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Globally, inadequate resources, skills deficiency and poor infrastructure have necessitated public-private partnerships (PPPs) as investment initiative for public sector projects. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the key constructs for improved stakeholder management (SM) success in curbing PPP projects’ failure in developing countries to fill the research gap. Pre-stakeholder identification (PSI); implementation, monitoring and feedback (IMF) factors impact on PPP projects’ success in Ghana were examined.

In total, 16 models were studied as part of literature review followed by a qualitative three-round Delphi survey for SM key factors and validated using a quantitative questionnaire survey. The findings were analysed using structural equation modelling and a model fit test.

PSI, IMF factors directly influence PPP SM success model hence are key constructs. Furthermore, stakeholder consideration, a clear statement of objectives, adopting design and build are variables established as influencing PPP projects failures. Stakeholder identification, engagement, communication and analysis are generic factors.

Project managers can achieve stakeholder satisfaction and improve PPP projects delivery by considering the innovative PPP SM model. Furthermore, considering the identified factors and variables in holistic models will enhance stakeholder involvement thereby curbing PPP projects failure.

Reducing PPP projects’ failure will enhance socio-economic growth.

PSI; IMF factors have never been included in holistic PPP SM model. They are proposed to curb PPP projects’ failure.

Increasingly adopted by various governments for infrastructure development, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a popular procurement delivery system, outperforming other systems. However, PPPs have been especially criticised due to the lack of sustainability aspect during the development and implementation of the projects. In India, similar critiques have been raised, as these qualities have inhibited the development of society and increased the time and cost overrun in the development of PPP projects. This paper, therefore, aims to address the sustainability issues in PPPs and systematically analyses from the perspective of the principles of sustainable development.

Based on literature review and focussed interviews with stakeholders in India, a qualitative system dynamics (SD) model using causal loop diagramming is developed to propose the inclusion of various strategies in the PPP procurement process, which can enhance the sustainability of the PPP process. Finally, the integration of these strategies in the current PPP procurement process has been highlighted in the form of the introduction of new mechanisms and policies and modification of the existing mechanism and procurement policies.

The paper first highlights key sustainability issues in the PPP procurement process and suggests 34 strategies to address the issues. The modelling approaches and the proposed strategies, along with their interrelationships, could help the PPP decision makers in implementing responsive policies in bringing sustainable development in the PPP procurement process.

The SD model developed is based on limited data, primarily focussed on PPP procurement practices in the context of infrastructure development in India. Developing the model with the analysis of a wider range of data and constructing a customised model can take broader perspectives into account.

Adoption of the identified strategies can facilitate the inclusion of sustainability practices in the development of infrastructure projects, which are even procured using private finance.

Studies on how to promote sustainable infrastructure development when procured through the PPP route are in the nascent stage. This study, therefore, extends the current body of knowledge on infrastructure projects implementation through PPPs from financial engineering and risk management to a sustainability perspective.

This study is aimed to explore the dynamic performance incentive model for a flexible PPP contract to handle uncertainties based on supervision during the long-time concession period, so as to ensure operation performance and benefits of the public sector while protecting the economic benefit of the private sector, thus avoiding unnecessary renegotiation.

The microeconomic and principal–agent theories and relevant studies on the basic incentive model and flexible contract are fully utilized. The procedure for developing the dynamic incentive model and the assumptions about the quantitative relationships among fundamental variables or factors are first proposed. The static incentive model without incentive parameter adjustment and then the dynamic incentive model allowing incentive parameter adjustment are successively developed. Finally, the propositions regarding the valid adjustment ranges of the incentive parameter with respect to the economic, social and hybrid benefits of the public sector and the economic benefit of the private sector are suggested.

The dynamic incentive model enables to achieve a flexible contract to handle uncertainties on the PPP project to ensure the benefits of the public sector while protecting the benefit of the private sector. The economic, social and hybrid benefits of the public sector and the economic benefit of the private sectors can be respectively realized through adjusting the reward–punishment coefficient under different adjustment ranges and different importance. The incentive model is able to ensure the benefits of the public sector while protecting the benefit of the private sector by controlling the private sector's effort level unknown to the public sector.

The dynamic incentive model helps implement a flexible PPP contract to handle uncertainties during the operation period, thus controlling the effort level of the private sector and ensuring the benefits of the public sector while protecting the economic benefit of the sector. It enables to clarify the quantitative relationships between the operation performance, the benefits of the stakeholders, the effort level of the private sector and the reward–punishment coefficient. This study contributes to the domain knowledge of the incomplete contract theory for designing a flexible PPP contract with dynamic incentive and supervision mechanism by applying the microeconomic and principal–agent theories.

The application of circular economy (CE) has received wide coverage in the built environment, including public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects, in recent times. However, current studies and practical implementation of CE are largely associated with construction demolition, waste and recycling management. Few studies exist on circular models and success factors of public infrastructures developed within the PPP contracts. Thus, the main objective of this article is to identify the models and key success factors associated with CE implementation in PPP infrastructure projects.

