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In 2010, 12 years after the signing and popular ratification of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (BGFA), the decommissioning of Irish Republican Army (IRA) weapons, and a significant decline in political violence, paramilitary public symbolic displays (PSDs) remained as prominent features of the landscape of Northern Ireland. Their contents and locations constituted an important, contradictory, and contested part of the peace process. We argue that paramilitary murals and other symbolic sites, such as memorial gardens and plaques, continue to tap into ethno-national collective identities forged in conflict but also exhibit a range of reframing strategies that we refer to as historicization, articulation, and suppression. We further argue that contextual factors affect the likelihood of these displays appearing within a given geographic area. To assess these hypotheses, we conduct content and geospatial analyses of all identified PSDs in West Belfast in 2010. The results lend support to a context-sensitive approach to predicting the contents and locations of paramilitary PSDs in Northern Ireland.

This chapter focuses on aspects of community restorative justice practices in Northern Ireland that have been central in challenging embedded cultures of violence within the current transitional context. It is argued that a strict adherence to restorative justice values, in combination with a flexible approach to the process used, are two core strengths of practice that have facilitated such a possibility. Moreover, these grassroots initiatives work well with organised, structured, and hierarchical communities, which in the Northern Irish context translate to paramilitary organisations. They are arguably less effective in relation to looser community structures, such as vigilante groups and individual violent responses to crime and conflict.

Focuses on contemporary law enforcement institutions, in Canadian and US cities, to illustrate the service limitations and public conflicts that are increasingly being generated into violent encounters by the failure to move beyond the authoritarian organizational operational model. The capacity of public policing institutions to provide effective, non‐violent police services to meet the needs of the communities is determined by the nature of the police institutional and/or organizational model employed. This analysis assesses the appropriateness of current police training models, race relations training, non‐violent conflict resolution training and all other police training that may be grounded and generated from a paramilitary authoritarian hierarchical composition. This applied approach discloses much needed systemic and policy reformation by considering a more expanded understanding of this prominent social agency, the actors and the interconnectedness with other institutions.

Colombia has one of the highest levels of inequality in landholding in the world. This inequality has persisted in spite of numerous state-led land reform efforts, which leads to the question: why has it been so difficult to reverse unequal land distribution in Colombia? To answer this question, the chapter examines the role of the state, non-state armed groups, land inequality, land reform efforts, and a history of violence to reveal the relationship between land, inequality and violence in Colombia. This chapter explores the nature of this relationship to understand Colombia’s enduring inequality and to inform theoretical approaches to statehood and power. Rather than reducing state capacity to common Weberian binary constructions of state and statelessness, I explore how state capacity takes on different forms in different regions of Colombia – analyzing how various actors shape land inequality and violence across the territory. Using a comprehensive longitudinal panel data set of displaced persons, I use a negative binomial regression model to demonstrate how land reform, land inequality, and a history of violence have directly affected current displacement of citizens. I argue that several constellations of powerful social actors have at various points converged to control land, through non-state armed groups, to exert a local form of logistical control outside the scope of the federal state, deeply affecting the dynamics violence across different territories. These groups have subsequently engaged in a land grabbing process that has resulted in a reverse form of land reform – leading to persisting inequality in Colombia.

Since the democratic transition in 1986, the Philippines has made considerable progress in re-establishing the legal/constitutional basis of civilian supremacy. Legislative control over the military's budget and appointment as well as the use of paramilitary units were re-instituted. Congress also assigned civilian court jurisdiction over human rights cases involving state security forces. An independent human rights commission was given power to investigate allegations of abuses. Constitutional limits were written into the President's ability to mobilize and deploy the military during emergency situations. Notwithstanding, the present structure of the Philippine security forces remains problematic. Of the three services, the army is primarily focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, with the police and paramilitary providing support. The army relies on large formations for its COIN operations and less on Special Forces, which owing to historical interventionist and coup-plotting proclivities, has been numerically emasculated.

Using a case study method, the chapter probes how local civilian authorities in Leon, Iloilo (a town in central Philippines) are able to monitor, supervise or control security sector activities within their area of jurisdiction. A considerable gap exists between each force's understanding of its functions and what they actually do in relation to other state security forces. The army performs mostly non-combat tasks in line with COIN as well as non-traditional tasks. The police are involved mostly in law enforcement and provide augmentation force to army-led COIN operations, but greatly handicapped in detection and investigation matters. The paramilitary is utilized primarily for COIN as territorial defense forces but not for other emergency tasks as envisioned in the law. A tighter relationship exists on the ground between the army unit and the paramilitary, whereas a gap is evident between the army and the police regarding the geographic scope of response to rebel threat. The local government played no significant role in the peace initiative brokered in the 1990s nor has the town peace and order council been the framework of choice in seeking more constructive engagements between the civilian authorities and security forces.

