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This paper aims to examine the effect of outside chief executive officer (CEO) succession on firm innovation in Chinese companies and to explore the mechanism behind the process. By analyzing the motivation of CEO successors of different origins in the context of selection, this paper identifies the factors affecting outside CEO successors’ decision-making on post-succession firm innovation.

A Poisson regression model is used on a sample of 1,084 firm-year observations taken from Chinese listed companies that endured CEO succession during the period of 2009–2016. Fixed-effect Poisson regression modeling was performed after likelihood ratio and Hausman testing to assess the robustness of the findings.

The results show that outside CEO successions are significantly and negatively associated with post-succession firm innovation. Moreover, the authors found a negative effect of outside CEO succession on post-succession firm innovation when the predecessor has a long tenure or the successor is older.

.This study contributes to the literature on CEO succession, CEO–board relationships and firm innovation by shedding light on how agency, human capital and career-concerning theories in the CEO selection context apply to corporate governance and strategy. Moreover, by exploring the factors influencing CEO successors’ decision-making in terms of firm innovation in the Chinese social and cultural context, this paper identifies ways to promote firm innovation for Chinese companies from the concept of leadership succession.

This paper aims to investigate an interesting yet mostly ignored distinction within external CEO successions: outside successors who have previous CEO experience and those who do not. It examines stock market reaction, compensation and firm performance prior and post‐succession.

The authors used an event study, “Patell Z‐statistic” and “Rank Z‐statistic” to test cumulative abnormal return before and after the successions. They also used probit and OLS regressions to examine firm performance and CEO compensation prior and post‐succession.

The authors find that the stock market reacts positively to the hiring of an outsider who is an exCEO. Compared with firms that hire non‐exCEOs, firms that hire exCEOs had higher debt ratios and greater bankruptcy chances pre‐succession, but post‐succession, these firms still have worse financial performances. Non‐exCEOs come from better performing firms than exCEOs. There is no consistently significant difference in compensation between an exCEO and a non‐exCEO, though the compensation for both increases significantly from that of the predecessors and that of their previous positions.

Future research could focus on the cost‐benefit tradeoff of hiring an exCEO. It would be interesting to examine the role of the board of directors in assessing this cost‐benefit tradeoff and determining the optimal choice for the firm. An important aspect that has not been sufficiently examined in the literature is the CEO fit. Hiring an exCEO may not always be the right choice for the firm. Another area for future research could examine how the post‐succession performance is affected by exCEO tenure in previous CEO position(s) and whether the exCEO worked in several industries or in the same industry.

This paper also has implications for the board of directors. There seems to be a negative transfer of human capital when it comes to hiring exCEOs. The human capital theory suggests that job‐specific experience positively relates to job performance. According to Hamori and Koyuncu, prior CEO experience may “lead to the formation of knowledge corridors and decision‐making templates that make it difficult for individuals to take in inconsistent information or take actions that are different from past ones in a changed context. This, in turn, undermines performance”. Boards of directors should put more effort into considering inside relay successions and should be cautious when hiring an outsider who has prior CEO experience. A best‐of‐both‐worlds scenario may be for boards to hire exCEOs into top executive positions, such as COO and/or president, so as to give them a chance to be groomed for the top position and familiarize themselves with the firm while still benefiting from their prior CEO experience.

There is very little research on the distinction between outside CEOs with previous CEO experience and those with no such experience. This paper tries to shed some light on this important issue in corporate governance in order to explain why boards of directors would hire an outsider with or without previous CEO experience.

This paper aims to investigate the roles of non-CEO inside directors (NCIDs) in the new CEO-firm matching process using the context of unplanned CEO departures when immediate CEO succession planning becomes a sole board responsibility. Although critics argue that inside directors decrease the monitoring effectiveness of a board, inside directors arguably possess superior firm-specific experience and knowledge that can be beneficial during the leadership transition.

The authors use a comprehensive, manually collected data set of unplanned CEO departures from 1993 to 2012.

