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“The latest available cross-country data presented in the PEPPER V Report (Lowitzsch and Hashi, 2024) can be viewed by examining EFP in and of itself as an isolated subject or it can be viewed in a much wider set of contexts. Widening the lens in order to examine EFP in the context of the concentration of capital ownership and the concentration of capital income can help observers establish EFP’s span of relevance. In particular US data on capital income show that policy makers need to be aware that EFP can have an important role in narrowing the income and wealth gap for the working middle class when the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high and when real wage growth is low.”

“Against this background, this article makes a very straightforward observation that the relevance of EFP in an economic system, in a country, and for the average employee in a country is related to the trend in the concentration of capital ownership and capital income. Interest in the idea is potentially increased or decreased by trends in real wages. Atkinson, who many consider the founder of modern wealth concentration scholarship, “focuses on the increasing share of capital incomes a source of income inequality among individuals” (Cirillo et al., 2017, p. 1). Indeed, we consider the difference between labour’s share and capital’s share to be a critically important fundamental problem of political economy. This essay asserts that when this concentration is high and real wages are flat, other things being equal, EFP may be more relevant. When the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high, this means that ownership and income on that ownership is thinly spread in the population. When real wages are flat, this means that the rate at which fixed wages can replenish wealth is decreasing. As a result, both trends would make EFP more relevant.”

The conceptual model suggested for this article asserts that the relevance of EFP can be viewed as a function of narrowing income and wealth options for the working middle class when the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high and when real wage growth is low. Does this relevance change across economic systems? There is no question that the future understanding of these issues requires adding metrics to the statistical methodologies of different regions and countries and adding to existing reports and analyses that focus on both the dynamics of and trends in capital income (property income in the EU) and on the EUR and USD value of EFP at the mean and at the median for different income levels of the population

This article presents – for the first time – a society-wide measure of the impact of EFP on one economy, namely, the US For further research, it makes sense to build on the comparable data available on the distribution of capital ownership and have similar research on the distribution of capital income for both the EU and the US along with measures of the EUR and USD values of EFP.

This paper seeks to examine the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of publicly listed firms.

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of 59 publicly listed firms in Jordan from 1989 to 2002.

The main findings were: ownership structure has significant effects on the accounting measure of performance return on assets (ROE); government shares are significantly negatively related to the firm's performance ROE; defaulted firms have a high concentration ownership compared with non‐defaulted firms and also high foreign ownership firms have a low incidence of default; government ownership is significantly negatively related to the firm's probability of default; both mix and concentration ownership structure data can be used to predict the probability of default as the largest five shareholders (C5) and government ownership fraction (FGO) are significantly negatively correlated with the probability of the default. These results further suggest that reducing government ownership can increase a firm's performance but will also cause some firms to go bankrupt, at least in the short term.

This paper provides useful information on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance and the default risk of a sample of publicly‐listed firms.

The primary objective of this study is to determine how concentrated ownership affects stock returns by country and scale (by market capitalization), like large, medium, and small-cap firms in selected developed economies of the world.

Using a dataset comprising 12,751 annual observations from 850 listed companies from developed economies from 2004 to 2018, the study employs panel data models and instrumental variable estimation to mitigate endogeneity bias.

The findings reveal a significant and positive correlation between ownership concentration and expected returns on corporate equities in developed economies. Furthermore, the study categorizes firms into distinct size categories and finds nuanced differences in the relationship between ownership concentration and stock returns across large, medium, and small-cap enterprises. The results of the study reveal that ownership concentration (by country) and scale (Large, medium, and small) have a significant and positive impact on the stock returns of firms in developed economies.

the practical implications of this study extend to investors, firms, policymakers, regulators, and other stakeholders involved in the financial markets. By considering these implications, stakeholders can make informed decisions to enhance market efficiency, investor protection, and overall market integrity.

To the authors' understanding, this study is the first to examine the impact of concentrated ownership on excessive stock returns across countries and scales, with an explicit focus on large, medium, and small companies in select developed economies worldwide.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of board characteristics (board size, board independence and duality) on the performance of takaful insurance providers with distinguishable muamalah contracts (wakalah and hybrid) moderated by ownership concentration.

The sample consists of 30 takaful insurances. The authors divided it into two subsamples: 18 insurance companies using wakalah contracts provided by Southeast Asia and 12 insurance companies using hybrid contracts provided by the Gulf Cooperation Council over the period 2010–2020. For data analysis, the authors used the partial least squares path modeling method.

