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Recent high profile U.S. corporate collapses have their counterparts in other international markets, such as Australia. The corporate governance failures that led to major corporate collapses in both countries are strikingly similar, despite differences in their respective corporate governance systems. In this paper, I present an examination of the corporate governance failures that led to the demise of three prominent Australian firms in 2001 and illustrate that the corporate governance failures are not limited to the existing corporate governance system in the United States. I will also outline the various corporate governance reforms that were established to restore investor confidence.

John McGee's 1958 paper, “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case,” has had an astonishing influence on both antitrust policy in the United States and economic lore. McGee argued that predatory pricing is irrational and his analysis of the Standard Oil Company Matter, decided in 1911, led him to conclude that the Record in this case does not show that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing. This single publication appears to serve as a foundation of the U.S. Supreme Court's position on the issue of predatory pricing, as well as the assertion by many economists that predatory pricing is irrational and rarely occurs.

Numerous arguments have been advanced during the past 25 years that predatory pricing can be a rational strategy. As to McGee's empirical findings, there has been no re-examination of the Record of the Standard Oil case to determine the validity of his finding that the trial “Record” does not support the claim that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing.

We examined this Record and have found that the trial Record contains considerable evidence of predatory pricing by Standard Oil. Therefore, the Record does not support McGee's conclusion that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing.

Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years, as well as the opinions of many economists, concerning predatory pricing are not consistent with either current theory or the empirical record.

This chapter explores the link between virtue and representational faithfulness in making judgments in a principles-based environment. The motivation for the chapter is the impending adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the United States and its principles-based approach to accounting. Even in a rules-based system, there are principles that provide a foundation for making decisions about the selection and implementation of accounting standards, financial statement presentation, estimates, and the sufficiency of evidence. A model is presented that reflects these judgments informed by virtue considerations that support substance over form decisions and a true and fair view. Implications for accounting education are discussed including the readiness of faculty to incorporate IFRS into the curriculum.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This chapter explicates inter-firm governance mechanisms and suggests employing similar approaches for managing corporate governance issues in an Islamic business setting. A number of theoretical approaches outline the motivation of business firms to choose between contractual versus non-contractual governance mechanisms in inter-firm business transactions. In addition, a number of socioeconomic and transactional factors also affect inter-firm governance choices. Obviously, a number of country-specific transactional elements affect corporate governance. Therefore, the chapter suggests that preferences for governance mechanisms may provide guidelines for corporate governance, particularly in an Islamic business context.

The measurement of non-financial assets that are held for their service potential rather than for a financial return can be challenging in the public sector. In some cases, the information is not available about the historical cost for the initial measurement and there is not an active market neither that could allow inferring a value for those non-financial assets. In response to this problem, this chapter analyses the newly developed measurement base current operational value (COV) to measure assets in the public sector. This measurement base is part of the proposals in Exposure Draft (ED) 76 – Conceptual Framework Update: Chapter 7, Measurement of Assets and Liabilities in Financial Statements, and ED 77 – Measurement. This chapter was developed using evidence obtained through participant observation to the IPSASB meetings from the authors and the desk analysis of the comment letters (CLs) to the ED 76 and ED 77. The findings from this study reveal that comparability is a major concern of the stakeholders. The CLs also highlighted the need for further guidance on a number of issues and suggested the way forward for the future standard-setting process that address the concerns identified in the proposed COV.