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The purpose of this study is to examine the association between the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO)-chairman titles (CEO duality) and investment efficiency, defined as a lower deviation from expected investment for targeted S-curve firms used to propel an innovation-driven economy. This study also aims to investigate the moderating effect of financial reporting quality on this association.

This paper focuses on the ten targeted S-curve industries – under the definition of the Thailand 4.0 model – listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from 2000 to 2019. Data related to CEO/chairman titles and investment supports were manually collected from the annual reports, the SET market analysis and reporting tool database and the company websites. Financial data used to estimate investment behaviors and discretionary accruals were extracted from 1999. The study analyzes unbalanced panel data using fixed-effects regressions. Additional tests embrace replacing the sample with nontargeted firms, partitioning into granted and nongranted firms, adding CEOs’ demographic moderators, using alternative variable measures and analyzing for lagged independent variables.

The main findings show that CEO duality reduces overinvestment but worsens underinvestment in targeted firms. Financial reporting quality (FRQ) appears to strengthen CEO duality in mitigating extreme spending but has no impact on the association between CEO duality and underinvestment. Additional results, for example, conclude that CEO duality has no association with both over- and underinvesting at nontargeted firms, but its effect becomes positively significant on overinvestment when financial reporting quality is high. The negative association between CEO duality and overinvestment is found only in government-granted and targeted firms. FRQ encourages CEO duality in lowering overinvestment among targeted firms without grants. CEOs’ female and serviced early years appear to elevate those main findings.

These findings assist innovative corporations in choosing a proper leadership structure to cope with investment inefficiency. The research gives the government and regulatory bodies an insight into the qualifications of the leadership structure and financial information that helps them put forward effective policies.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to establish the association between CEO duality and investment efficiency for innovation-driven firms in a transforming economy. The study fills the gap in the literature on management, accounting and finance by unveiling the interplay between dual leadership and financial reporting in affecting the efficiency of investments.

This study aims to investigate the impact of pollution control bonds (PCBs) on overinvestment within utility firms.

This empirical study analyzes a data set comprising 215 US energy firms observed from 2011 to 2021, using the ordinary least square regression with standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering.

The study reveals a negative relationship between PCBs and overinvestment, indicating that PCBs are an effective tool in curbing excessive investment. Additionally, it demonstrates that chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence diminishes the influence of PCBs on overinvestment. These findings remain robust across various metrics for measuring overinvestment and CEO overconfidence, as well as when alternative estimation methods are used. These results align with insights derived from agency theory and upper echelon theories.

Regulators are encouraged to actively promote the use of PCBs as a financing tool for environmentally focused initiatives. To achieve this, regulatory bodies should enhance their presence within the utility sector, particularly in regions grappling with higher pollution levels. This requires the implementation of strategic policies and regulatory frameworks aimed at mitigating excessive investments. Simultaneously, policymakers should take proactive measures to introduce financial instruments designed to optimize investment efficiency, thus facilitating eco-friendly projects.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper holds the distinction of being the first to examine the impact of a specific type of green bond, namely, PCBs, on overinvestment. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature on personality traits, particularly within the context of the upper echelon theory, by investigating the moderating influence of CEO overconfidence.

Using panel data for the period 2004-2010, this study shows that political connections have a significant positive effect on corporate overinvestment in China while their interaction with related-party transactions has a negative effect. Results also indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the Chinese central government tend to have greater overinvestment than non-SOEs. However, their interaction with related-party transactions has an opposite effect on overinvestment, lending support to the conjecture that firm ownership structure plays a significant role in corporate overinvestment decisions. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Panel data analysis and regression.

This study shows that political connections have a significant positive effect on corporate overinvestment in China while their interaction with related-party transactions has a negative effect. Results also indicate that SOEs controlled by the Chinese central government tend to have greater overinvestment than non-SOEs.

The research shows some Chinese firms' behavior that indicates expropriation of minority stockholders. Policymakers should be aware of this issue as overinvestment is not good for the economy as a while. The limitation of the study is based on six-year data.

Stockholders should monitor the firms to mitigate the overinvestment problems in Chinese firms.

This is the first paper to examine the overinvestment issue along with related-party transactions and political connections.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of large shareholdings from the agency problem perspective of overinvestment, and re‐test the role of board independence in the context of concentrated ownership.

