Search results
1 – 10 of over 1000Most prior studies investigating determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofit hospitals ignore how managerial ability affects compensation. This study aims to examine whether…
Abstract
Purpose
Most prior studies investigating determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofit hospitals ignore how managerial ability affects compensation. This study aims to examine whether CEOs with greater ability to manage corporate resources efficiently receive more payment in nonprofit hospitals.
Design/methodology/approach
This study employs a sample of 764 observations from 85 Pennsylvania nonprofit hospitals for the period 2010–2020.
Findings
This study finds a positive and statistically significant association between managerial ability and CEO compensation. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability.
Practical implications
The measure of managerial ability proposed in this study could be used by boards of directors to quantify, evaluate and benchmark CEO ability. The results are also relevant to policymakers, stakeholders and the public interested in understanding the determinants of CEO compensation in nonprofits.
Originality/value
This study is among the first to use a more precise measure of managerial ability, which captures the unobserved manager-specific aspects of CEO ability. In addition, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that CEO's ability to manage hospital resources efficiently plays an essential role in designing executive compensation contracts.
Details
Keywords
Madhur Bhatia and Rachita Gulati
The purpose of the paper is to explore the long-run impact of board governance and bank performance on executive remuneration. More specifically, the study addresses two…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of the paper is to explore the long-run impact of board governance and bank performance on executive remuneration. More specifically, the study addresses two objectives. First, the authors investigate the long-run relationship between pay and performance hold for the Indian banking industry. Second, the authors explore the moderating role of the board in explaining the relationship between executive pay and performance.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses multivariate panel co-integration approaches, i.e. fully modified and dynamic ordinary least square, to explain the co-integrating relationship between executive pay, governance and performance of Indian banks. The analysis is conducted for the period from 2005 to 2018.
Findings
The results of co-integration tests reveal a long-run relationship between executive pay, board governance and bank performance. The long-run estimates produce evidence in favour of the dynamic agency theory, suggesting that the implications of asymmetric information can be mitigated by associating the current executive pay with the bank performance in the previous periods. The finding of this study reveals that improvements in the board quality serve as a monitoring tool to constrain excessive pay and moderate the executives’ pay. Furthermore, the interaction of performance and board governance negatively impacts pay, supporting a substitution approach. It implies that setting optimal pay packages for executives necessitates enhanced and efficient board governance practices.
Practical implications
The study recommends significant policy implications for regulators and the board of directors that executive pay significantly responds to the bank’s performance and good board governance practices in the long run.
Originality/value
This paper provides novel evidence of long-run pay-performance-governance relation using a panel co-integration approach.
Details
Keywords
Faraj Salman Alfawareh, Edie Erman Che Johari and Chai-Aun Ooi
This paper aims to investigate the effect of governance mechanisms and firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in relation to the Jordanian business…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the effect of governance mechanisms and firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in relation to the Jordanian business environment. This study also examines the moderating role of gender diversity.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample is drawn from the annual reports of 68 Jordanian firms between 2015 and 2019. This paper uses the ordinary least square regression. It also uses the generalised method of moments approach to control any endogeneity issue and analyses the data in depth. In addition, it uses a dynamic model to address concerns regarding causality in the study’s models.
Findings
The results show that governance mechanisms and firm performance have an impact on CEO compensation. Furthermore, the outcomes indicate that gender diversity significantly and positively moderates the association between firm performance and CEO compensation. These findings enhance and support agency theory in the context of Jordan.
Practical implications
The study’s results have significant implications for policymakers, shareholders, investors, academicians and the public in the developing Jordanian market. The findings also support more monitoring and inspection to prevent the occurrence of opportunistic management behaviour and ensure that CEO remuneration packages are appropriately designed.
Originality/value
This study provides a unique understanding by explaining the impact of governance and performance on CEO compensation in a developing country such as Jordan. Besides that, the current study extends prior studies in Jordan significantly.
Details
Keywords
Ahmed Bouteska, Taimur Sharif and Mohammad Zoynul Abedin
Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms…
Abstract
Purpose
Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.
