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Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.

The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.

Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.

Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.

Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the new Budget Act (2015) and the new budget cycle influence and were influenced by the contextual environment of the Tanzanian parliament and how this changed parliamentarians’ (MPs) budgetary oversight roles.

The paper employed analytical concepts explained in the contextual framework proposed by Alsharari et al. (2015) to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms. Interviews, video clips and document review were employed in the data collection. Data were analyzed using the thematic approach.

The values of the new Budget Act and the new budget cycle were in conflict with the prevailing institutions, political and power aspects. The MPs modified a few provisions in the new Budget Act and in the new budget cycle. Legitimating budgetary oversight roles as a result of institutional pressure emerged but stopped. Although there was a change in MPs formal powers and MPs involvement in budgetary oversight, there was stability as the change was ineffective.

The paper only extracted relevant aspects of the contextual framework, which were sufficient to achieve the objective of the paper. Moreover, the study was conducted only a few years after the implementation of the reforms. Therefore, it might be too early to reach conclusions. Yet, the paper serves as the basis for further studies investigating changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms.

In order for the parliament to hold the government accountable to the electorate, there is a need for reforming the nature of the government system, improving MPs capacity, harmonizing Budget Act with prevailing constitution and demonstrating the political will to use MPs’ formal powers. The findings suggest that effective change in budgetary oversight by focusing on formal institutions only is unlikely.

This paper provides a more robust explanation on how the integration of institutional, political and power aspects shape budgetary oversight roles in parliaments. It is the first paper to explore accounting change using the contextual theoretical framework in an organization of a parliamentary nature. The paper responds to Kim’s (2018) call for conducting case studies to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles by investigating potential attributes of institutions when operating in practice.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the conduct of the audit committee (AC) in terms of its oversight role of audit quality in the UK.

This study uses semi-structured interviews with 11 AC members and 11 audit partners.

The findings show that the conduct of the AC in relation to audit quality involves the assessment of the contents of the reports prepared by the external auditors for the AC. Furthermore, the oversight of audit quality by the AC involves a thorough assessment of the presentation of the external auditors during the interaction and communication between the two parties. This illustrates the AC’s role as an effective monitoring mechanism when overseeing the audit quality. However, the conduct of the AC in overseeing four major areas (independence, appointment, remuneration and effectiveness of audit process) related to audit quality, as recommended by the UK Code of Corporate Governance, provides mixed results. The findings highlight the ceremonial role of the AC in those areas, which demonstrates the limited supporting role of the AC in enhancing audit quality. Furthermore, it is suggested that the effectiveness of the oversight role is influenced by the quality of the chairman of the AC and the quality of the relationship between the AC and the external auditors.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing additional insights into the conduct of the AC in overseeing audit quality as well as additional evidence concerning the role and effect of the AC in relation to audit quality as prescribed by the UK Code of Corporate Governance.

This study investigates how disclosure of the board of directors’ leadership and role in risk oversight (BODs oversight disclosure) influences investors’ judgments when information on risk exposures is disclosed. The theoretical lens through which we examine this issue involves negativity bias. Sixty-two stock market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of stocks on a regular or professional basis participated in our study. Our results reveal that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure (positive information) does not carry significant weight on investor judgments (i.e., attractiveness and investment) when financial statement disclosures indicate a high level of operational and financial risk exposures (negative information). In contrast, under the condition of a low level of risk exposures, BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to assess higher risk in terms of worry, catastrophic potentials and unfamiliarity about risk information and, in turn, make less favorable investor judgments. Our findings add to the literature on negativity bias and contribute to the debate on the usefulness of disclosures about risk.

This study aims to explore the opinions of audit committee (AC) members on the extent to which they fulfil the oversight role vested in them by the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code (JCGC).

This study uses semi-structured interviews with 18 AC members.

The findings suggest that although ACs largely meet the JCGC’s recommendations, their substantive oversight role in practice is limited. In particular, the responses indicate that ACs suffer from a lack of real power, especially concerning the appointment (or removal) of external auditors and the evaluation of internal control. Moreover, ACs have no actual role in issues deemed important for financial reporting quality (e.g. reviewing management estimates and evaluating chief financial officer (CFOs) and internal audit executives).

This study provides rich insights into ACs’ oversight processes in a setting outside the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model where knowledge is scant on the ACs’ real function. Hence, the study injects the literature with new qualitative-based evidence from a peculiar civil law country. Also, Jordan has spent time and energy trying to strengthen corporate governance practices to boost investors’ confidence. However, the interviewees’ responses indicate that the oversight role of the AC is still far from what the regulators anticipate. Therefore, the findings offer useful feedback for regulators to think more deeply about the current governance regulations. The feedback from this study can be extended to other developing countries with similar institutional environments, especially countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and board performance in monitoring roles.

A survey questionnaire was used to gather data on board performance, while annual reports were employed to gather data on internal corporate governance mechanisms. Data for board performance were based on 112 directors who represent the companies.