Using a five‐year panel data of Chinese non‐financial listed companies between 2001 and 2005, the paper estimates both a fixed‐effects model and a random‐effects model.

The paper finds evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between large shareholdings and firm level overinvestment. It also finds that state‐owned firms and firms with more independent directors experience lower level of overinvestment. However, firms with more frequent meetings experience a higher level of overinvestment.

The paper's findings indicate that concentrated ownership is not always a bad thing. The crux of the matter is how to induce large shareholders' incentive to monitor managers' opportunistic behaviors and restrict their motivation to expropriate minority shareholders.

In the context of concentrated ownership, the key to improve corporate governance is to strengthen board independence.

The paper provides useful information on non‐monotonic governance effects of large shareholdings in Chinese listed companies and overinvestment.

The purpose of this paper is to expand the investor sentiment’s effect on investment efficiency to the layer of “credit financing,” studying whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

The authors obtain firm-level data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and using panel estimation techniques examine whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

This paper finds that credit financing plays the role of partial media in the process of investor sentiment affecting investment efficiency. Based on the funds increasing effect, with the high-investor sentiment and increasing credit financing, corporations alleviate the financing constraints, but also provide a convenient for the abuse of corporate funds. So, investor sentiment positively associates with enterprises’ overinvestment, while investor sentiment negatively associates with enterprises’ underinvestment. Relying on the particular system background and property right environment in China, this paper finds that investor sentiment has an effect on the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises and the underinvestment of private enterprises through credit financing channel, while it does not function in the overinvestment of private enterprises. The reason of the difference is that under the soft budget constraint in the country, the credit preference of state-owned enterprises and the creditor’s rights management of banks are partially absent.

By fusing the special financial environment and institutional background, this thesis further includes in the analysis frame the difference in governance effect by credit financing between state-owned and privately owned listed companies, and further analyzes the difference in impact on investment efficiency in enterprises of different natures after investor sentiment has affected enterprise credit financing.

This paper has verified the constraint assumption and deepened the research work on bank credit supply and answered practical questions such as whether the banks in the country exercise supervision function over the listed companies and on which kind of listed companies the supervision function plays a more effective role.

As an unofficial substitution mechanism, bank-enterprise relationship can elevate the investment efficiency by private owned enterprises. Based on the timely research results on credit financing, reference is provided for private listed companies to utilize investor sentiment to improve its investment efficiency.

This paper has proved the specific path which creates the dual effects on resources allocation by investor sentiment, that is, the intermediary transmission in credit financing, clarifying the mechanism of action by which investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment and making incremental contribution to the research of how investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment.

The authors show that there is a negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firm overinvestment using Korean data from 2007 to 2016. Since Jensen (1986) shows that a firm's free cash flow is an important factor of overinvestment, the authors examine how free cash flow influences the sensitivity of overinvestment to EPU. The authors find that a high level of free cash flow attenuates the negative effect of EPU on overinvestment. The authors find that there is no significant difference in the effect of EPU on overinvestment between Chaebol (Korean family-run conglomerates) and non-Chaebol firms, which is consistent with the literature that the features of Chaebol are weakening.

Debt, dividend and investment policy constitutes a company's important financial decisions to determine firm performance. The research emphasizes on the problem of overinvestment, a phenomenon that worsens firm operation. Furthermore, it clarifies the moderation role of debt and dividend policy in mitigating the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance in the case of Vietnamese listed companies.

The research uses all financial statement of non-financial Vietnamese listed companies on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchange in the period of 2008–2018. The data are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The final data set is comprised of 669 listed companies. The study measures overinvestment though investment demand function and HP filter. Moreover, the research employs the dynamic model, so it has to apply the SGMM method to deal with the problem of endogeneity caused by the lagged dependent variable.

The research finds that overinvestment is negatively associated with firm performance. Debt or dividend policy separately can moderate the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance. However, when these two policies are combined, they lessen the positive interaction impact of each policy due to the substitution between debt and dividend policy.

