Open economy macroeconomic models generally overlook the effects ofinternational migration and remittances on income and welfare. Atwo‐country temporary equilibrium model…
Open economy macroeconomic models generally overlook the effects of international migration and remittances on income and welfare. A two‐country temporary equilibrium model is presented which incorporates trade theoretic elements of international migration and remittances. In the model, an expansionary incomes, or a trade, policy by the host country induces migration, while expansionary demand policies in the source country discourage migration. In all cases, however, when some degree of international migration exists, potential income and welfare gains to both countries induced by such policies exceed the equivalent policy gains where international migration and remittances are absent.
We examine the allocation of a pre-determined amount of aid from a donor to two recipient countries. The donor suffers from cross-border pollution resulting from production activities in the recipient countries. It is shown that the recipient with the higher fraction of aid allocated to public abatement and with the lower emission tax, receives a higher share of the aid when the donor allocates aid so as to maximize its own welfare. Competition for aid reduces cross-border pollution to the donor when recipients use the fraction of aid allocated to pollution abatement as a policy to divert aid from each other. But, it increases cross-border pollution when recipients use the emission tax to divert aid from each other.
The importance of foreign aid cannot be overstated.1 Unprecedented integration of the world economy in recent years has brought the issue of poverty back in the policy debate at the international level. Some of the recent initiatives such as the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals and the report by the Africa Commission (set up by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair) which was discussed at length at G8 meetings, recognize this fact. The analysis of foreign aid is however fraught with controversies and paradoxes. This applies to both the theoretical and the empirical literature. There are two broad strands in the literature. First, in international trade theory, researchers have examined the welfare effects of foreign aid and, in particular, if aid can be donor-enriching and recipient-immiserizing – the so-called Transfer Paradox.2 The main mechanism here is via changes in the international terms of trade. The primary benefit (loss) to the recipient (donor) can be offset by a secondary loss (gain) because of deterioration (improvement) in the international terms of trade. More recently, a number of studies have examined the possibility of strictly Pareto improving foreign aid, i.e., situations where both the donor and the recipient are better off as a result of the transfer.