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As numerous scholars have noted, the law takes a strikingly incoherent approach to adolescent reproduction. States overwhelmingly allow a teenage girl to independently consent to pregnancy care and medical treatment for her child, and even to give up her child for adoption, all without notice to her parents, but require parental notice or consent for abortion. This chapter argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law on teenage reproductive decision-making is in fact not as contradictory as it first appears. A closer look at the law’s apparently conflicting approaches to teenage abortion and teenage childbirth exposes common ground that scholars have overlooked. The chapter compares the full spectrum of minors’ reproductive rights and unmasks deep similarities in the law on adolescent reproduction – in particular an undercurrent of desire to punish (female) teenage sexuality, whether pregnant girls choose abortion or childbirth. It demonstrates that in practice, the law undermines adolescents’ reproductive rights, whichever path of pregnancy resolution they choose. At the same time that the law thwarts adolescents’ access to abortion care, it also fails to protect adolescents’ rights as parents. The analysis shows that these two superficially conflicting sets of rules in fact work in tandem to enforce a traditional gender script – that self-sacrificing mothers should give birth and give up their infants to better circumstances, no matter the emotional costs to themselves. This chapter also suggests novel policy solutions to the difficulties posed by adolescent reproduction by urging reforms that look to third parties other than parents or the State to better support adolescent decision-making relating to pregnancy and parenting.

This article considers the independent liberty interests of children in foster care and their mothers in parental termination proceedings. Recent federal reforms impose a mandatory deadline for the state to terminate parental rights. That policy erroneously presumes that the passage of time alone establishes parental fault and satisfies a parent’s due process rights. It also fails to protect the minority of children who assert an interest in preserving a safe relationship with mothers who are unlikely to meet the state’s schedule – including many substance abusers and victims of domestic violence.

This chapter addresses a five-year phase of protest activity set in motion by fathers’ rights and shared parenting groups’ resistance to the Federal Child Support Guidelines, which were incorporated into Canada’s Divorce Act in 1997. Drawing upon Department of Justice discourses, parliamentary hearings and debates, and advocacy websites it examines the dynamics and outcomes of the protest cycle. It argues that the government’s legislative response signals a failure of fathers’ rights activism in Canada. This failure is a consequence of the collective identity that advocates and their supporters enact and celebrate in various public arenas, the effectiveness of feminist counteraction, and the contingencies of governance in Canada’s left-of-centre advanced liberal democracy.

This chapter describes the results of an exploratory study that examined parents’ experiences with the law as they obtained funding for speech generating devices for their children with communication disabilities, either through public health insurance, private health insurance, or a public school. Exploring legal consciousness: Experiences of families seeking funding for assistive technologies for children with disabilities. Law, Policy, and Society Dissertations. Paper 17. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20000265). The study explored how parents engaged with the law and how their experiences and perceptions about the law compared to the formal law. This research was based on sociolegal theory, particularly the concept of legal consciousness, which examines how people think and act in relation to the law as a consequence of social interactions, and analyzes how law in action compares with the formal law. Sociolegal theory broadens the definition of law to include “the meanings, sources of authority, and cultural practices” (Ewick & Silbey, 1998, p. 22) as well as the formal law.

Similar to other sociolegal research, this study collected personal narratives of law using grounded theory methods to identify themes within those narratives. The narratives revealed that while parents expressed varieties of legal consciousness, there was one overarching theme: the law provided a framework for parents to envision rights, discuss rights, and claim rights. While few parents invoked formal legal mechanisms to solve grievances, the law created a rights consciousness among parents which empowered them to acknowledge and validate the notion of rights and entitlements.

This paper seeks to consider the inter‐connections between law and child development, particularly in the areas of child custody and child protection, in both the USA and the UK.

The paper is based on analysis of US and UK legal systems and child developmental research.

Although the two legal systems have much in common in their approach to safeguarding children's welfare, there are also notable differences between them in terminology and in concept. Whereas the USA places a greater emphasis on the rights, particularly autonomy rights, of both parents and children, the UK justifies its laws affecting children largely in terms of parental responsibility and child need.

