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Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

This chapter presents an approach for teaching divergent and evolving auditing standards in an introductory auditing course. The existence of divergent and continually evolving auditing standards can be challenging for students and for auditing educators. In addition to two separate sets of standards in the United States for the audits of public companies (issuers) and nonpublic companies (nonissuers), auditors also need to be aware of the growing prominence of international standards. In addition to providing background information on standard-setting bodies and divergent auditing standards, and suggestions for simplifying the process of guiding students to an understanding of these standards, this chapter provides figures that can be used for demonstration in class, along with a series of brief internet-based research exercises. The exercises and examples provided may help auditing educators to facilitate students’ understanding and mastery of the fundamental elements of the domestic and international auditing standard-setting forces and activities that impact, directly or indirectly, auditing practice in the United States and abroad.

This article is the third in a trilogy of articles that discuss the professionalism (or deprofessionalism) of the accounting profession. The first examines the slow uphill climb of accounting and auditing practice to the level of being recognized as a highly trusted profession. The second examines the stagnation in professionalism leading to deprofessionalization of the accounting profession. This third article looks at the resulting directionless efforts of accounting and auditing firms in the wake of major deprofessionalization events. The interest in this study is the time period immediately following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 which is described in this paper as the “Post-SOX” history of public accountancy in the United States. During this time period, nearly equally mixed activities of professionalism and deprofessionalism have resulted in a status quo with directionless efforts doing little if anything to reverse decline in professionalism. Public accountants continued to experience conflict with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over independence rules. The large Certified Public Accountant firms generated controversies and squabbles concerning “auditing and consulting,” while at the same time they faced questions regarding the marketing and selling of aggressive tax shelters. In addition, most of the self-regulating aspects of the profession declined dramatically following passage of SOX. While initially both tax fees and audit fees of CPA firms increased during this time period, concerns are again arising as the large CPA firms more recently have renewed the emphasis on advisory services. While revenues have both increased and changed in composition during the post-SOX era, public opinion has maintained a status quo. The post-SOX era has also seen a weakening in the Code of Conduct, providing more liberties for CPAs to maximize self-interest. Meanwhile, the PCAOB faced constitutional challenges, while at the same time the AICPA experienced strong divisions in its membership. To provide some sense to these directionless efforts, this study, similar to the prior two articles in this trilogy, concludes with a summary analysis based on the nine SOCRECELIST criteria, and the question whether public accountants have learned their history lesson.

The accelerated pace of change in the global economy and capital markets along with the complexity of transactions and financial reporting that involve applying fair value measurements (FVM) is a major third-party user concern. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted risks that investors are exposed to when making FVM-related capital allocations. Accounting estimates often involve subjective assumptions and measurement uncertainty, increasing potential management bias (Choudhary, 2011; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). FVMs are of critical importance to the reliability of the financial statements. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to inform educators of the possible need to evaluate their curriculum as to coverage of FVM topics. The support for this evaluation is based on our attempt to: (1) evaluate the extent of reported FVM-related deficiencies with reference to regulatory bodies’ findings of significant deficiencies in FVM; (2) examine the use of FVM specialists; (3) determine if colleges and universities are keeping pace with FVM demands; (4) list the Uniform CPA Examination Blueprint FVM testing areas; and (5) provide curricular FVM topic recommendations.

The typical unqualified audit report of publicly traded firms in the United States indicates the nature of the audit and an opinion that the firm’s financial statements fairly present the financial position and the results of operations of the audited company. Accordingly, some users of the financial statements, including investors, do not consider the unqualified opinion to be very useful in providing other informational value about the particular audit. In this paper, the authors examined the views of two stakeholders in the US financial reporting system, auditors in large public accounting firms and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the Fortune 1000. The authors elicited their perceptions involving a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) proposed auditing standard commonly referred to as “the other information standard.” This standard, if adopted, would require the auditor to evaluate information other than the audited financial statements and the related audit report for (1) a material inconsistency, (2) a material misstatement of fact, or (3) both, and if they exist, communicate them in the auditor’s report. The authors developed their research instrument based upon its perceived potential effects on the audit if adopted, some of which were referenced in the exposure draft of the proposed standard (PCAOB, 2013). They found that a majority of each groups believed, among other effects, that the proposed standard would increase audit costs, subject both the auditor and the reporting firm to increased litigation risk, and that its implementation costs by affected firms would exceed any benefits to financial statement users created by the standard.

This paper aims to help auditors manage the risk of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations of the companies that they audit, particularly those with operations in Latin America.

First, the paper describes the relevant provisions of the FCPA. Second, it identifies the common schemes and transactions associated with heightened risk of FCPA liability in Latin America and provides recommendations to minimize this risk. Third, it discusses the responsibilities of auditors under U.S. securities laws and regulations with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. Finally, it describes the sanctions that auditors could face if they fail to fulfill their responsibilities regarding these FCPA violations. The paper is based on data collected from various documents including laws, cases, accounting and auditing standards, litigation releases, press releases, deferred prosecution agreements, and enforcement actions.

Auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(a) of the Exchange Act to design procedures that provide reasonable assurances of detecting the FCPA violations of their clients, which are illegal acts with direct and material effects on the financial statements. In addition, auditors have a responsibility under Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act to report the violations of the FCPA that they detect during the audit to the appropriate level of management. If management does not take the necessary remedial steps, auditors must report FCPA violations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In order to reduce their FCPA-related liability and fulfill their responsibilities under U.S. securities laws and accounting standards, auditors should closely scrutinize transactions with a high risk of FCPA liability. An analysis of FCPA cases occurring in Latin America reveals six categories of transactions with heightened FCPA risk.

While there is much literature regarding a company’s compliance with the FCPA, there has not been much literature about the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to the FCPA violations of their clients. This paper attempts to start bridging this gap by providing guidance to auditors regarding their responsibilities to detect and report FCPA violations.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between law and ethics in accounting. The primary arguments of the chapter are that law and ethics have between intertwined historically, that concepts of morality and ethics have permeated law and that laws are based on ethical and religious principles. As a result, it is important for accounting students and practicing accountants to understand the close relationship between law and ethics. The chapter defines the meaning of “legal” and “ethical,” and draws distinctions between these concepts. It also discusses historical relationships between law, morality and ethics in major religious traditions. The concepts of ethics expressed in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and how these concepts influenced the development of law and ethics in Western philosophy are then discussed. In particular, the ethical principles of independence, integrity and objectivity as embodied in the Code of Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) are recognizable in Aristotle’s premise, that moral virtue is situated at the mean between deficiency and excess and that ethics is oriented toward practical implementation of the good life through human rationality. The final section of the chapter discusses the application of law and ethics to accounting and in particular to the detection of management fraud.

In crafting Auditing Standard No.3 (AS3), a primary objective of the PCAOB was to reduce auditors' exposure to litigation by raising the standard of care for audit documentation. We examine whether the increased documentation requirements of AS3 affect legal professionals' perceptions of audit quality and auditor responsibility in the event of an audit failure. Our experiment consists of a 3 × 2 between-participants design with law students serving as proxies for legal professionals. The results of our experiment indicate that when an audit procedure, namely the investigation of inconsistent evidence, is not required to be documented, legal professionals perceive the performance of the work itself but not its documentation to significantly increase audit quality and reduce the auditor's responsibility for an audit failure. When documentation of the procedure is required, as per AS3, legal professionals perceive enhanced audit quality and reduced auditor responsibility only if the performance of the work is documented.