The authors find that NCIDs play an important role in the CEO transitioning process. They help firms identify qualified inside replacements and provide stability as the new permanent or interim CEO. In addition, NCIDs facilitate the transfer of information and help the new external CEOs succeed. They show that the longer the NCID stays with the company, the longer the tenure of the new CEO. They also document that the presence of NCIDs improves operating and stock performance; especially when the new CEO is hired from outside of the firm.

The impact of NCIDs is particularly important when the firm hires an outsider as the new CEO. These results suggest that board composition affects frictions in the CEO labor market.

The literature has predominantly focused on the downside of having inside directors. Too many inside directors on a firm’s board is often associated with ineffective boards and entrenchment. To the contrary, the authors focus on a potential benefit of having inside directors.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of the splintered chief executive officer (CEO) succession literature and provide a unifying future research agenda.

This review content analyzes 227 relevant articles published after 1994. These articles examine the causes, process, replacement, and consequences of CEO succession.

The review develops a comprehensive typology, identifies gaps in the literature, and proposes opportunities for future research. For instance, the CEO succession literature can be classified along four primary dimensions: when, how, who, and consequences. These four primary dimensions are further explained by ten secondary factors and 30 tertiary components. Research opportunities include: enlarging the data pool to expand the repertoire of firms studied, incorporating the CEO’s perspective, and integrating CEO succession research with literatures in selection, turnover, and human capital theory.

Through integrating research across research domains, future research will be able to better predict when CEO succession will occur, how to avoid unwanted CEO succession, how to better implement CEO succession, and how to minimize negative aspects and maximize positive aspects of CEO succession for the firm and the CEO, as well as understand the consequences of CEO selection, and help move toward and understanding of how to prevent poor performance, and retain high performing CEOs.

This is the first comprehensive review since 1994. It creates a typology to guide and categorize future research, and shows ways to incorporate relevant, but often ignored literatures (e.g. human resources, psychology, decision making, and human capital).

The purpose of this paper is to examine operational and stock performance changes around forced CEO turnovers caused by conflicts between corporate boards and CEOs over the strategic direction of the firm. In addition, the authors investigate whether changes in performance can be explained by board, CEO, or firm characteristics.

The authors apply propensity score matching to choose matching firms that do not forced CEO turnover but have similar characteristics with the sample firms. The authors compare their operating and stock performances. The authors apply both univariate analysis and multivariate regression analyses.

The authors find that the CEO turnovers caused by conflicts between corporate boards and CEOs over the strategic direction of the firms tend to be preceded by significant declines in a firm’s operating and stock performance and that corporate performance improves after turnovers. In addition, the authors find that an increase in long-term incentives and firm size and a decrease in turnover improve firm performance.

While the existing corporate governance literature emphasizes oversight as the main role of the board of directors and identifies the CEO as the leader who sets the strategic direction of the firm, in cases of conflict-induced forced CEO turnover, it is the board that sets the strategic direction. This paper is the first to provide evidence regarding the implications of conflict-induced forced CEO turnovers.

This paper aims to explore the effect of hiring outside chief executive officers (CEOs) on restaurant performance. As outside CEOs have a mandate to bring changes but lack internal knowledge, this study expected that outside CEOs impose a significant influence on restaurant performance. It was further expected that the relationship is substantially moderated by franchising and recession.

The CEO data was manually collected from firms’ annual filings and the EXECOMP database. The COMPUSTAT database was used for company financial data. A two-way panel regression was used to examine the proposed relationships.

The results revealed that outside CEOs have a positive effect on growth but a negative effect on restaurant profitability. It was further turned out that franchising significantly moderates the outside CEO-performance relationship. However, the moderating effect of recession turned out to be insignificant.

The results suggested that outside CEOs play a critical role in determining restaurant performance. The results further imply that franchising helps to maximize the positive effect of outside CEOs while mitigating the adverse effects of outside CEOs.

This study is one of the first to examine the effect of outside CEOs in the hospitality context. Moreover, this study extended the literature by revealing the relationship in the restaurant industry and highlighting the importance of long-term organizational context.