This chapter examines the considerations weighed by armed actors in responding to civilian demands in three Colombian peace territories, where residents have engaged in civil resistance against armed violence and negotiated with armed actors to reduce such violence. It does so mainly on the basis of data from fieldwork, including interviews with former or current members of armed groups who operated in the areas under study, and other actors. We find that armed actors weighed political, security, economic and normative considerations when faced with civilian demands and that the armed actors’ relative dependence on civilians regarding these four aspects influenced these actors’ responses.

In the discussion that follows we provide an overview of the operation of informal justice and ‘punishment violence’ in Northern Ireland which has been a deep-seated a semi-permanent aspect of the violent political conflict and which has persisted well into the transition to peace. Eschewing a mono-causal framework we argue that ‘punishment violence’ can only be explained and hence understood in terms of the organizational dynamics of the various armed groupings; the economic and social deprivation caused by Northern Ireland's declining economic base and the economic costs of the conflict and finally by the deficiencies in the provision and nature of public policing. We then turn our attention to restorative justice as a panacea to the problem of ‘punishment violence’ and examine the effectiveness of a number of schemes and initiatives that currently operate in Northern Ireland. Finally, we suggest that the capacity of armed groups to demobilize and demilitarize and embrace non-violent means of dealing with conflict depends to a significant extent on the leadership skills of ex-combatants themselves.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of USA Executive Order 13224, one of the most important US counter‐terrorist finance measures, on corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations.

The effects of Executive Order 13224 are focused on the case of Chiquita Brands International, a major US banana‐exporting corporation that operated in Uraba, Colombia until 2004. The US Government prosecuted Chiquita for “engaging in transactions” with an illicit, Colombian paramilitary group considered by the US a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a specially‐designated global terrorist. This paper presents the duress defense that Chiquita could have raised at trial under US federal law.

Executive Order 13224 was drafted hastily and under pressure leading to over‐inclusive language and over‐broad implementation. Chiquita's case suggests that Executive Order 13224, drafted with the intention of reducing terrorist funding, has made it possible for an extortion victim to be prosecuted for payments it has not chosen to make. This paper will suggest narrowly tailoring the language of Executive Order 13224 or providing an exculpatory provision.

Counter‐terrorist finance measure Executive Order 13224 has not been sufficiently examined by scholars. Research on this topic should go hand in hand with enquiry into possible defenses for corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations and having to make extortion payments.

Suggestions are put forward for corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations as well as for drafters of counter‐finance terrorist measures.

Although the designation of terrorist organizations under the executive order has been discussed, few scholars have addressed cases of over‐broad application of the executive order. The unexamined case of Chiquita is a unique case in that the extortion victim, and not the extortion perpetrator, is prosecuted. Also, Chiquita was prosecuted for an activity (making extortion payments to the Autodefensas Unidas Campesinas that became a crime after Chiquita began its engagement with such an activity. Furthermore, examining this case thoroughly is important because it has repercussions on at least two public policy levels: the US' War on terrorism and the rights and remedies of corporations investing in countries with designated terrorist organizations.

Examines individuals′ psychological responses towards paramilitary discipline. Reports on a study which followed 145 recruit firemen (RFn) throughout their six‐month initial training in Hong Kong Fire Services Training School. California Psychological Inventory (CPI) was administered to the subjects on their very first and final days of stay in the academy. The findings support the theoretical assumption that paramilitary fire services training changes one′s personality. Post‐paramilitary training personality (PPMTP) was identified. CPI dimensions typifying PPMTP are decreasing levels in sense of well‐being, responsibility, socialization, self‐achievement via conformance, self‐control, good impression, communality and increasing levels in the dimensions of capacity for status and flexibility. Except capacity for status, all PPMTP dimensions are negatively related to RFns′ satisfaction and work stress in the academy. It is believed that the dysfunctional nature of PPMTP is due to the deleterious effects of strict military‐like discipline on the psychology of subjects.