A systematic review of the literature was undertaken in this study using forty-two (42) peer-reviewed journal articles from Scopus, Web of Science, Google Scholar and PubMed.

The results show that environmental factors, sustainable economic growth, effective stakeholder management, sufficient funding, utilization of low-carbon materials, effective supply chain and procurement strategies facilitate the implementation of CE in PPP infrastructure projects. Key CE business models are centered around the extension of project life cycle value, circular inputs and recycling and reuse of projects.

Although the study presents relevant findings and gaps for further investigations, it has a limited sample size of 42 papers, which is expected to increase as CE gain more prominence in PPP infrastructure management in future.

The findings are relevant for decision-making by PPP practitioners to attain the social, economic and environmental benefits of transitioning to circular infrastructure management.

This study contributes to articulating the key models and measures toward sustainable CE in public infrastructure development.

This paper aims to help understand how adopting risk allocation criteria impacts the delivery of public–private partnership (PPP) mass housing in Nigeria with the view of promoting the adoption of PPP housing scheme in Nigeria.

The research design adopts the census sampling approach by using well-structured questionnaires distributed to stakeholders involved in PPP-procured mass housing projects, i.e. consultants, in-house professionals, contractors and the organized private sector, registered with PPP departments in the Federal Capital Territory Development Authority, Abuja, Nigeria. Sixty-three risk factors, nine risk allocation criteria and nine project delivery indices were submitted for the respondents to rank on a Likert scale of 7. Two hypotheses were formulated to test whether the risk allocation criteria impacted PPP mass housing delivery or otherwise. The study adopts partial least square-structural equation modeling to model the effect of risk on risk allocation criteria on project delivery indices and risk severity.

The finding shows that project risk allocation criteria have less effect on project delivery indices than on risk severity. The study concludes that risk allocation principles do not directly affect the delivery of PPP-procured mass housing projects. This is evident by the path coefficient of 0.724 values, which is not statistically significant at a 5% alpha protection value. The study concludes that allocating critical risk factors influences the performance of PPP-procured mass housing projects, as the path coefficient of 0.360 is also not significantly far from 0 and at a 5% alpha protection value.

The study is one of the recent studies conducted in PPP-procured mass housing projects in Nigeria owing to the novelty of procurement option in the sector. It highlights the risk factors that can jeopardize the PPP-procured mass housing project objectives. The study is of immense value to PPP actors in the sector by providing the necessary information required to formulate risk response methods to minimize the impact of the risk factors in PPP mass housing projects.

The Public–Private Partnership (PPP) modality plays an important role in the procurement of global infrastructure projects. Regarding PPP's complex transaction structure, pricing of a PPP project is critical to both parties where the government pursues a high value for money (VFM) and the investor strives to maximize its financial gains. Despite the straightforward win–win principle, a formidable compromise is often the case to end up with a fairly acceptable price, subject to many determinants such as the risk profile, expected return, technological innovation and capacities of both parties. Among them, this study chooses to examine the “managing flexibility” (MF) capacity of investors in pricing of a PPP project, in light of the widely recognized importance of a real-option perspective toward the long term, complex and uncertain PPP arrangement. This study addresses two major questions: (1) how is MF in PPP projects to be valued and (2) how are PPP projects to be priced when considering a project's MF value.

A binomial tree model is used to evaluate the MF value in PPP projects. Based on the developed MF pricing model, net present value (NPV) and adjusted VFM value are then calculated. Finally, a multi-objective decision-making method (MODM) was adopted to determine the optimal level of returns based on invested capital (ROIC), return on operation maintenance (ROOM) and concession period.

The applicability and functionality of the proposed model is investigated using a real project case. For a given return, extended NPV and adjusted VFM value were calculated and analyzed using sensitivity analysis. Factor influence is shown by the model to be dependent on factor impact on cash flow. Subsequently, a multi-objective decision-making (MODM) model was adopted to determine the optimal level of returns, where the solution approximates the real-world bidding price. Results confirm that the pricing model provides a reliable and practical PPP proposal pricing tool.

This study proposes an integrated framework for valuing MF in PPP projects and thus more accurately determine optimal pricing of PPP projects than revealed in extant research. The model offers a practical tool to aid in the valuation of PPP projects.

Governments of many developing countries that are unable to develop their infrastructure in order to obtain financial resources prefer to establish public–private partnerships (PPPs) for providing the much-required infrastructure. Time is thus opportune for Sri Lanka, which is also a developing country, to make use of PPPs to develop its road network. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to identify the PPP models that suit road construction in Sri Lanka.

The study used a mixed approach. The characteristics of road construction, procurement selection factors to be considered in road construction, and the different PPP models that can be used for such procurements were identified through a comprehensive literature synthesis. The findings were validated using expert interviews. A questionnaire survey identified the PPP models that suit road construction in Sri Lanka. The most suitable model among them was identified by ranking the PPP models using procurement selection factors.