The research may have two limitations. Firstly, the research measures overinvestment indirectly through investment demand function and HP filter. These two measures only help identify the sign that companies may have the problem of overinvestment because we cannot determine whether they overinvest or not in reality. Secondly, when using interaction variables, the problem of multicollinearity may be higher, and this may adjust the signs and significance level of variables in the models.

Practically, the research proposes three policy recommendations. Firstly, a company can exploit debt or dividend policy to limit excessive free cash flow in order to constrain the problem of overinvestment. Secondly, a company should enhance its corporate governance to resolve agency problems. Thirdly, the government should make the financial sector more transparent and effective to improve monitoring functions of various parties in the capital market.

Overinvestment sometimes can cause social issues. Overinvestment means that companies make ineffective investment. If they continue this situation over a long time, companies may have financial distress or even go bankruptcy. As a result, it will slow down economic growth and increase unemployment in the economy.

The research is supposed to make two great contributions to the existing empirical studies in two aspects. Firstly, it is the first attempt to take into consideration the interaction between overinvestment and financial policies. Secondly, it helps enhance the fundamental stance of the agency theory, which supports the interdependence of debt, dividend and investment policy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting.

Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity.

The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms with lower reputation, weaker shareholder rights, and lower institutional ownership. The effect of overinvestment on collateral requirement is mixed, and investment efficiency has no significant relation to loan maturity.

The results are subject to the following caveats. First, while the study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency affects bank loan contracting terms, especially the cost of bank loans, the underlying theory is not well-developed. The authors leave it up to future research to provide a theoretical framework to clearly distinguish the cash flow and credit risk effects of past investment behavior from those of existing agency conflicts. Second, due to data limitation, the sample size is small, especially when the authors control for corporate governance measured by G-index and institutional ownership.

The finding that overinvestment is costly to corporations suggests that managers should consider the potential trade-offs from such investment decisions carefully. The evidence also alerts shareholders and board members to the importance of monitoring management investment decisions. In addition, the authors find that corporate governance moderates the relationship between investment decisions and cost of bank loans, suggesting that it would be beneficial to design effective governance mechanisms to prevent management from empire building and motivate managers to pursue efficient investment strategies.

First, the findings enhance understanding of the potential economic consequences of overinvestment decisions in the context of a firm’s private debt contracting. The evidence suggests that lenders perceive higher credit risk from overinvestment than from underinvestment, likely because firms squander cash in the current period by investing in (negative net present value) projects that are likely to result in future cash flow problems. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the determinants of bank loans by identifying an observable empirical proxy for uncertainty in future cash flows that increases credit risk.

This paper comes to the point from the tax competition of local government in investment promotion and capital introduction. This paper aims to empirically examine the internal mechanism of enterprises obtaining land resources from local government and its resulting equity investment increase and economic consequences of overinvestment.

The data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 were used to test the relationship between the increase in enterprise equity investment and the acquisition of land resources and overinvestment. The descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and least squares linear regression were used to solve the above question.

One of the reasons for the enterprise equity increase is to obtain scarce land resources. The enterprise acquisition for land resources leads to overinvestment. The equity investment increase from obtaining land resources will further stimulate enterprise group to overinvest.

The authors could not get the actual data of land that subsidiaries have obtained directly. In this research, the authors get the data using consolidated statements and subsidiary statements indirectly.

The results make contributions to the influencing factors and economic consequence of the enterprise investment structural deviation.

It provides reference to optimize the “interaction” relationship between government and enterprises.

It identified the “dual-channel” conduction mechanism between land resource acquisition and enterprise overinvestment.

This study investigates the relationship between foreign ownership, earnings quality and overinvestment in Japanese zombie firms.

The study makes use of data from Japanese firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2019. The study employs logistic and multinomial logistic models to test whether the overinvestment behavior of zombie firms is mitigated by foreign shareholdings and earnings quality.

The results show that (1) zombie firms tend to overinvest; (2) an increase in foreign ownership mitigates the overinvestment of zombie firms and (3) the mitigation of zombie firms' overinvestment by foreign ownership is stronger with higher earnings quality.

This study extends the discussion of earnings quality and investment efficiency to the zombie firm setting. Previous studies in accounting suggest that high earnings quality enhances firms' investment efficiency. The findings suggest that both a change in ownership structure and high-quality accounting information are necessary to mitigate the inefficiency of zombie firms.