Findings
The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.
Practical implications
The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.
Originality/value
The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.
Details
Keywords
Jooh Lee, Kyungyeon (Rachel) Koh and Eunsup Daniel Shim
This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial…
Abstract
Purpose
This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial services industry. Considering that financial firms can inflict systemic shocks across the economy, it has been argued that they must conduct ethical and sustainable business in accordance with ESG principles. This study examines whether ESG efforts are beneficial to managers.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use CEO compensation and ESG performance ratings data for all US financial firms (SIC 6000–6799) from 2015 to 2019. Employing fixed effects regressions, the authors test whether lagged ESG performance is related to CEO compensation, after controlling for other firm characteristics such as size, financial performance, leverage and CEO stock ownership.
Findings
The authors find that lagged ESG ratings are strongly associated with all forms of compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in the composite ESG rating is associated with a 14%–16% increase in the total pay. Among the three ESG pillars, only S (social) and G (governance) exhibit persistent and significant associations with both short- and long-term executive pay. The authors also document the significant moderating effects of ESG on the relationships among firm performance, size, leverage, ownership and executive pay, identifying how ESG is associated with compensation.
Originality/value
The authors conclude that managers receive ESG incentives implicitly and explicitly. The novel finding of direct and indirect associations between ESG and top executive compensation contributes to the growing ESG literature on the financial sector and ongoing debate about the explicit inclusion of ESG targets in compensation design.
Details
Keywords
Mark Brosnan, Keith Duncan, Tim Hasso and Janice Hollindale
It has been two decades since the first academic paper shone a spotlight on non-GAAP earnings. The past 20 years of research investigates concerns over the misuse of these…
Abstract
Purpose
It has been two decades since the first academic paper shone a spotlight on non-GAAP earnings. The past 20 years of research investigates concerns over the misuse of these disclosures and resulted in some significant changes to accounting and reporting standards across the globe. This paper aims to document the history of non-GAAP reporting and outline the emerging themes of the now matured practice of non-GAAP reporting.
Design/methodology/approach
This systematic literature review searches two popular databases to identify the academic publications relating to non-GAAP reporting between 2002 and 2022. The paper uses bibliographic mapping to present the key statistics of the non-GAAP reporting field of research.
Findings
The non-GAAP reporting environment started out as the “wild West’ but, through regulation and public awareness, emerged as an important supplement to the traditional outputs of financial reporting. Current consensus is recent non-GAAP earnings are informative to users but there is lack of research into qualitative non-GAAP disclosures and the vast body of archival research needs triangulating with more experimental studies.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature by documenting the past 20 years of non-GAAP reporting and identifying the important existing and emerging research areas concerning non-GAAP earnings disclosures.
Details
Keywords
Stephen J. Perkins and Susan Shortland
Drawing on institutional theory, this study aims to analyse the regulation of executive remuneration as espoused in the United Kingdom (UK) codified corporate governance…
Abstract
Purpose
Drawing on institutional theory, this study aims to analyse the regulation of executive remuneration as espoused in the United Kingdom (UK) codified corporate governance principles, focussing on sources of advice to decision-makers, the nature of the advice sought and given, and interaction of those involved in the process.
Design/methodology/approach
A qualitative research design was used. Data were assembled from interviewing non-executive board/remuneration committee members; institutional investors; external remuneration consultants and internal human resources (HR)/reward specialists. Results were analysed in accordance with the Gioia technique.
Findings
Tensions inherent in the interpretation of corporate governance codes are illustrated. Emphasis on independent advice combined with constraints on decision-makers' capacity to navigate the nuances of a complex field and reputational concerns risks standardised instead of bespoke remuneration approaches aligned with corporate contexts.
Practical implications
There is a role for internal HR advisors to add value through their potential to reduce the gap within remuneration committees between institutional contexts and independent decision-making, facilitating more strategic human resource management inspired executive remuneration.
Originality/value
Application of institutional theory indicates the relevance of balancing external with internal sources to secure advice that is horizontally and vertically aligned within an organisation to meet the letter and spirit of corporate governance norms. Extending the explanatory power of institutional theory, care is needed though not to overlook the normative underpinnings of professional advisors' own value sets.
