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The funding of defined-benefit plans has garnered the attention of academicians, practitioners, and policymakers. Drawing upon agency and organizational control theories, this study investigates the implications of board independence on changes in defined-benefit funding. Using a panel dataset of S&P 500 companies sponsoring defined-benefit plans, the author finds that corporate boards matter. Specifically, CEO duality and outside director representation are associated with year-to-year decreases in defined-benefit funding. Conversely, outside director ownership is related to year-to-year increases in defined-benefit funding. Furthermore, outside director ownership moderated the relationship between outside director representation and defined-benefit funding such that outside director representation is associated with year-to-year increases in defined-benefit plan funding when the percentage of outside director ownership is high.

This study investigates the relationship between outside directors, managerial compensation, and firm performance in the Korean insurance industry.

The authors employ a simultaneous equation framework by using three-stage least squares (3SLS) to address the endogeneity problems that could result from the joint determination of outside directors, firm performance, and executive compensation in Korean insurance companies.

The authors find that the ratio of outside directors on the board is negatively associated with insurance firm's value and financial profitability. In addition, this study's evidence shows that greater representation on the board by outside directors leads to a higher level of executive pay. In particular, the authors provide evidence that variable compensation scheme and outside directors who have backgrounds in the legal profession and former high-ranking government officials drive this study's main results.

This study adds to the literature by first demonstrating the interaction effects between outside directors, firm performance, and executive compensation in the Korean insurance industry. Unlike previous studies that typically focus on US companies, the authors study the Korean insurance sector that is an emerging power in the global insurance market, ranking seventh in terms of total premium volume, and show that the Korean insurance firm's outside directors system does not work in the manner that it is intended to function.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the current research on corporate philanthropy and organizational outcomes by empirically exploring two specific types of antecedents: board of director composition and industry membership.

A theoretical framework was developed based on the resource dependence and stakeholder theories which suggest that the extent that firms build relationship with certain stakeholders is closely tied to the personal and social background of board members, in turn influencing the allocation of resources to corporate philanthropy. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis as well as analysis of variance with post hoc comparisons was conducted using multi-year data philanthropic data from 104 US corporations.

The results provided empirical support for a positive relationship between the number of female board directors and the level of corporate philanthropy. In addition, the results showed significant inter-industry variations in the level of corporate philanthropy. This indicated that the rather aggressive role of philanthropy in mitigating reputational challenges associated with product-market dysfunctions. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results did not support a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors and level of philanthropy.

The authors believe the empirical finding on the relationship between industry membership and corporate philanthropy is a significant contribution to the philanthropy literature. Accordingly, by empirically showing the disproportionately higher level of philanthropy by some prominent industries (such as gas and oil, financial services and chemical) than their counterparts, the authors contribute to the understanding of sector-level determinants of corporate philanthropy.

Since board of directors have a direct involvement in reviewing and approving major corporate initiatives, the choice of these directors is more likely to influence the amount of resources committed to philanthropic causes. Consistent with other studies in the larger corporate social responsibility research, the authors found that more women directors on the board are associated with greater philanthropic spending. Hence, a major implication of the study is that shareholders and the general corporate community need to pay close attention into who is elected to serve as director of business organizations as these directors’ background and experience could shape major social responsibility initiatives such as corporate philanthropy.

By empirically investigating the relationship between board composition and philanthropy, this study extends the scholarly discussion to focus on the role of the board in shaping the level of firm commitment in overall CSR. In addition, this study provides empirical evidence on the role of industry context in the level of commitment in corporate philanthropic activities.

The purpose of this paper is to uncover the stylised facts about NZ corporate boards and identify unanswered questions about their composition, activity and incentives during the 16-year period between 1995 and 2010.

The paper uses annual report data to document the evolution of 22 NZ board characteristics. The paper also informally compares these trends with those occurring in other countries.

Unsurprisingly, the representation of non-executive, independent and female directors on NZ boards rose during the period, as did real chair and director fees and the importance of board committees, while average board size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this movement occurred before NZX governance reforms in 2003. Moreover, there are some intriguing differences between New Zealand and other, mainly larger, countries.

The analysis is largely descriptive and focuses on identifying questions rather than answering them.

The paper fills an obvious gap in the governance literature, which largely ignores small, open economies, and hence provides little clue as to the overall state and evolution of NZ boards. The paper also identifies a number of questions for further research.

The purpose of this paper is to apply theoretical concepts of corporate and bank boards to the Boards of Directors at Federal Reserve Banks and at US Basel II A‐IRB adopters. The Basel II Accord set to take effect in the USA in 2009 provides direction as to board oversight in Pillar 2. Since the Federal Reserve is one agency responsible for this document, the paper proposes to investigate the governance structure at US banks, presumably adopting (or opting in) the Basel II A‐IRB framework.

The board structure at Federal Reserve District Banks as of 2006 is examined. Also analyzed are the board structure, executive compensation, and ownership structure at the 22 banks identified as Basel II A‐IRB adopters. These results are then compared with current views and standards of “good governance” in the literature.

It was found that there is a fairly diverse representation on the board (in terms of female directors), a large proportion of directors are CEOs (generally of other banks), and that boards comprised a majority of outside directors. Several governance characteristics are contrary to “good governance” characteristics described in the literature. Further, banks adopting A‐IRB procedures in Basel II may need to improve governance structures to be in compliance with Pillar 2 of Basel II.