The results show that the larger the board of directors and the higher the number of independent directors, the greater the takaful performance in both the wakalah and hybrid subsamples. Nondual functions improve the takaful performance in both the wakalah and hybrid subsamples. The results also reveal that a highly concentrated ownership structure positively (negatively) moderates the relationship between board size and takaful performance in the wakalah (hybrid) subsamples. Moreover, highly concentrated ownership insignificantly (negatively) moderates the relationship between independent directors and takaful’s performance in the hybrid (wakalah) subsample. Furthermore, a highly concentrated ownership structure insignificantly (negatively) moderates the relationship between the nondual structure and takaful performance in the wakalah (hybrid) subsample.

This study contributes to the understanding of the moderating role of a highly concentrated ownership structure between the characteristics of the board of directors and the performance of takaful insurance, which applies wakalah and hybrid contracts. In addition, this study contributes to takaful insurance by determining the appropriate board characteristics that must be adopted to achieve oversight and improve performance. Regulators should appreciate this contribution to the formulation of suitable approaches for efficiently supervising takaful insurance activities.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

Prior literature shows that income shifting is widely performed by multinational groups, but no research as yet has studied alignment between controlling and minority interests on tax avoidance in multinational groups with high ownership concentration. This study aims to analyze the effect of high ownership concentration on cross-jurisdictional tax-motivated income shifting.

To test the hypotheses, this study focuses on European multinational groups. Data are collected on European parent firms and each subsidiary. The model considers the natural logarithm of profit before tax and tax incentive.

Findings show that subsidiaries shift income for tax avoidance purposes. The alignment of shareholders’ interests and ownership concentration leads to higher levels of tax avoidance through subsidiaries’ infra-group transactions. High ownership concentration decreases the influence of minority interests and allows parent company shareholders to choose a tax avoidance strategy more freely.

The results suggest that taxation levels need to be harmonized to reduce the incentive for tax avoidance and the incentive of governments to reduce their statutory tax rate, to shift profits inwards and reduce outward flow. Without international coordination, this approach may lead to the unevenness of legislative frameworks around the world, and bring significant disadvantages for some countries, influencing economic growth and business development.

This study extends prior findings showing that tax-motivated income shifting as a method of tax avoidance in European multinational groups is stronger in groups with high levels of ownership concentration. This means that managers have the incentive to shift income between subsidiaries for tax and ownership benefits in favor of the parent company’s shareholders and against minority interests.

This paper aims to present an analysis of the association between five categories of concentrated ownership and firm performance in Pakistan. The connection between high ownership concentration and firm performance has attracted much attention, especially in emerging market, yet yielded many inconsistent empirical results.

Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-100 Indexed companies listed in KSE from 2007 to 2011 were selected as the sample, and correlation coefficient and regression model were used to inspect the relationship between ownership concentration degree and corporate performance.

It was found that there is no significant association with ownership concentration and accounting-based performance, market-based performance measures and economic profit, in general.

The first demonstration that the shareholding proportion of the single largest shareholder is the only variable having positive association with market-based performance measures.

This study aims to examine the effects on Tobin's Q of various dimensions of the Spanish ownership structure likely to represent conflicting interests: ownership concentration, insider ownership and bank ownership.

The sample of firms is drawn from the population of Spanish non‐financial firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during 1999‐2002. This paper uses data that have both cross‐sectional and time variation, which allows us to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity and obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients.

Contrary to most previous evidence, the results show that the main ownership structure mechanism that affects firm value is ownership concentration. The findings suggest that ownership concentration appears to influence firm value favourably, but at high levels a detrimental effect causes market valuation to be negatively affected by high levels of large shareholder ownership. These findings, which are different from the linear or non‐significant relationships found in other countries, can be explained by the differences in corporate governance systems.

The evidence indicates that controlling owners tend to misuse their dominant position at high levels of concentration and to make decisions that destroy market value. The findings also highlight the necessity of alternative corporate governance mechanisms that lead Spanish firms to lower their agency costs and to maximise their market value when blockholders' and minority shareholders' interests do not converge.

The study builds on prior research in several ways. First, the paper offers new insights into the relationship between corporate governance and economic performance by using data from Spanish listed firms. Second, the study focuses on three dimensions: ownership concentration, insider ownership, and bank ownership, which allow one to get a more accurate picture of the ownership structure‐firm value relation. Finally, the study controls for unobservable firm effects by applying the econometrics of panel data.

Documents evidence on the interdependence between the mechanisms used to control the agency costs in Turkish manufacturing firms where the external control devices are restricted and most of the firms have concentrated ownership. The ownership concentration, board size and composition, managerial shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, and family shareholdings are the selected devices. Evidence reveals that the proportion of insiders on the board is positively related to the percentage of family shareholdings and negatively related to the percentage of foreign institutional shareholdings and ownership concentration. Board size shows a significant negative relation with all the control mechanisms except the debt ratio. The finding that the managerially controlled firms have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms and the family controlled firms supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The capital market seems to complement the institutional shareholdings, family shareholdings, and ownership concentration in monitoring the CEOs.