Build–Own–Operate–Transfer was identified as the PPP model that best suits road construction in Sri Lanka. However, investors may not find it attractive because of its high payback period, a result of the low traffic volume in Sri Lanka. Therefore, a PPP model that involves road construction alone will not be feasible in Sri Lanka. It will have to include the construction of other infrastructure as well.

The study identifies a PPP model that best suits the road construction projects in Sri Lanka.

In what seems as an infinitely ongoing debate regarding the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory, this paper seeks to question the strength of the scientific “evidence” put forward by the PPP revisionists

In this paper, the validity of the PPP revisionists' scientific evidence supporting long‐run PPP is questioned based on the replication of an influential review study that is considered by PPP revisionists to exhibit “some of the strongest evidence” in favour of the PPP theory.

By simulation experiments it is demonstrated that the traditional PPP unit root tests are non‐robust to the empirically identified (G)ARCH distortions. Due to (G)ARCH distortions, over‐rejections for the traditional unit root tests are shown to be a problem that potentially misleads researchers to believe that long‐run PPP holds under circumstances when it is in fact not valid. As a potential remedy to this problem, a new unit root test is introduced which is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity disturbances, and in contrast to traditional unit root tests, it exhibits no significant empirical support for the PPP theory.

The study illustrates that the PPP revisionists' unit root tests cannot reliably test the PPP hypothesis in the presence of (G)ARCH distortions, due to bad power and size properties. Perhaps it is time to conclude that, based on the currently existing research, it is virtually impossible to empirically come to a credible conclusion regarding whether long‐run PPP holds or not.

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are notoriously prone to disputes among stakeholders, some of which may unduly jeopardize contract performance. Contract disputes arising in Iran are often due to inefficiency of PPP concession agreements and practice. This study presents a causal-predictive model of the root causes and preventive measures for inter-organization disputes to enhance the likelihood of achieving desirable performance in PPP projects.

A theoretical “causal-predictive” model was developed with fourteen hypotheses based on extant literature and contractual agency theory, which resulted in the creation of a pool of 110 published items. Data were obtained from a questionnaire survey with 75 valid responses, completed by 4 stratified groups of Iranian PPP experts. Partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was used for validating the proposed model via a case study.

Results reveal that the main three factors of PPP desirable performance are as follows: on-time project completion, high quality of activities/products and services for public satisfaction. Further, the most influential factors of the lifecycle problems, construction stage, and preferred risk allocation included risk misallocation, improper payment mechanism and failure to facilitate a timely approval process.

For researchers, the findings contribute to the theory of contractual agency; specifically, how different influences among the model's elements lead to better PPP performance. In practical terms, proposed outcome-based strategies will inform PPP stakeholders to avoid dispute occurrence and thus improve the time, quality and services of projects.

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects for construction waste recycling have become the main approach to construction waste treatment in China. Risk sharing and income distribution of PPP projects play a vital role in achieving project success. This paper is aimed at building a practical and effective risk sharing and income distribution model to achieve win–win situation among different stakeholders, thereby providing a systematic framework for governments to promote construction waste recycling.

Stakeholders of construction waste recycling PPP projects were reclassified according to the stakeholder theory. Best-worst multi–criteria decision-making method and comprehensive fuzzy evaluation method (BWM–FCE) risk assessment model was constructed to optimize the risk assessment of core stakeholders in construction waste recycling PPP projects. Based on the proposed risk evaluation model for construction waste recycling PPP projects, the Shapley value income distribution model was modified in combination with capital investment, contribution and project participation to obtain a more equitable and reasonable income distribution system.

The income distribution model showed that PPP Project Companies gained more transaction benefits, which proved that PPP Project Companies played an important role in the actual operation of PPP projects. The policy change risk, investment and financing risk and income risk were the most important risks and key factors for project success. Therefore, it is of great significance to strengthen the management of PPP Project Companies, and in the process of PPP implementation, the government should focus on preventing the risk of policy changes, investment and financing risks and income risks.

The findings from this study have advanced the application methods of risk sharing and income distribution for PPP projects and further improved PPP project-related theories. It helps to promote and rationalize fairness in construction waste recycling PPP projects and to achieve mutual benefits and win–win situation in risk sharing. It has also provided a reference for resource management of construction waste and laid a solid foundation for long-term development of construction waste resources.

PPP mode is an effective tool for construction waste recycling. How to allocate risks and distribute benefits has become the most important issue of waste recycling PPP projects, and also the key to project success. The originality of this study resides in its provision of a holistic approach of risk allocation and benefit distribution on construction waste PPP projects in China as a developing country. Accordingly, this study adds its value by promoting resource development of construction waste, extending an innovative risk allocation and benefit distribution method in PPP projects, and providing a valuable reference for policymakers and private investors who are planning to invest in PPP projects in China.