The paper argues that each of these legal regimes has something to learn from the other and a reader interested in thinking about the relationship between child welfare and law will profit from considering the distinctions, as well as the commonalities, between the two regimes.

Much of the discussion surrounding the antivaccine movement focuses on the decision of parents to not vaccinate their children and the resulting danger posed to others. However, the primary risk is borne by the child left unvaccinated. Although living in a developed country with high vaccination rates provides a certain amount of protection through population immunity, the unvaccinated child is still exposed to a considerably greater risk of preventable diseases than one who is vaccinated. I explore the tension between parental choice and the child’s right to be free of preventable diseases. The chapter’s goal is twofold: to advocate for moving from a dyadic framework – considering the interests of the parents against those of the state – to a triadic one, in which the interests of the child are given as much weight as those of the parent and the state; and to discuss which protections are available, and how they can be improved. Specific legal tools available to protect that child are examined, including tort liability of the parents to the child, whether and to what degree criminal law has a role, under what circumstances parental choice should be overridden, and the role of school immunization requirements in protecting the individual child.

Children in many societies are often seen as immature in issues and therefore should be dependent on adults for provision of basic needs participation. This gives the impression that it is only at adulthood that members of society can make contributions to personal, family and societal development. This is particularly so in African societies. Most African societies consider children as omo kekere (small people/children) and inexperienced people and therefore should be under watch and socialisation of adults who often compromise their rights particularly to participation even when the United Nations’ advocacy guaranteeing the right of children to participate in decision making and other issues concerning them exists. This chapter therefore examines the real experiences of children in a traditional but modernising setting of Ibadan, Nigeria. This is a very relevant research setting since traditional and modern socio-cultural values and forces moderate child rights. Hence, this chapter exposes ways and manners children are treated and, possibly, negotiate cultural systems in the contexts of families to exist within family rules and cultural ethos that define their belongingness and participation in decision making and associated issues. This chapter is placed within the policy framework of implementation of UN Child Rights Charter and Nigerian Child Rights Act which have been found to be largely ineffective in most African societies and Nigeria. This chapter benefits from many years of primary insights and scholarly engagements with children’s experiences and participation in families in Africa. Families with children within the ages of 5–10 in Ibadan were also systematically and extendedly observed. In-depth interviews were conducted with 10 children in their family environments after getting informed consent of their parents. Findings show that culture, traditions and institutionalised gerontocracy remain negatively formidable and hold sway in perpetuating systemic child disempowerment and alienation in families. This chapter provides theoretical, professional and policy settings and environments of child rights and childhood in Nigeria with implications for Africa and globally.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the question of parents’ rights to make choices regarding the education and upbringing of their children.

Article 26(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’. However, authors including Joel Feinberg also argue children have a right to an ‘open future’, implying parents and the state have obligations to ensure certain elements are present in a child’s care and education. Commodifying education and early childhood care where it occurs in many developed societies, ostensibly provides parents with greater choice regarding the education and upbringing of their children. However, following the work of Brenda Almond, I argue that parents do have some rights to make choices about the care and education of their children. But just having the freedom to choose from alternative schooling or caring options may be insufficient to provide a choice in any significant sense, if one is only choosing between service providers all offering essentially the same service.

It would seem then, that responsible leadership and ethical decision-making by the state and by service providers requires them to engage in consultation with parents and facilitate their participation in determining the nature and content of educational and developmental programmes for children.

Leaders in these roles will also need to have a strong sense of the competing demands on content coming from this array of ethical requirements.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. (Declaration of Independence, 1776)

While many see the 1960s as the era of a “rights revolution” in American law, this article looks back from the present moment of conservative legal dominance to better understand the ways in which conservative ideas began to grow during the heyday of legal liberalism. Using recent histories of post-1945 grassroots conservatism, the author argues that conservative rights claims – while often legally questionable – constituted for many a powerful and persuasive understanding of the Constitution. Due to this popular conservative jurisprudence's endurance and influence, its existence in the 1960s forces reconsideration of understandings of the 1960s as the era of the “rights revolution.”