This study aims to investigate how new CEOs’ previous experiences in other organizations and other industries create value in acquisitions. Drawing on the upper echelon perspective, this study theorizes that the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs is positively associated with acquisition performance and, in particular, that the multi-industry experience of new CEOs leads to better performance in diversifying acquisitions than in related acquisitions. While new CEOs without multiorganizational experience undergo a cognitive entrenchment in firm-specific experience, new CEOs with multiorganizational experience can lead acquisitions with more flexibility and agility.

Acquisition and organizational data were drawn from the US manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) between 2008 and 2010. The event study method was used to test hypotheses. In 346 acquisitions made by 139 firms, acquisition performance was measured according to cumulative abnormal returns.

Consistent with the hypotheses, the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs was positively associated with acquisition performance and, in particular, the multi-industry experience of new CEOs led to better performance in diversifying acquisitions than in related acquisitions.

This paper contributes to the CEO literature and acquisition literature by suggesting that the multiorganizational experience of new CEOs can be a valuable source of competitive advantages, particularly when implementing corporate strategies involving interorganizational integration processes.

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context.

Reviews the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoints practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

Why do firms change their boss? There, of course, numerous reasons why this happens, and almost none of them are admitted publicly when it happens. Some bosses are there today, and then gone tomorrow, and while the hastily issued press release from the firm in question cites a desire for the previous incumbent to spend more time with their family, this is usually code for ‘he was fired.’ Other bosses may leave more publicly, but the real reasons remain buried – although consecutive sets of poor financial results and a spiraling share price usually point to the real reasons.

The briefing saves busy executives and researchers hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and easy-to-digest format.

The paper aims to study the effect of tenure on the structure of CEO compensation. The relation between CEO compensation and CEO tenure provides a good testing bed for many effects: the managerial power effect, the portfolio consideration effect, the learning effect, and the career concern effect.

Tobit regressions were run of the percentage of equity‐based compensation on CEO tenure and the effect of tenure compared between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.

It was found that the percentage of equity‐based compensation increases during the early years of tenure for outside CEOs, and decreases during the later years of tenure for inside CEOs. Before they are tenured, outside CEOs have significantly higher and faster growing percentage of equity‐based compensation than inside CEOs. Furthermore, the portfolio consideration effect and the learning effect are the major effects in explaining the effect of tenure on the compensation structure.

The evidence that boards of directors take into account the CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives, the types of CEOs, and their years on tenure to adjust the structure of CEO compensation indicates that firms should, and do, try to optimize their CEO compensation structure on the basis of firm‐specific or CEO‐specific characteristics. It is suggested that there is no simple formulaic approach to governance reform.

The paper contributes to the literature by studying and explaining the different patterns of compensation structure over CEO tenure between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the market reaction to the appointments of chief executive officers (CEOs) in companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The authors focussed on the relationship between the characteristics of a newly appointed CEO and the shareholders’ reactions to the appointment of a CEO.

To measure shareholder reaction, the authors apply an event study methodology. The determinants of reaction are identified on the basis of multi-regression analysis.

The results reveal a negative market reaction to all CEO appointments, both new appointments and reappointments. Investor reaction is driven more by the financial condition of the company, the company’s market performance and the free float, than by the characteristics of a newly appointed CEO. Neither the origins and generation (age) nor the gender of a CEO influence share prices. The relationship between the educational background of a CEO and shareholders’ reactions is mixed. Furthermore, the appointment of an inexperienced CEO seems to be preferred by investors.

The study is restricted by certain limitations related to the adopted measures, the single-market research, data gaps and the selection of variables for regression analysis. A further cross-country study including Central and Eastern Europe and/or the transition economies of the Baltic Region is recommended. The relationship between the operating performance of a firm and its internal control mechanisms could be explored.

The findings might influence the decisions made by company owners and supervisory boards when appointing top executives, and might contribute to a better understanding of how CEO appointments can affect shareholder value creation. The results also provide important guidelines for institutions that oversee the financial system.

The findings of this study are expected to the findings are expected to contribute to the literature on the empirical analysis of the shareholder wealth effect, on signalling theory, on the phenomenon of information asymmetry and on corporate governance. The study covers a full economic cycle of the capital market, including the financial crisis and financial bubbles, and it fills a gap in the research regarding emerging markets and transition economies in Europe.