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The purpose of this paper is to discuss a unique principal–agent dilemma, one that is very much off the beaten track. The relationship of the Popes pre-1500 and God was one full of emptiness and strain. The Catholic Church was saved by a positive externality of the printing press (technology) that guided the Papacy to act more ethically and, thus, we presume in the best interest of God.

We utilize a historical and an economic analysis to probe the phenomenon that the goals of the principal and the agent are not always congruent. How the former entices the latter to do his bidding is an issue on which economists have long focused. We apply it to an unusual historical episode.

There were numerous corrupt popes during the medieval times of the Catholic Church and the number seemed to lessen and then even approach zero asymptotically after the printing press was invented. The Protestant reformation was a driving force, and this too, we argue, would have been nearly impossible were it not also for the printing press.

This is a contribution to the economic subfield of the economics of religion. It explores how the dismal science can make a contribution to our understanding of matters of faith. It looks at religion not from a theological point of view, the more usual departure, but from the perspective of economics.

Officially, of course, the world is now post-imperial. The Q’ing and Ottoman empires fell on the eve of World War I, and the last Leviathans of Europe's imperial past, the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist empires, lumbered into the grave soon after. Tocsins of liberation were sounded on all sides, in the name of democracy (Wilson) and socialism (Lenin). Later attempts to remake and proclaim empires – above all, Hitler's annunciation of a “Third Reich” – now seem surreal, aberrant, and dystopian. The Soviet Union, the heir to the Tsarist empire, found it prudent to call itself a “federation of socialist republics.” Mao's China followed suit. Now, only a truly perverse, contrarian regime would fail to deploy the rhetoric of democracy.

Our Dublin correspondent telegraphed last night:

Although the Bullock Committee's proposals on industrial democracy have been quietly put on the shelf, greater employee participation in decision‐making is inevitable. Drawing on events following the decline of the Roman Empire — with the emergence of the Papacy — the authors suggest that middle‐managers could emerge as industrial Cardinals. To them would fall the task of reconciling conflicting demands from senior management and worker directors.