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The EU harmonisation has created changes in the military's formal and informal influence in the directions of decreased formal and informal military influence in civilian politics. The EU reforms have created changes in the mindset of the citizens, by creating changes in the security culture of the citizens and in the civil-military related political culture. The desired level of alignment has not been reached. Therefore, the study examines the areas where further alignment is required. Moving from Rebecca L. Schiff's concordance theory, the article examines the relationship between the Turkish military, the civilian politics and the society before and after the EU harmonisation process. It examines the effects of the EU harmonisation process on the changes in the civil-military balance of power, and on the related security culture and political values. The analysis focuses on: (i) increased civilian control and consequent changes in the policy of accountability; (ii) transparency building in the defence sector; (iii) parliamentary oversight; and (iv) the change in the political culture related to the civil-military issues. It also investigates the extent the EU harmonisation has achieved in building democratic civil-military relations in order to align with the EU standards.

After the financial collapse, the Icelandic Parliament set up a Special Investigation Commission to explain the causes of the events. A working group on ethics evaluated the explanations of the commission from a moral perspective and placed its analyses in the wider social context. This chapter delineates the approach and the main findings of these investigations. The author argues that the main lessons to be learned are about the need to strengthen democratic structures and professional practices in business, politics and administration. The implications of this structural approach for assessing the responsibility for the collapse are discussed in the light of I.M. Young’s social connection model. While the parliamentary reports were well received, three events hindered Icelanders in learning the reports’ main lessons. In addition to a volcanic eruption immediately after the publication of the report, two major political debates led the reconstruction work astray. The first was about the case of the former prime minister and the second was the fierce Icesave dispute about whether Icelanders should share the financial burden with the citizens of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who lost their savings in the Icesave accounts. This issue dominated Icelandic public discourse for three years and diverted political attention from the message of the parliamentary reports – namely, that the main explanatory factors for the financial collapse were weak governance and flawed practices within Iceland. As a consequence, the political sector has lagged behind other social sectors in efforts to learn lessons from the financial collapse.

In 2004, the Canadian government appointed an ethics commissioner reporting directly to Parliament. I show how an appeal of the ethics commissioner finds its traction in three problem areas. First, there is an increasing distaste in Canada for patronage and other similar forms of partisanship in politics, but there is general uncertainty about the constitutional or ethical standards that ought to apply. Second, the language of democratic criticism and reform of Parliament is rooted less in actual constitutional practice than in an idealized sense of how Parliament ought to work, a problem that is exacerbated by the ongoing presence of the American example. Finally, these both feed into a growing disengagement from traditional party politics and a desire for more “independent” or non-partisan checks on government, of which the Office of the Auditor General is becoming a popular exemplar. As an independent, Parliamentary, and non-partisan check on government, the ethics commissioner appears to serve as at least a partial solution to much of what is wrong with the Canadian political system.

Public trust in institutions in Iceland plunged after the country’s banking sector collapsed. The political system wobbled under outrage and anger when the general public took to the streets. The Parliamentary Special Investigation Commission conducted a ground-breaking crisis-induced investigation, delivering a report that was a milestone in Iceland’s history of politics and public administration. Yet, despite this endeavour and the fact that subsequent investigations have disclosed ample information intended to restore trust in institutions, public trust remains unsteady. This chapter addresses the following questions: How has public trust in institutions progressed after the crash? Why is it taking so long for trust to return? In Chapter 3 in this volume, we examine data on public trust in Icelandic institutions from Gallup surveys over the 15 years from 2002 to 2017 in order to identify and explain patterns of trust in the aftermath of the crisis. Our interpretation of theory in this chapter suggests that elements of mistrust inherent in the principal–agent approach to accountability in public administration, implemented in previous New Public Management reforms, undermined the creation of a climate of trust necessary to ensure effective accountability mechanisms. We argue that in the absence of a climate of trust, accountability mechanisms of culpability that conflict with mechanisms of answerability, combined with a succession of post-crisis scandals, mainly explain the slow return of the public’s trust.

In recent years, the World Bank has channeled up to one-sixth of its lending and advisory support to reform of central governments. A recent evaluation tried to understand what was working, what needs to be improved, and what needs to be added or discontinued. The evaluation looked at four key central government tasks: public financial management and procurement (PFMP) reform, administration and civil service reform (ACS), tax administration reform, and combating corruption. This chapter looks at the first of these tasks.

The advice provided by the World Bank on improving public financial management and procurement is influenced by debates on theory and practice in developed and developing countries. This chapter touches on some of the highlights of these debates, drawing from indicative literature mainly since 1990 from scholars and practitioners. The second part of the chapter discusses examples of Bank support for reform of budget planning and execution, financial management, and procurement, looking at the Bank's diagnostic work, design, and implementation of project support. It also assesses evidence of outcomes and attribution, and ends with questions for further research.

For almost half a decade, after World War II, capitalism and socialism coexisted on the European continent. Some believed that these systems would converge, with state intervention stabilising capitalism in the west and socialism became more democratic in the east. Michał Kalecki, in his last published article, co-written with Tadeusz Kowalik, wrote about how governments had implemented a crucial reform in the developed capitalist economies. State investment had filled the demand gap, which could potentially result in the long-term mitigation of capitalism's slumps and crises. Tadeusz Kowalik later extended this notion of the crucial reform, to the troubled socialist systems in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. He argued that previous economic reforms had failed in the socialist countries as they had not been accompanied by sufficient democratic political reforms, which needed to be extended in order to fully revitalise the socialist economies. Ultimately the proposals for a crucial reform of capitalism and socialism were not realised and these systems did not converge economically or politically. This chapter examines the theses of Kalecki and Kowalik within the historical and intellectual tradition of Polish socialist and Marxist thought.