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The “Battle in Seattle” has been credited with giving birth to a new, more radical phase in transnational social movement organizing; yet evidence suggests it may be…
The “Battle in Seattle” has been credited with giving birth to a new, more radical phase in transnational social movement organizing; yet evidence suggests it may be misleading to speak of “global” social movements. In Seattle in 1999, the contribution of transnational movement organizations was quite modest compared with that of conventional, nationally based interest groups that focused on local resource mobilization and ideational preparation. This suggests that the basis of the new “global” social movements may be the well-established process of resource mobilization by which organized interest groups provide support for local activist communities.
Reconsiders tax reform and economic emancipation of women withrespect to public policy formation in The Netherlands. In particular,investigates the attempts of organised…
Reconsiders tax reform and economic emancipation of women with respect to public policy formation in The Netherlands. In particular, investigates the attempts of organised interest groups of the Dutch women′s liberation movement during the 1980s to influence the public policy process on tax form. The theory of public choice is applied as a theoretical framework for this case study of The Netherlands. The analysis starts with an overview of the issues at stake in the tax reform debate in The Netherlands. Organised women′s interest groups have a specific viewpoint on these issues. These viewpoints are expressed in the public policy process by various lobby mechanisms and political arenas in the Dutch political‐economic system. The attempts to influence these mechanisms and arenas in favour of women′s interests appear to have been rather unsuccessful in the 1980s. The Dutch policy process can be characterised by the so‐called “barrier model”. Various barriers in the Dutch policy process offer an explanation for the relative failure of the organised women′s interest groups to influence the tax reform process in The Netherlands. This explanation may also be valid for similar cases in other West European countries, where the same issues of tax reform and women′s emancipation are at stake and where the public policy process has the same characteristics. Finally, formulates some policy recommendations to overcome the barriers in the public policy process on tax reform.
The “economic” (Chicago School) theory of regulationfails to explain many important features of regulatory history in theUSA, such as the periodicity of regulatory…
The “economic” (Chicago School) theory of regulation fails to explain many important features of regulatory history in the USA, such as the periodicity of regulatory innovation, the role of the organized consumer movement, and the roots of reform, including deregulation. J.Q. Wilson′s political theory of regulation accounts for these phenomena when interpreted in historical context. The widely‐held social values of Wilson′s theory are identified with the values articulated by the consumer movement. This theory suggests that regulation can indeed serve the public interest as understood from the perspective of consumerist values.
This paper develops a new theory arguing that party change results from ruptures in political parties’ ties to civil society organizations. I demonstrate the utility of…
This paper develops a new theory arguing that party change results from ruptures in political parties’ ties to civil society organizations. I demonstrate the utility of this approach by using it to explain why the Rhode Island Democratic Party (RIDP) changed from a hierarchical machine to a porous political field occupied by multiple interlegislator cliques and brokered by extra-party political organizations and professionals. While others attribute party change to bureaucratization, electoral demand, or system-level changes, I analyze historical, observational, and interview data to find that a severance in the RIDP’s relationship with organized labor prompted party change by causing power to diffuse outward as leadership lost control over nominations and the careers of elected office holders. In the spaces that remained, interest groups and political professionals came to occupy central positions within the party field, serving as brokers of the information and relationships necessary to coordinate legislative activity. This analysis refines existing theories of party change and provides a historically-grounded explanation for the institutionalization of interest groups and political professionals in American party politics.
This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of…
This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in the field. The paper discusses the origins of the field and the roles of nonmarket strategy. The political economy framework is used and contrasted with the current form of the resource-based theory. The paper argues that research should focus on the firm level and argues that the strategy of self-regulation can be useful in reducing the likelihood of challenges from private and public politics. The political economy perspective is illustrated using three examples: (1) public politics: Uber, (2) private politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup, and (3) integrated strategy and private and public politics: The Fast Food Campaign. The paper concludes with a discussion of research issues in theory, empirics, and normative assessment.
This paper presents and discusses the rent‐seeking process that occurred during Franco's regime in Spain (1939‐1975). Once the Civil War (1936‐1939) was over, those who…
This paper presents and discusses the rent‐seeking process that occurred during Franco's regime in Spain (1939‐1975). Once the Civil War (1936‐1939) was over, those who won the war (militiaman, right‐wing factions) took control of the key positions in the new government. That meant the transfer of rents from the budget to veterans of war and their relatives, fuelled by the creation of an increasingly strong and well‐organised interest group. The author takes a public‐choice approach and is inspired by a similar study by R. Holcombe on the American Civil War.
We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their…
We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation of contributions to state legislators as if seeking to purchase influence over regulatory policy. We find that interests respond defensively to contributions from rivals, take into account the configuration of support available to them in both the legislature and the regulatory commission, and vary their contributions according to variations in relative costs for influence by different legislatures. This strategic behavior supports a theory that commercially motivated interests contribute campaign resources in order to mobilize legislators to influence the decisions of regulatory agencies. We also report evidence that restrictions on campaign finance do not affect all interests equally. The paper therefore provides positive evidence on the nature and effects of campaign contributions in regulated industries where interest group competition may be sharp.
Political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europehave created both the preconditions as well as the need for thetransition from the old to a new economic…
Political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have created both the preconditions as well as the need for the transition from the old to a new economic order. In the absence of any ready substitute, the institutional vacuum which arose plunged the majority of these countries into economic chaos and anarchy. A way of arresting this continuing drift towards chaos and political discontent is not to be found by striving for the reintroduction of laissez‐faire. A new stable economic order can be established only on the precepts of a just society. Suggests two alternatives delegating decision making in the sphere of economics to groups and formations outside parliament, or establishing a socially reponsible free market economy. The transition process probably would go through the phases: from plan to anarchy to group control to legally constrained market control.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretically informed analysis of a struggle for power over the regulation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social…
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretically informed analysis of a struggle for power over the regulation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social and environmental accounting and reporting (SEAR) within the European Union.
The paper combines insights from institutional theory (Lawrence and Buchanan, 2017) with Vaara et al.’s (2006) and Vaara and Tienar’s (2008) discursive strategies approach in order to interrogate the dynamics of the institutional “arena” that emerged in 2001, following the European Commission’s publication of a Green Paper (GP) on CSR policy and reporting. Drawing on multiple sources of data (including newspaper coverage, semi-structured interviews and written submissions by companies and NGOs), the authors analyse the institutional political strategies employed by companies and NGOs – two of the key stakeholder groupings who sought to influence the dynamics and outcome of the European initiative.
The results show that the 2001 GP was a “triggering event” (Hoffman, 1999) that led to the formation of the institutional arena that centred on whether CSR policy and reporting should be voluntary or mandatory. The findings highlight how two separate, but related forms of power (systemic and episodic power) were exercised much more effectively by companies compared to NGOs. The analysis of the power initiatives and discursive strategies deployed in the arena provides a theoretically informed understanding of the ways in which companies acted in concert to reach their objective of maintaining CSR and SEAR as a voluntary activity.
The theoretical framework outlined in the paper highlights how the analysis of CSR and SEAR regulation can be enriched by examining the deployment of episodic and systemic power by relevant actors.