Factor analysis extracted two dimensions of monitoring roles: management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles. Non‐independent non‐executive directors and managerial ownership were found to be positively related to both dimensions of monitoring roles, while the multiple directorships of non‐executive directors were negatively related to management oversight roles.

The paper establishes the need for regulators to pay particular attention to multiple directorships, which are commonly practiced in public listed companies. The contribution of non‐independent non‐executive directors rather than independent directors in monitoring roles calls for further research. Regulators need to emphasize the performance evaluation roles of the board of directors (BOD), as much emphasis has been given to management oversight roles.

The study contributes to the literature concerning monitoring roles as it shows that management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles are differentiated. The findings provide an avenue for the contribution of non‐independent non‐executive directors and multiple directorships in monitoring roles.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Washington State school district financial reporting and budget reporting meet the information needs of school board directors charged with governance.

Washington State school board directors were surveyed and asked to rank information items’ usefulness in carrying out their governance role. School district annual reports, budgets and websites were examined to determine whether the identified information was reported and easily transparent to those charged with governance and the public.

Directors rank information on strategic oversight, budget planning and student outcomes as more useful, consistent with the strategic role of new public management. Follow-on analysis of district annual financial reports, budgets and websites reveal that the availability of the information ranked useful by directors is limited. The findings suggest an information gap exists between directors’ information needs and school district reporting. Annual reports and budgets, when provided, often provide typical financial statements and variance data, respectively, rather than reporting on mission-aligned performance measures. The main consequence of the information gap may be compromised decision-making effectiveness.

By directly asking those charged with governance what information they identify as useful and then examining whether the information is reported in the annual report, budget or website, the study links user information needs to information transparency.

This study aims to examine the structural power wielded by the audit committee (AC) and the various bases of its power, whilst also exploring the behavioural tactics used by the AC to leverage its power in the oversight of the external audit.

Empirical evidence was drawn from semi-structured interviews with external auditors and AC members in Malaysia.

The AC’s structural power is derived from its formal and network position in the organisation. The AC possesses three forms of organisational-based power (legitimate, coercive and informational) resultant from its formal position, and these combine with the AC’s personal power (will and expert). The AC uses its personal power base to develop trusting relationships and to promote the exchange of information with other key corporate governance actors in the network position. Furthermore, the AC applies at least four behavioural tactics (assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality and coalition formation) to exercise its bases of power.

This study attempts to describe the AC’s structural sources of power, its organisational and personal power bases, and the behavioural tactics it uses when exerting its power.

Taking a cognitive perspective of internal auditor independence, the purpose of this study is to develop measures for the concepts of commitment to independence, role conflict and role ambiguity in the context of the internal auditor's work environment, in order to provide evidence of the effects of role conflict and ambiguity, and their sub‐dimensions, on the internal auditor's commitment to independence.

To measure these concepts, scales are developed for a questionnaire by drawing on measures established in the organizational behavior literature and adapting these to the internal auditor's context. The questionnaire is sent to a sample of internal auditors drawn from the database of the Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia in which listed companies with an in‐house internal audit function are extracted. There are 101 useable responses.

The results reveal that both role ambiguity and role conflict are significantly negatively related to commitment to independence. The underlying dimensions found to have the greatest impact on commitment to independence are: first, ambiguity in both the exercise of authority by the internal auditor and time pressure faced by the internal auditor; and second, conflict between the internal auditor's personal values and both management's and their profession's expectations and requirements.

The results extend the literature on internal auditor independence and provide insights for auditing standards setters and corporate governance designers.

This study aims to investigate the extent to which audit committee (AC) members who are formally independent are truly independent in practice, and what challenges they face that undermine their independence.

The study utilizes semi-structured interviews with 18 members of the AC in Jordan.

The responses indicate that AC is mostly labelled as independent but fails to play an effective monitoring role due to different institutional factors. These factors include family ownership, government ownership, culture, compensation package and the lack of qualified directors.

This research addresses this gap by presenting qualitative evidence from a civil law jurisdiction, featured by a developing financial market, a prevalence of family businesses, limited investor protection and a low risk of litigation. Additionally, this study aims to rectify the current imbalance between qualitative and quantitative studies on AC and bridge the gap between research conducted in developed countries and their developing counterparts.

This study offers valuable insights for regulatory authorities to engage in a more profound contemplation of extant governance regulations. Also, this study offers useful feedback for nomination committees of public companies, and it also has an implication for shareholders as they rely on independent directors to protect their investment. Furthermore, implications of the findings derived from this research possess the potential for generalization to other developing nations characterized by akin institutional contexts, notably encompassing the countries situated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

This research introduces novel qualitative empirical evidence from a distinctive jurisdiction governed by civil law, thereby enriching the existing scholarly discourse. It also contributes to the AC literature by suggesting that it is not only the existence of conventionally independent ACs that affect the integrity of financial statements, but also the absence of social ties and other contextual obstacles.