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Introduction: According to the effective market hypothesis, investors act rationally when making an investment decision. The hypothesis assumes that investors invest in a way that maximizes their returns, taking into account the new information received. If the information released on the market is interpreted in the same way by all investors, no investor would be able to earn above the market. This hypothesis is valid in case of efficient markets. In the event that investors show irrational behavior to the information released on the market, the markets move away from efficiency. Overreaction behavior is one of the non-rational behaviors of investors. Overreaction behavior involves investors overreacting by misinterpreting the new information released to the market. According to De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985), overreaction hypothesis in the event that investors overreact to the news coming to the market, after a period the false evaluation, the price of the security is corrected with the reversal movement, without the need of any positive or negative information. Aim: The purpose of this study is to examine investors’ overreaction behavior in mergers and acquisitions. For this purpose, overreaction behavior was analyzed for companies whose stocks are traded on the Borsa Istanbul, which were involved in mergers or acquisitions. Method: In the study, companies that made mergers and acquisitions for the period 2007–2017 were determined, and abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns were calculated by using monthly closing price data of these companies. Moreover, whether investors overreact to the merger and acquisition decision is examined separately for one-, three- and five-year periods. Findings: As a result of the research, it has been observed that there is a reverse return for one-, three-, and five-year periods. However, it has been determined that the overreaction hypothesis is valid for only one year.

This chapter examines investor overreaction and seasonality in the stock markets of Korea, Hong Kong and Japan using data for the period of 1985–2004. Evidence suggests little to no reversals following days of excessive increase, but all three indices reversed 35% to 45% following days of excessive decline. Seasonality analysis revealed month-of-the-year effects, day-of-the-week effects, the Friday (weekend) effect and the January effect. The Monday effect was not evident.

Introduction – Emerging markets are under the influence of many external factors in global market conditions. International interest rates and price fluctuations in major stock market indices are also among these factors. The FED policies shape the international capital movements in particular, which significantly affects the emerging markets. For this reason, emerging stock markets may show different reactions especially in times of crisis.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the BIST30 index acted in accordance with the overreaction hypothesis (ORH) against the return changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index in the process of the 2008 global financial crisis.

Methodology – The data set of the study was analysed by dividing it into two periods. The first period is the monetary expansion period between 17 August 2007, when the Federal Reserve (FED) reduced the interest rate for the first time, until 22 May 2013 when the FED announced that it would reduce the bond purchases. The second period is the monetary contraction period including the dates between 23 May 2013 and 1 June 2017. An error correction model (ECM) was established in both periods for the indices, determined as cointegrated. The validity of the ORH was tested by Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) Analysis.

Findings – According to the ECM, the authors identified that the effect of short-term changes in the DJIA return in the monetary expansion period on BIST30 index return was higher than that in the monetary contraction period. However, according to the findings obtained from the CAR analysis results, the BIST30 index did not generally act in accordance with the ORH against the DJIA. Findings can be appreciated as a decision-making tool especially for investment specialists and investors interested in securities investments.

Several Asia-Pacific financial markets impose price limits to reduce excessive fluctuations. We examine stock price behavior following daily limit moves on the Shanghai Stock Exchange for 200 firms in the period 1997–2004. We find weak evidence for the occurrence of overreaction on the Shanghai stock market on the basis of price limits. We conclude that investors do not exhibit overreaction to the event of limit activation except in the case of 1-day up limit moves. We also conclude that the Shanghai Stock Exchange can be regarded as a (semistrong) efficient market.

This chapter aims to expand the overreaction literature by examining whether the price reversals occur in the short-term period (i.e., 3 days) and long-term period (i.e., up to 20 days), following large 1-day price changes in Asia-Pacific markets over the period 2001–2005. Our results based on firm data in three Asia-Pacific markets, namely, Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, and static and dynamic measures of large price changes indicate the followings. First, stock prices tend to reverse over the short-term period after large price changes. Second, in the case of large price declines defined by arbitrary trigger values, investors may earn profit from exploiting the phenomena of price reversals; however, the profit is not large enough to exploit since it is less than the profit from passive funds. This result is supportive of the weak form of efficient market hypothesis. Third, we find mixed evidence of long run price reversal across markets. Forth, market conditions (i.e., bear or bull) may not explain the magnitude of price reversals. Finally, the dynamic measures of large price changes based on individual firms provide more consistent evidence across markets, which is supportive of short-term price reversals and overreaction hypothesis. This evidence exists in the emerging market of Vietnam as well as developed Australian and Japanese markets.

In this chapter, we argue that under- and over-reaction are both parts of the price dynamics caused by investor's naïve judgmental extrapolation. We propose to use the Holt–Winters model, a parsimonious model with two parameters, to represent investor's conservatism (anchoring) and representativeness (trending). The complexity of earning information, which is broken down into a drift, a transitory shock, and an autocorrelated permanent shock, add further volatility to the price. We explain the price dynamics caused by the interplay of the earning model and investor's naïve belief. It is further argued that empirical “underreaction” and “overreaction” differ from true under- and overreaction. The simulated results with the proposed model confirm with empirical findings on under- and overreaction.

We investigate institutional investors’ trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992–2001. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts, and insurance companies as passive institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolution. Our results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” However, they update their beliefs between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the final resolution.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

The economic doctrine of market efficiency plays an essential role in securities fraud litigation. In lawsuits alleging violations of SEC Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs typically must argue that the market for the relevant security is efficient, and therefore that the “fraud on the market” doctrine applies. However, the term “market efficiency” is often applied imprecisely. In this chapter, we discuss properties of efficient markets that have been proposed in academic research, legal scholarship, and case law. We explore what must be assumed about capital markets for each of these properties to hold. We then ask how, in practice, each property could be rebutted.