Details
Keywords
Muhammad Farooq, Muhammad Imran Khan and Amna Noor
The current study aims to investigate the impact of firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration in the context of an emerging market, i.e. Pakistan. Further…
Abstract
Purpose
The current study aims to investigate the impact of firm performance on chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration in the context of an emerging market, i.e. Pakistan. Further, the interactive effect of financial constraints is investigated in the pay–performance relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
The study's sample includes 173 non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange. This study covers the years 2010–2019. The CEO compensation of the sample firms is measured in terms of salary and bonuses, perquisites and stock options paid to the CEO, whereas firm profitability is measured by return on assets, return on equity, Tobin's Q (Q) and earnings per share. The KZ Index measures the degree of financial constraint. The fixed effect model (FEM) and system GMM estimation techniques were used to conclude the study's findings. In addition, to test the robustness of the results, the authors computed the level of financial constraints using the WW Index.
Findings
The findings show that firm performance has a significant positive impact on CEO compensation in all profitability measures except Tobin's Q. Further financial constraints have a significant negative impact on CEO compensation. The interactive variables of FC with all profitability measures have a significant negative impact on CEO compensation.
Originality/value
This study examines the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. Furthermore, the current study expanded the analysis by incorporating the role of financial constraints in the pay–performance relationship, which has not previously been tested, particularly in the context of an emerging market.
Details
Keywords
Peng Huang and Yue Lu
The purpose of the study is to examine the relation between board structure and firm performance variability in an international setting. The authors further explore the effect of…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of the study is to examine the relation between board structure and firm performance variability in an international setting. The authors further explore the effect of national culture in shaping such relations.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors’ international sample contains 4,911 firms across 49 countries over the 2002–2017 period. The authors use national culture values on individualism and power distance developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001, 2011). The authors focus on within-firm, over-time variability of firm performance and estimate multivariate linear regressions with fixed effects. The authors address the endogeneity concern using the instrumental variable approach, and the authors’ results are robust to alternative measures of variables and different subsamples.
Findings
The authors find that firms with larger board size, greater board independence and less powerful CEOs have less variable performance. Individualism has a magnifying effect while power distance has a mitigating effect in shaping such relations.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to answer the call of Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for research on corporate boards in an international setting. It is also one of the few studies which examine the variability of firm performance, while the majority of existing literature focuses on the level of firm performance. Most importantly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the role of national culture in shaping boardroom interactions that affect the decision-making process of corporate boards, which, in turn, affects firm performance variability.
Details
Keywords
Chenhao Li, Huanan Sun and Qian Zhang
The purpose of this study is to explain the following questions: First, whether the executive equity incentive has an impact on enterprise innovation and digital transformation;…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to explain the following questions: First, whether the executive equity incentive has an impact on enterprise innovation and digital transformation; Second, if there is any influence, whether there is difference between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in the research conclusions; Third, whether the digital transformation of enterprises has had an intermediary effect between executive equity incentive and enterprise innovation; Fourth, whether the proportion of independent directors in the corporate governance mechanism has a regulatory effect.
Design/methodology/approach
In the context of China's promotion of “digital China” construction and high-quality development of economic innovation, this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2011–2019 as a sample, empirically studies the linear and nonlinear relationship between executive equity incentive and enterprise digital transformation and innovation, and further considers the regulatory effect of heterogeneous property rights and the proportion of independent directors, with a view to improving the reform of China's enterprise equity incentive system make contributions to enterprise innovation and digital transformation.
Findings
The results show that executive equity incentive has a positive role in promoting enterprise digital transformation and innovation, and enterprise digital transformation has a positive role in promoting enterprise innovation; Digital transformation of enterprises has a partial intermediary effect between executive equity incentive and enterprise innovation.
Originality/value
First, it expands the research on the economic consequences of enterprise salary incentive system. Second, it expands the research on the specific role path of enterprise digital economy transformation. Third, provide new ideas for the reform of corporate governance mechanism.
Details