The Federal Reserve System, in an effort to increase board oversight as part of a risk management framework, should also consider its own board structure in light of current research on private‐sector boards. Both Federal Reserve District Boards and Basel II Boards should work towards exemplary corporate governance in light of their place in the US banking system.

The paper investigates the governance structures of banks.

This paper aims to investigate the moderating effects of a board of directors on foreign direct investment (FDI)’s international diversification in Turkey.

A sample of Turkish multinational firms with FDI was used. Two different aspects of international diversification were considered: the relationship between international diversification and financial performance and the moderating effect of board composition on the relationship between international diversification and the firm’s financial performance. Firm-level data were obtained from the Istanbul Stock Exchange in Turkey.

The findings reveal that international diversification leads to better financial performance according to market-based measures. On the other hand, this study indicates that the board characteristics have a moderating effect on international diversification and financial performance.

The study is based on a sample of publicly listed firms in Turkey, and this restriction limits the generalizability of the findings.

The internalization efforts of Turkish FDI have led to better financial performance in terms of market-based measures. The results have stated that the interest of independent outside directors is aligned with lower-risk investment decisions. Independence of independent outside directors in Turkey is interrogated by practitioners or the Capital Markets Board of Turkey. The larger board size which a moderator variable is provided, the wider shareholder value in Turkey is.

One can understand that the development of market-supporting institutions provides the support for entry to an emerging economy which is inefficient or incomplete markets and highly concentrated family ownership.

These findings provide important implications for corporate governance and highlight the need for further research on the role of governance in firm internationalization. This study not only helps to understand how board characteristics affect the choice of international diversification decisions, but the results also allow to assess the performance implications of these choices for a particular period.

The purpose of this paper is to study the role of corporate governance in abnormal returns around announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by publicly traded US firms from 2001 to 2004.

Cross‐sectional regression analysis was used to determine which variables are important to the market's reaction to the SEO, with a particular focus on corporate governance variables.

It was found that investors react more positively for firms in which different people hold the CEO and board chairman positions. Limited evidence was found that investor reaction is more positive when the board has a greater representation of outside directors, the CEO has less ownership, and the board is not too large. These findings suggest that investors react more favorably to SEOs by firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms that reduce adverse selection or agency problems.

This paper's findings are evidence that stronger boards can reduce a firm's cost of raising additional equity capital. Originality/value – There is not believed to be any other published paper that examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the reaction to SEOs with such a comprehensive sample or in post‐Enron periods.

Drawing on agency theory and resource dependence theory, the study aims to link board demographic diversity and independence to corporate social performance.

Data were collected from various sources for a sample of 475 publicly traded Fortune 500 companies between the years 2007 and 2008.

It is found that board gender diversity is positively related to institutional and technical strength ratings, while board racial diversity is positively related to institutional strength rating only. Both the proportion of outside directors and CEO non‐duality were negatively associated with institutional and technical weakness ratings.

The sample was predominantly large, publicly traded national and international corporations, which might limit the generalizability of the findings.

Management personnel should be cognizant of how board configurations and leadership structure may influence their corporate reputation for social responsibility. Efforts should be made to foster a group dynamic that is conducive to effective board functioning.

Few empirical studies have examined the relationship between board characteristics and corporate social performance. This study contributes to the literature by examining such associations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether internal attributes of corporate governance such as board size, outside directors, CEO duality, managerial ownership, and ownership concentration affect the performance of Pakistani firms.

Panel econometric technique namely pooled ordinary least squares is used to estimate the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and performance measures (i.e., return on assets, return on equity, earnings per share, and market‐to‐book ratio) using the data of non‐financial firms listed on the Karachi stock exchange Pakistan during 2004‐2008.

The empirical results indicate that board size is positively, whereas outside directors and managerial ownership are negatively related to the return on assets, earnings per share, and market‐to‐book ratio. Ownership concentration is positively related to all measures of performance used in this study. CEO duality is positively related to earnings per share only. As far as control variables are concerned, leverage is negatively related to the return on assets, return on equity, and earnings per share. Alternatively, firm size is positively related to all measures of performance. In sum, empirical results indicate that internal governance mechanisms have material effects on firm performance.

Empirical results provide support to managers to understand how internal governance mechanisms affect the firm performance. Moreover, results provide support to regulatory authorities for enacting laws to make internal governance mechanisms work more effectively in the country.

This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effects of internal governance mechanisms on firm performance using the data of Pakistani firms. Moreover, empirical findings somehow proceed to confirm that theories of corporate governance surely provide some support to explain the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance.

This study investigates the roles of board independence and CEO duality on a firm’s performance relying on financial ratios, namely ROA, ROE, EPS and profit margin. This paper argues that if boards and leadership structure are well in place and conform to the practices in other developed countries, the long‐term shareholder value is expected to increase and shareholder interests are also well protected. To test the roles of board independence and CEO duality, data from the KLSE Main Board companies for the 1994‐1996 financial years were used. The 1994‐1996 financial years were chosen because, during this period, the issue of corporate governance in Malaysia was not as prominent as it was during, and after, the 1997/1998 financial crisis. Thus, this period could be considered as the period during which guidelines on the structure of the board of directors were not yet available in Malaysia. The findings, generally, suggest that neither board independence, leadership structure nor the joint effects of these two showed any relations with firm performance. Findings of this study, nonetheless, showed that Malaysian companies’ boards were generally dominated by outside directors and the majority of the companies in the study practiced non‐dual leadership structures. Thus, this evidence suggests that the structure of the boards of directors in Malaysia is largely independent of management and the absence of any dominant personality.