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States that the Stackelberg leadership model is rarely used to describe market price determination perhaps because of the lack of a theoretical basis for selecting the minimum size necessary for leadership. Provides structural sufficiency conditions for selecting a unique Stackelberg leader based on the concept of Pareto dominance, in which the structural criterion involves the relative capacity shares of the first and second largest market rivals. Suggests that the Stackelberg price game is a viable static equilibrium construct even though the fringe firms are not atomistic. Applies the Stackelberg model to antitrust merger analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers punish more and work harder in teams with peer monitoring when it is less costly to punish in a two-period, one-shot horizon.

An experiment is conducted in a two-period horizon with two treatments. The structure of performance measures makes it costless or costly to punish in the second period.

The results find punishing, contingent on first-period strategies, was significantly greater when it was costless compared to costly, as expected. Working, which is analogous to cooperating in prisoner dilemma games, was also significantly greater in the first and second periods when punishing was costless.

This paper is informative about the potential benefits of performance measures in dynamic team environments, which can be challenging and costly to develop. It adds insight into the design of self-discipline and tasks in teams which might help increase productivity.

This paper is related to the research on indefinite horizons, which attributes increases in cooperation to the existence of subgame perfect strategies to cooperate and potential gains from future cooperation. In comparison, this study examines the effects of the existence of subgame perfect strategies to work in isolation from the potential gains from future interactions. In addition, it examines whether their potential benefits depend on the cost of punishing when punishing is subgame perfect in a one-shot horizon.

Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In this chapter, we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.

This paper studies product adoption as modeled by Katz and Shapiro (1986) in an experimental setting. Two sellers offer competing, incompatible technologies and two groups of buyers make purchase decisions sequentially in a two-stage game of complete information. Value to a buyer from purchasing a technology depends on the total number of buyers of that technology (installed base). There is mixed evidence that the results are qualitatively consistent with equilibrium predictions laid out in theory. Buyers of technology display behavior close to equilibrium predictions. However, the sellers in the laboratory do not exploit their installed bases significantly.