states – and the strategies pursued by other states in their efforts to cooperate with, balance, or counter the hegemon – have major implications for security. Regional cooperation emerges through concrete collaboration to address commonly perceived challenges, at times as an unintended effect of a targeted initiative. Key actors – and the networks of which they form part – are often transnational, spanning the borders of several states. The behaviour of transnational actors, how they interface with the system of states and regions and the potential for their conversion into constructive political forces remain poorly understood. As a whole, these are findings that inspire an agenda for future research at the interface between the state and the region.